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ABSTRACT I-X" 
The Lebanese civil war is, undoubtedly, one of the most protractýd civil wars that 
has ever been witnessed in the last two decades. Many interventions have occurred in 
Lebanon and most of them were the subject of discussion and legal analysis. Of all 
these interventions, the Syrian intervention has attracted no academic or scholarly 
attention whatsoever. It is the main concern of the present thesis to discuss the 
Lebanese civil war and the legality of the Syrian intervention under the rules of 
international law. It specifically and exclusively focuses on the Syrian intervention 
during the years 1975-1976. 
In evaluating the Syrian intervention, of necessity, the thesis discusses in the first 
and second chapters the norm of non-intervention, the definition of intervention, and 
the attitudes and practices of the Superpowers towards the norm of non-intervention. 
Moreover, it provides a thorough review of the history of Lebanon, the causes of the 
conflict, and the legal nature of the conflict. 
Having identified the nature of the Lebanese conflict, the rest of the thesis deals 
with the legality of the Syrian intervention under the rules of international law which are 
applicable to internal conflict. Ile discussion of Syrian intervention is dealt with from 
four legal perspectives: intervention under the rebels' invitation; humanitarian 
intervention; Lebanese government's invitation, and the effect of invitation on the 
Lebanese right to self-determination; and finally the legitimization of Syrian intervention 
through its inclusion in the peace keeping force of the Arab League. 
The out come of the discussion establishes the illegality of the Syrian intervention 
and the ineffectiveness of regional organizations, namely the Arab League, in 
N 
responding to civil war. It also proves that, so long as the norm of non -intervention is 
not respected by powerful states, small states will be encouraged to break the norm and 
undertake intervention; and unless the international community responds positively to 
the norm of non-intervention, anarchy will be the prevailing norm with serious 
implications for the survival of mankind in the era of nuclear weapons. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
The Syrian intervention in the Lebanese civil war has turned out to be one of the 
most protracted interventions in the twentieth century, and at the time of writing this 
thesis it had already reached its fifteenth year anniversary. Yet it has escaped even a 
scant analysis and evaluation. Although the political analyses of that intervention are 
numerous, nevertheless from a legal perspective, the Syrian intervention has passed 
almost unnoticed. 
The first Syrian intervention began with the first flame of civil war but was 
restricted only to diplomatic activities. By January 1976, the Syrian government 
contemplated its first indirect intervention to influence the outcome of the civil war. 
From that time on, Syria carried out various types of activities, which culminated in the 
direct intervention on the fu-st day of June 1976. Despite the ensuing events that befell 
Lebanon and the various interventions which were undertaken by the Arab-League, 
Israel, and multi-national forces, only Syria has succeeded in keeping its grip on 
Lebanon. 
The Syrian intervention in Lebanon has so far demonstrated a lacuna in the legal 
literature which is regrettable. In the present international system, foreign intervention 
was originally and constantly pursued by Superpowers and powerful states, such as 
France in Africa and China in Vietnam, but rarely contemplated by small states such as 
Syria. It is very enriching for legal literature to evaluate the behaviour of Syria during 
its intervention in 1975-1976. 
Many reasons can be invoked to explain the legal negligence of Syrian intervention. 
Foremost among these is the barrier of Arabic language. Nevertheless, English and 
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French publications on the political and historical event are numerous, but it is still not 
possible to grasp in detail the whole picture without consulting the Arabic documents 
which contain various official statements and the most relevant facts. Other difficulties 
are manifest in the absence of any legal discussion by Syrian officials concerning their 
intervention. The Syrian legal official justification was only detectable through various 
political statements made by the President of Syria, Hafez Assad , and his foreign 
minister, Abed Al Halim Kaddam, and other officials in the ruling Ba'ath party in 
Syria. The unavailability of primary sources necessitated a reliance on secondary 
resources. 
Ile main concern of this research is an analysis of the legality of the Syrian 
intervention during 1975 -1976. Moreover, this study will attempt to fill the lacuna 
concerning the legality of that intervention and provide a better understanding of the 
Syrian intervention in Lebanon. The present study is divided into seven main chapters. 
The first two chapters serve as an introduction to the analysis of the Syrian 
intervention, while the remaining chapters deal with the Syrian justification and legal 
problems thereof. 
In the first Chapter a review is made of the changes that have taken place in the 
international system and also, what constitutes an intervention ? It also deals with the 
norm of non-intervention and the superpowers' attitude towards non intervention. 
In the second Chapter a thorough review of the history of Lebanon, and causes of 
the conflict and identification of parties to the conflict, is undertaken. Moreover, the 
legal nature of the conflict is discussed in order to out line the rules that are applicable. 
Chapter three deals with the Syrian justification as an invitation from the rebels. It 
gives an account of customary and contemporary rules of international law and 
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discusses the Syrian intervention in the light of them. 
Chapter four discusses the Syrian intervention as humanitarian. It throws light on 
the meaning and development of the concept and its validity in contemporary 
international law, and the necessity for criteria with which states conduct could be 
evaluated. 
Chapter five deals with two matters: invitation by the Lebanese government and the 
effect of invitation on the Lebanese right to self determination. As to the former, it 
considers two issues: the validity of the invitation in international law and also in 
Lebanese constitutional law. As to the latter, the origin of the principle of self- 
determination and its present status in contemporary international law is re- examined. 
Chapter six is mainly concerned with the transformation of Syrian forces into a 
peace-keeping force under the auspices of the Arab-League. It re-examines the origin 
of the League, its Pact, and its power to establish a peace keeping force. Moreover, it 
discusses the legality of the two types of Arab peace keeping force: Arab Security Force 
and Arab Detterent Force . The above discussion clarifies the circumstances 
in which 
the Syrian intervention is being legitimized and by implication provides a clear idea 
about Arab-League action in Lebanon. 
Chapter seven provides a general conclusion. It affirms the illegality of the Syrian 
intervention and puts it on an equal footing with similar modes of intervention by thr 
superpowers. Also it draws attention to the fragility of the norm of non-intervention 
vis a vis national interest. 
Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the norm is greatly explicable by the development 
that the international system has undergone since the recognition of the principle and the 
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willingness of national leaders to break the law in order to reap the short- term benefits 
of national interest. 
XVII 
CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL REVIEW TO THE NORM OF NON INTERVENTION. 
I- Inevitability of intervention: An Introduction. 
As the world was recovering from the unforgettable and devastating effect and 
terror of the Second World War, another episode of violence and suffering was being 
ushered in. However, this type of violence is very different from international war 
(which is between states across recognised borders) as it is a war between members of 
certain political communities carried out within the territory and jurisdiction of a state. 
Although this violence was well known years ago, particularly in the 18th and 19th 
century, its present intensity and complexity are unprecedented. Between 1946 and 
1959, the New York Times reported more than one thousand two hundred cases of 
violence ranging from civil war, guerrilla war, coups d'etat, mutinies, to localized 
rioting. (l) Bearing this in mind, one may easily conclude that social violence or civil 
war is a common characteristic of present times. In general, most writers agree that the 
existence of the nuclear deterrent has, by eliminating wars between states with nuclear 
weapons, led to an increase in the occurrence of civil wars and to an escalation within 
such conflicts. However, the danger of nuclear war, with its potential holocaust, has 
never been completely eliminated. Parties to civil war may at some juncture, in order to 
achieve what they consider essential for their survival, resort to nuclear weapons. Ibis 
possibility was well expressed by the American President Nixon, and Senator Douglas: 
"We should not automatically preclude the use of nuclear weapons to end the war in 
Vietnam"-(2) With that, it becomes clear that a war such as was fought in Vietnam has 
the potential to extend beyond the country of origin and to involve other countries 
whose interests are at stake. In such a context, two questions arise: why do civil wars 
escalate to such a point that foreign powers become involved, and why is the 
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occurrence of civil war, particularly in underdeveloped countries, so very frequent ? 
As a matter of fact, the problem is not very simple, and a satisfactory answer cannot 
be given unless one considers the causes of the violence, the nature of the prevailing 
international system, and the inter-relationship between the internal and external causes 
which shape the present intemational system. 
The occurrence of civil war, especially in Third World countries, and its. 
ramification on the international system are very serious. Civil war is no longer an 
isolated event which can be denied international attention. On the contrary, it has 
international implications which make it the focus and the primary concern for those 
who are involved in the maintenance of international peace and order. The 
interrelationship between civil war and the international system is undeniable. It is , 
thus true that internal war no longer takes place only within the internal system but also 
within the international system-(3) The international system has undergone major 
changes since the Second World War, many states have emerged, in the process of 
decolonization, with great expectations and marginal capabilities. Ile major problem 
of these states is simply the lack of cohesion amongst their citizens. This is largely due 
to a variety of factors such as religion, tradition or culture, language and ethnic 
considerations, to any of which the citizens express their loyalty rather than to their 
state. Some governments, in such a context, are generally dominated or monopolized 
by a particular tribe or religious community to the exclusion of others. Thus, the said 
government is inaccessible to a large section of the population, and at the same time it 
denies political rights to certain parties, classes or ethnic groups. (4) Such minority 
governments inevitably lead to dissatisfaction within the country. Furthermore, the 
situation is often exacerbated by the increasingly unequal distribution of wealth which 
leads to a growing belief that only violence could effect an amelioration of the political 
situation. For example, a recent analysis of the national income in Brazil showed that 
the poorest people representing 20 percent of the population, received only 3.5 percent 
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of the national wealth; in Nigeria the poor received only 7 percent of the national 
income where the rich received 60.9 percent. (5) . This wide gross injustice is not by 
any means restricted to the said countries, but it is very common in Third World 
countries with only a few exceptions. This injustice in social welfare, together with the 
exclusion of a large portion of the population from power sharing, creates a sense of 
alienation and frustration. This alienation, due to the absence of any constitutional 
machinery to soften its impact, paves the way for the emergence of a coercive or 
undemocratic government whose survival depends entirely on the control of military 
force and coercive rule. Where both the above factors co-exist, the potential for 
revolution increase dramatically. John Gerrassi's comments support this view 
"from contradiction emerges confrontation, and from confrontation 
eventually surges progress ... no power has ever been too strong, 
no class too thorough, no elite too shrewd, no army too invulnerable 
permanently to suppress the desire for redress by ordinary 
people"(6) 
This, however, does not reflect the wider political backdrop of the ensuing 
revolution. Nowadays, internal struggle for power is hardly achievable without the 
interference of outside states and particularly Superpowers states. Of the many factors 
which are responsible for that, the first is, the division of the world into what could be 
called a bipolar system in which the two Superpowers have divergent ideologies and 
each strives for dominance. However, there are many powerful states in the 
international system, most of them adhering, in one way or another, to the 
superpowers' policies. The second factor is the interdependence of all states in the 
world which, through the advance in modern technology, increases daily. That 
interdependence, in the case of weak states which lack stability and cohesion, increases 
the incidence of intervention to an unprecedented level. The third factor is the stalemate 
in nuclear deterrence. The existence of nuclear weapons makes it impossible for states 
to secure their interest through conquest, as used to be the case, and they resort to 
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intervention- (7) As conventional war is no longer a very profitable enterprise, given 
the presence of nuclear weapons, powerful states resort to the exploitation of the 
internal contradiction in many Third World states as a means of achieving their national 
interest. In view of that, any event that takes place in those countries could hardly 
escape the attention or influence of the superpowers or states that are linked to them 
indirectly-(8) Thus, any revolution which wishes to overthrow an undemocratic and 
tyrannical regime cannot undertake such an option without at least securing some 
support from outside states or, as in most cases, Superpowers. Logically, it follows 
that any change that might take place inside one state may have a negative effect on 
other states. That effect may vary in intensity and scope as the orientation of the regime 
and its strategic importance play a major role in decision-makers' strategy. It looks like 
a zero sum game where any gain to one party would means a loss to the other. 
Therefore, the ideology of the regime and its alignment with an external state would 
guarantee the necessary help that, at some point, might be needed to defend its 
existence against any actual threat whether through internal revolution or subversion. 
This is clearly illustrated in the Superpowers' pattern of intervention, as they in practice 
reserve the right to use force directly to prevent any change in a regime which falls in 
their sphere of influence or bloc. Outside that bloc, and what some describes as " the 
loose bipolar system"(9), superpowers can compete and extend any support to their 
proxy in order to secure their dominance. As such, competitive intervention increases in 
any state which is experiencing a civil war. And since the out-come of civil war is 
uncertain, foreign powers will increase their intervention and commitment to influence 
the out-come of the civil war. 
Therefore, the extent of involvement to which foreign powers commit themselves, 
in a troubled nation, is entirely dependent on the importance of national interest at stake. 
If that interest is vital, foreign powers intervene and rarely give the legal consideration 
serious attention. What now is the norm in international relations is the conviction that 
any revolution which aims at overthrowing a backward or imperialistic regime deserves 
the assistance of socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union and China and other 
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socialist states. In contrast, Western states headed by the United States and its allies 
reserve their right to help any incumbent regime which is threatened by revolution. 'Mis 
kind of unilateral assertion, has been embraced by other states such as African states 
with their declaration to topple the regime of South Africa and the Arab states' 
manifesto proclaiming its intention to overthrow the state of Israel in order to secure the 
right of Palestinians to self deten-nination-(10) In such cases, the rule of law seems to 
give way to policy considerations with the inherent axiom: the best course of action is 
that which protects my interests. And if that is conceded, then the challenge to 
international law is very serious. Not only that, but further development of that self 
interest will make the rule of law irrelevant and ineffective in reducing conflict between 
states and maintaining justice. For states, under the guise of maintaining justice and 
progress, argue that sovereignty is not absolute and community values at some critical 
point have higher priority and command more respect. 0 1) With that, any state could 
claim that its action is in accordance with community values such as self determination 
or the protection of human rights and thus intervene in an internal conflict in which its 
interest was at stake. Whether or not a states action is consistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations is not very relevant since states could use the uncertainty of some of the 
Charter's provisions to defend their action. There are many pretexts that can be used 
ranging from human-right, self determination, treaty obligation, invitation, to counter- 
intervention. Therefore, the prevailing circumstances or environment have accelerated 
the wheel of intervention and with it the spiral of violence. Consequently, an 
intervention becomes the norm and with it the prolongation of the conflict. This 
prolongation ultimately creates an atmosphere of hostility between parties in conflict, 
brings new issues to the surface and draws in uninvolved nations with the possibility of 
polarization of foreign states around internal factions(12) Civil war, arguably, creates 
an incentive for outside intervention. However, the potential danger of civil war 
escalating into an international war is a distinct possibility. With this in mind, civil war 
ought to be looked at not entirely from a domestic perspective, as used to be the case, 
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but from an international one. If it is so, then the legal argument has to be interpreted 
and analysed in the light of the prevailing system in which internal and external factors 
are inseparably linked. As far as the rules of civil war are concerned, the general rule is 
that an external intervention in civil war is illegal. It is so because it violates the rule of 
international law and in particular the most sacred and cherished rule of non- 
intervention. However, there is an ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the precise 
meaning of the word intervention; in other words, what actually constitutes 
intervention?. Moreover, other questions arise regarding the validity of the norm of 
non-intervention, as many states violate it frequently. All these question will be dealt 
with as briefly as possible. In the present chapter an attempt will be made to define 
intervention and to review the norm of non-intervention in the light of states' practice 
which is limited, in this chapter, to the Superpowers. This review will show how the 
norm has been interpreted by the Superpowers ; and the effect of that practice on other 
states, which in this investigation addresses the Syrian intervention in the Lebanese 
civil war. 
Il- The Definition of Intervention 
The increasing occurrence of intervention in inter-state relations has put, in one way 
or another, the term intervention under more extensive analysis and scrutiny than 
before. Intervention is no longer viewed as an ordinary event in international relations 
but rather an action which brings about unpredictable and serious consequences. 
However, the degree of seriousness varies as to whether the change of'a political 
authority is by subversion or by direct intervention. 
The word intervention has several connotations, intervention may either enhance or 
undermine the principle of self determination and may either increase stability or cause 
instability of the international system. No wonder, therefore, that many commentators 
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and officials use the word some times to stigmatize, at other times to justify, certain 
behaviour as legal or illegal. 
As such, the word "intervention" is one of the most ambiguous term in international 
law and politics. It has moral, legal and political connotations. One writer has 
summarized this difficulty by saying: 
" The subject of intervention is one of the most vague branches of 
international law. We are told that intervention is a right; that it is a 
crime; that it is a rule; that it is an exception; that it is never 
permissible at all"-(13) 
The ambiguity which has surrounded the term intervention stems from the fact that 
intervention is not confined to one particular type of behaviour which is agreed upon or 
defined by legal writers and statesmen. This, in turn, creates a consensus amongst 
international writers that there is a pressing need for a definition. That necessity has 
become more urgent in the prevailing international system which is composed of 
sovereign states with great disparities in power and population, as well as with sharp 
ideological differences. In such a system the difficulty which arises is that states, 
especially weak states, are subjected to clandestine interference carried out by 
indigenous people who are linked to, or receiving orders from, more powerful states. 
That pattern of intervention, although illegal, is impossible to detect in some cases and 
this makes the task of formulating a definition very difficult, but at the same time very 
imperative. 
In view of this difficulty, many writers have tried to formulate a precise definition 
which takes into account all the features and variables of intervention. However, so far 
all these attempts have fallen short of success. In fact, there is no uniform agreement 
amongst writers and jurists as to the meaning and content of intervention in 
international relations and law-04) -n1is is largely due to the fact that the term has been 
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used in a variety of senses. Sometimes the term is employed as a legal instrument to 
denote the illegality or legality of certain acts (15) That confusion is notiust limited to 
jurists but has extended to the practice of states as well. In this respect, Lawrence 
points out that: 
it there are few questions in the whole range on international law 
more difficult than those connected with the legality of intervention, 
and few have been treated in a more unsatisfactory manner. An 
appeal to the practice of states is useless: for not only have different 
states acted on different principles, but the action of the same state at 
one time has been irreconcilable with its action on another"-(16) 
Ilerefore, the exact meaning of intervention has not yet been defined. However, it 
must be reiterated that the need to formulate a definition is very important, especially at 
the present time when interventionist activities are soaring to a point when intervention 
has become the norm and the concept of non-intervention is the exception. Although, 
therefore, it is difficult to formulate a specific and satisfactory definition, nevertheless 
an attempt must be made. 
The following attempt toe 
A 
laborate on a definition will be based on two areas; 
firstly, an identification of the form of intervention through the work of international 
writers; secondly, a demonstration that any act can be judged and identified by the end 
to which such an act is directed; Afterwards an attempt will be made to form a link 
between the forms of intervention and the end upon which the legitimacy of the act 
rests, in order to arrive at a definition for intervention. 
A- The form of intervention. 
Intervention indicates a variety of actions and activities carried out by one state 
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within the domain of another state. These actions or activities are not uniform but, on 
the contrary, are varied in form and degree. That is to say, sometimes states intervene 
in indirect ways by lending support to dissatisfied groups in a state. On other 
occasions states resort to direct intervention with the use of force. However, one 
should not hold the belief that every intervention is illegal, for there are interventions 
which are compatible with basic world order policies, such as political independence of 
sovereign states, human rights and the prevention of aggression. Thus, it becomes 
difficult, in view of this, to set a clear-cut fine between various actions in international 
relations by branding one interventionist and the other not. 
The classical international writers tackle the issue of intervention by relying only on 
the theory that interference is illegal whenever involves the use of force. (17) To them, 
intervention is a" dictatorial interference carried out by a state in the affairs of another 
state for the purpose of maintaining or altering the conditions of the things". (18) The 
classical definition of intervention covers two areas: the first is intervention in the 
internal domain of a state, the second in the external affairs of a state. 09) 
There is no doubt that the criterion of force as a means of identifying intervention is 
very valuable but still has many drawbacks. This is partly because of the drastic 
changes in the international system in which intervention takes place render the 
customary definition inadequate. 
In the international system, which is composed of small and large states, there are 
powerful states which by their sheer economic, diplomatic, and military power can 
affect the conduct of the smaller states without using the customary method. of 
dictatorial interference. For instance, by having economic or military aid cut off, some 
small states may experience major difficulties which affect their stability and progress. 
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Thus, with means such as economic aid, subsidies, diplomatic measures,, states 
can coerce others without resort to the traditional method of dictatorial interference. 
Undeniably, for example, this method was employed in Portugal when Western 
financial aid to the Democratic party, who were opposing the Communist party, 
brought the former into power in 1974, without any use of force as defined in 
traditional definition-(20) 
In the present international system, without doubt, that the prevailing pattern is of 
indirect interference which lacks the characteristics of dictatorial interference. This 
pattern evolved largely because of the inability of foreign powers, and Western powers 
in particular, to undertake intervention as used to be the case in the past; the cost of 
such intervention would be very high and would run against western public opinion. 
Therefore, the term "dictatorial interference", as defined by one writer, is both too 
inclusive and exclusive at the same time. (21) It is inclusive because small states regard 
any act by the powerful state as dictatorial due to the implicit threat which is manifested 
in disparities of power between them; and exclusive, because it fails to take into account 
the economic measures and others, short of the use of force into consideration-(22) 
In the light of these difficulties, other writers have adopted a different approach by 
which any influence exerted by one state upon the other in order to force it into certain 
behaviour would be regarded as an intervention so long as there is a sense of 
compulsion-(23) . Ile merit of this criterion, namely "compulsion", is that 
it takes into 
account other variables which the customary definition had failed to include, such as 
economic, diplomatic, propaganda. etc measures. According to the criterion of 
compulsion, if a state's action is accompanied by compulsion, the action becomes 
interventionary, irrespective of the forms in which it is carried out. As is advocated by 
one writer. 
" The essence of intervention is the attempt to compel, for if a state 
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interfering is not disposed to support the interference with some 
form of pressure, it is evident that it is not imposing its will; such 
'pressure 
would consist in placing the state in a position where it 
must submit or face certain consequences if it refuses". 
(24) 
'Ibis approach, although very important, falls short of an comprehensive definition, 
since it relies on the intent of the intervening state which is hardly recognizable in 
certain areas such as international business transaction . 
(25) Other attempts to define 
intervention have been made by identifying two variables of illegal intervention: 
convention-breaking and authority oriented intervention(26) Convention breaking and 
authority oriented intervention could be easily identified " whenever the form of the 
behaviour constitutes a sharp break with the then existing forms, and whenever it is 
directed at changing'or preserving the structure I of political authority in the target 
society"-(27) Although this definition is of great significance, it i's still short on 
precision. During the Spanish civil war, the governments of Italy and Germany 
provided Franco's regime with every assistance to gain power, whereas Britain and 
France, for domestic reasons, abstained from any action. To many writers, this 
behaviour, although not convention breaking or authority oriented, has nevertheless 
been depicted as interventionary as their abstention facilitated Franco supremacy-(28) 
Another example is the Marshal plan, as it was convention breaking and was designed 
to shore up the political authorities of certain countries-(29) However, it would be far 
from true to depict it as interventionary, since it depended entirely on the intent. 
Moreover, the International Monetary Fund is another example of the imprecision of the 
definition, as the IMF is neither convention breaking nor authority oriented, but it has a 
great effect on states policies through its practices. 
All these attempts to define intervention while they are not comprehensive, they do 
nevertheless, clarify the variables by which illegal intervention take place. All these 
variables which could be called the forms of intervention(30) are quite important in 
determining what constitutes interventionary behaviour. However, such forms have no 
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meaning on their own without being linked to the purpose of intervention or what could 
be called here the end of intervention. 
B- The End Of Intervention. 
It is generally assumed that every act performed has by itself an end which 
originally prompted the act. This end is the ultimate aim of the intervening person or 
state. Thus, the end of an intervention does help establish the legality or illegality of the 
act. With this in mind, one could say, intervention is, more or less, a means for a 
designated end which may or may not be legitimate under international law. The end 
which states seek to assert through their intervention is not very ambiguous or 
uncommon. States always intervene either to shore up or to undermine the political 
authority in the target state. In their intervention many justifications are offered all of 
which center on national interest. Morgenthau affu-ms that pattern by saying: 
" [from] the time of ancient Greece to this day, some states intervene 
on behalf of their own interest and against the latter's will Other 
states in view of their interest have opposed such interventions and 
have intervened on behalf of theirs". (31) 
Thus, intervention has always been carried out, with what could be called an 
"external animus"-(32), in order to protect or adjust the conditions of that state of 
affairs which is vital to the intervening state. This is fully demonstrated in American 
and Soviet interventions in different parts of the world under a variety of pretexts-(33) 
It becomes clear that the end of intervention plays an important role in identifying 
the legitimacy of certain interventionary behaviour. An intervention cannot be judged 
only by reference to forms of intervention. Intervention is not confined to a particular 
kind of activity, it is , on the contrary, a spectrum of activities, ranging 
from forceful, 
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non forceful, covert to overt acts. It is only by weighing up the the forms against the 
end that one can decide the legality of an intervention. A working definition of 
intervention could therefore be this: illegal intervention is a convention-breaking and 
coercive act carried out intentionally in the domain of another state in order to alter or 
influence the authority structure of the target state-(34), 
III- The Norm Of Non-Intervention. 
Non-intervention is, nowadays, the predominant principle in international law. It 
underlines the prohibition which forbids states from intervening in other states' affairs. 
It is the by-product of the naturalist writers who identified its importance and insisted 
on its observation. It is Grodus who took the the first step along this path; he perceived 
international society as being composed of sovereign states and also identified an ambit 
for a state within which other states are forbidden to exercise any power-(35) 
Although Grotius failed to go further and identify the norm, his successors, such as 
Wolff and Vattel, succeeded where he failed. 
Wolff's main contribution is in his assertion of states' equality. Basing his 
arguments on the analogy of individuals, he asserts: " By nature all nations are equal 
the one to the other. For nations are considered as individual free persons living in a 
state of nature. Since by nature all men are equal, all nations too are by nature equal the 
one to the other"; and that equality, as with individuals " the moral equality of men has 
no relation to the size of their bodies the moral equality of nations has no relation to the 
number of men of which they are composed, '. (36) From that premise he proceeds to 
assert that no nation has the right to meddle in the affairs of another sovereign. (37) 
Later, Vattel identified the principle of non-intervention more accurately. He relied on 
the above analogy in order to reach the conclusion , by virtue of states' equality and 
independence, that: 
" each has the right to govern itself as it thinks proper and that no 
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one of them has the least right to interfere in the government of 
another. Of all the rights possessed by a Nation, that of sovereignty 
is doubtless the most importante and the one which others should 
most carefully respect if they are desirous not to give cause for 
offence". (38) 
However, many writers who are from the positivist school of thought reach the 
same conclusion, although, they follow a different type of analysis-(39) Writers such 
as G. F Von Martens, James Kent, and Henry Wheaton earnestly and equivocally argue 
that the norm of non-intervention is one of the important pillars upon which the stability 
of the international system is dependent-(40) 
Since the principle of non-intervention has, with the passing of time, been hardened 
and crystallized into customary international law, it has become one of the most basic 
and important principles in international law. It can be argued that in the absence of a 
central authority, which is capable of performing its task impartially in intemational 
society, the principle of non-intervention is expected to fill the gap and creates 
conditions whichi if faithfully observed, would lead to the maintainance of peace and 
would nourish the spirit of co-operation amongst various states. Thus, according to the 
principle of non-intervention, states shall be immune from outside interference and shall 
freely choose whatever political system they desire and conduct their intemal and 
extemal relation as they deem proper. Others suggest that the principle plays a 
stabilizing role by enabling states to communicate to each other their understanding and 
interpretation on any controversial issue-(41) 
Since the basic premise of the principle, therefore, is based on the sovereign 
equality of states and their independence, irrespective of their size or strength, it is 
doubtful whether or not such premise could be expected to operate in the present 
structure of the international system. 
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The repeated violation of the principle has already given rise to the belief that the 
principle is no longer fulfilling its original purpose, or at least, its effectiveness is very 
doubtful. Despite that consistent violation of the principle, however, its existence has 
never been threatened, and its violation urged many writers and state officials to 
reassert it. Winfield pointed out that: 
"... This rule, the pillar upon which the whole fabric of international 
law rests, should require some reasseration when national policy 
was so frequently pursued to the prejudice of international right and 
if the cavalier fashion in which the rule was treated urged Vattel to 
insist more earnestly upon it, its frequent infraction afforded equal 
reason for its restatement by those who followed him. (42) 
'Mis is rightly reafflirmed. by the International Court of Justice in its recent judgment 
in-the Nicarasua case: 
"... though examples of trespass against this principle are not 
infrequent, the Court considers that it is part and parcel of customary 
international law"-(43) 
In view of that assertion, the violation of the principle neither eliminates it nor 
invalidates it by virtue of the fact that rules must be effective and fully observed. 
However, one point needs more clarification: that states, whenever they violate the 
principle, do not do so explicitly and challenge its existence; they usually introduce a 
variety of justifications which indicate that their action is not a violation but rather than 
an action which is consistent with the principles of international law. This kind of 
justification which states often give for their international conduct is very important. If 
a justification, for an act which is usually considered illegal , is then fully approved 
and, what is more, repeated by other states it would be a major challenge to the 
principle of non-intervention and its effectivness. Of the many states in the 
international system, the United States of America and the Soviet Union are the most 
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powerful and dominant. It follows that their behaviour is crucial for the development 
of international law and the principle of non-intervention in particular. Thus, their 
claims or justifications for their interventions are very important, as they set the pattern 
of behaviour in international relations. In the coming section, therefore, a concise 
review of the Superpowers practices will be given in order to demonstrate the legal 
strength of their justification and the prevalent practice in the international system. 
Moreover, this will help in illuminating the consequences of that practice'on other states 
behaviour. 
Therefore, the Syrian intervention in Lebanon will be seen in the light of that 
practice. It is the belief of the present author that small states tend fully to respect the 
law when they feel, for once, that great powers are behaving legally. 
IV- Non-intervention and Sul2erl2owers practices and cla ms. 
A- The Soviet Union: practices and claims. 
The Soviet Union's policy and its orientation has its primary source in the 
philosophy of communism. The very core of that philosophy is based on the notion that 
the concept of nation would be replaced by class. This conviction has not only been on 
the level of theory, but emerged, after the victory of the Revolution, to shape the 
foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and later the international system as a whole. The 
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, proclaimed triumphantly: "I will issue a few 
revolutionary proclamations to the people of the world and then shut the shop". (44) At 
that point the principle of non-intervention had no superiority over other norms, so long 
as there are classes. According to Marxist ideology: 
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"The Marxist theory of morality asserts that moral rules do not 
possess an absolute value either throughout several successive 
historical periods or within the same epoch as long as there subsist 
antagonistic classes. A moral rule is neither perpetual nor 
immovable; it has no universal meaning in a society split up into 
classes"-(45) 
However, this revolutionary spirit and its vigor has been forced to retreat in the face 
of reality. T'he Soviet Union, unable to change the world, has modestly accepted other 
states' existence, with their different ideologies. The principle of co-existence has been 
introduced to illustrate the readiness of the Soviet Union to recognize other states' 
ideologies and the duty of non-interference in their affair. Respect for the principle of 
non-intervention has been asserted by A. Piradov: 
" Without its faithful and consistent observance there can be no 
peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems, no 
disarmament, no assurance of non-aggression, no practice of the 
principle of self-determination, no respect for, or consolidation of , 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations"446) 
Despite that insistence on the absolute respect for the principle of non intervention, 
the Soviet Union has intervened forcibly in many countries, such as Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. In the case of the latter, the Soviet Union has tendered a claim which 
has, particularly, the effect of splitting the principle of non-intervention into two 
categories: intervention in Socialist states and in non-Socialist states. 
The Soviet leaders thought that the events which took place in Czechoslavakia were 
threatening their interest; and thus, they moved into Czechoslovakia to overthrow its 
government. At first they relied, as a justification, on the invitation of the legitimate 
government. However, in the face of mounting denials of any invitation from the 
government, the Soviet Union introduced what later becomes known as the "Brezhnev 
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doctrine". According to that doctrine, the Soviet intervention was not to be considered 
as a violation of the norm of non-intervention for that norm cannot be interpreted in 
isolation from the existing split in the international system. For " from the Marxist point 
of view, the norms of law, including the norms of mutual relations of the socialist 
countries, cannot be interpreted narrowly, formally, and in isolation from the general 
context of class struggle in the modem world .... such a decisive fact of our time as a 
struggle between opposing social systems (Capitalism and Socialism)', (47) Tlus, and 
in view of that interpretation, 'the norm of non-intervention has a new meaning in which 
" the people of the Socialist countries and communist parties certainly do have and 
should have freedom to determine the way'bf advance of their respective countries. 
However, none of their leaders' decisions should damage either Socialism in their 
country or the fundamental interest of other socialist countries, and the whole working 
class movement which is working for socialism"- (48) Thus, by virtue of that 
interpretation, the Soviet Union has practically negated the norm of non-intervention. It 
does so on the basis that such an intervention is mere brotherly assistance from the 
Soviet Union to counter an imperialist intervention which is aimed at bringing the 
Czechoslovaldan people into the circle of imperialism-(49) 
Accordingly, the principle of non-intervention has, as far as the Soviet Union is 
concerned, two meanings: progressive and reactionary- (50) It is progressive whenever 
it is being employed to counter an imperialist plot, and it is reactionary whenever it 
becomes an obstacle in the implementation of that purpose. In the Document of the 
Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union such an 
understanding is explicitly made: 
" In fair weather and foul the people of the socialist countries act 
according to the principle - all for one and one for all. Whoever 
raises his hand against the socialist gains of the people of our 
community will be hurled back by a thousand million builders of 
socialism and communism"- (5 1) 
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Therefore, it becomes clear that the principle of non-intervention is not an absolute 
norm, and its limitation ought to be understood in the inter-relationship between 
socialist countries. 
As to non-intervention in relation with non- socialist states, that is to say outside the 
bloc of Soviet Union, the principle has a different interpretation. The crux of that 
interpretation hangs on the status of national liberation movements. Although the Soviet 
Union recognizes unequivocally the imperative of non-intervention(52), it nevertheless 
permits one exception, namely to assist any national liberation movements. Any 
national liberation movement which wages a just struggle to gain sovereignty and 
freedom, escapes the prohibition of the norm of non-intervention; in its struggle it can 
count on the help of Socialist countries and particularly the Soviet Union-(53) The 
struggle of a national liberation movement and its war are revolutionary and so fall in 
the category of " progressive justified war". (54) Khrushchev confirmed that socialist 
countries have faithfully fought against world wars and local wars which might have 
developed into world war, but the struggle of national liberation movements do not fit 
into this category " because the insurgent people are fighting for the light of self- 
determination, for their social and independent national development". 
(55) 
Consequently the help that should be accorded to national liberation movements is not a 
favour-, rather it is a duty incumbent upon Socialist countries as those countries 
look upon the forces of a national liberation movement not merely 
as temporary fellow-travellers, but rather as allies in the struggle to 
spark the world revolution whose goal is to end all forms of 
oppression, exploitation and inequality. Life has drawn together the 
interests of national liberation movements with world socialism, the 
true friend and warrior for the peoples which have liberated 
themselves from the yoke of colonial subjugation"- (56) 
However, the determination of the people who deserve the assistance of the Soviet 
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Union in their struggle is still arbitrary. In other words, self-detem-dnation is only 
applicable in a situation outside the dominion of the Soviet Union and especially in a 
place where there is no threat to its interest. 71be Soviet Union intervention in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia are still outstanding examples. Moreover, the recent intervention 
in Afghanistan is another clear example of the violation of the norm of non- 
intervention. Although the people of that country wanted to have a different system 
from that identified with the Soviet Union, the latter insisted that it is defending the 
interest of the people of Afghanistan. It furnished more legal justifications: from the 
consent of Afghanistan, self-determination of Afghanistan, to the treaty of Friendship 
and Co-operation signed in December 1978. 
In that respect the head of the Soviet Army and Navy's chief political administration 
affirmed that the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan and Angola is progressive 
since, " Leninist understanding of the defence of revolutionary gains reflect the 
profound international character of insuring the transition of people to socialist and 
communist conditions where international and internal reaction is trying to prevent this 
historic process by force". (57) Moreover, the argument has been extended further to a 
point at which the danger to the revolution in Afghanistan is not only a threat to the 
Afghan people but to Russians as well-(58) Therefore, by intervening in such a 
manner, the norm of non-intervention is not being broken, nor does such an 
intervention go against the prohibition stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations. 
Summing up , the Soviet Union's approach to the norm of non-intervention has 
developed to the point where the norm has already been stripped of its legal character 
and subordinated to the rhetoric of ideology and expediency. The Soviet Union has 
consistently used the principle as a vehicle for expansion, and at the same time, 
protection. On the one hand, when the Soviet Union in its infancy was weak and 
subjected to foreign interference, an appeal was made to, the principle of non 
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intervention to halt such interference (59); on the other hand, when the Soviet Union 
became one of the Superpowers, an appeal was made to the ideology to negate or at 
least undermine the very principle they once held so strongly. 
As a whole, and as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the principle has already 
two functions: firstly, it does not apply in the domain of Socialist countries, and 
secondly, outside Socialist states, the principle does not apply to the struggle of people 
who wage a just war under the banner of national liberation movement. With such an 
attitude, the principle is no longer functioning according to its proper and original 
purposes; rather it is providing an outlet by which the Soviet Union can prevent any 
defection from its camp and at the same time can interfere in other nations' affairs under 
the flexible concept of national liberation movement. This auto-interpretation, if it is 
recognised, signals the dernise of the norm and its dilution by the rhetoric of ideology 
and national interest. In a decentralized system, such practice is very dangerous as, 
under the principle of reciprocity, other nations which are less powerful might employ 
that justification to intervene in their weak neighbor affairs, possibly leading in time to 
the erosion of the imperative of the principle of non-intervention, and to more instability 
in the international system which is already under such strain. 
B- The United States Practice and Claims. 
As an emerging powerful nation, having a long tradition of democracy, obedience 
to the law, and paying full respect to the norm of non-intervention, the United States, in 
reality, is at odds with these broad principles. From the Monroe Doctrine, which was 
originally invoked to prevent European intervention in Latin American states, the 
United States, with its increase in prestige and power, has moved to the European style 
of intervention. The United States viewed the Monroe Doctrine in a way that the 
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doctrine is not applicable to its intervention. This attitude is fully explained by Thomas 
and'Ibomas: 
" The Monroe Doctrine, like all human institutions, did not stand 
still. On the contrary, it was subjected to evolution and change, and 
with this change Latin America became ill-satisfied, for it signified 
that the United States did not feel itself bound to a policy of non- 
intervention in the affairs of its southern neighbour"00) 
As the world witnesses the emergence of the Soviet Union with its ideological 
purpose, the United States stood as a front line to curb Soviet influence. Ile division 
of the international system into two ideological blocs was fully recognized by the 
leaders of the United States. President Truman perceived the split in the international 
system into two divisions: democratic and communist. A democratic system is " based 
on the will of majority and is distinguished by free election, guarantee of individual 
liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression... 
(6 1) 
The other system, however, "is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed 
upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, 
fixed election and the suppression of personal freedom"-(62) That division required 
the President of the United States to "support free people who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure-(63) That support was 
presented as a counter-revolution in order to upset the outside intervention which is, in 
the United States'view, communisL 
This justification of the United States follows the same line of arguments which is 
presented by the Soviet Union. The United States' stand towards the norm of non- 
intervention is divided as well into two categories: first, in Latin American states which 
fall within the United States' sphere of influence ; second, outside the domain of Latin 
America. 
As to the former, the United States expressed its total commitment to defeat any 
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attempt to upset the political status quo in the region, even though, it entailed the 
violation of non-intervention . That norm 
is enshrined in the Charter of the Organization 
of American States by virtue of Article 15 which reads: 
" No state or group of states has the right to intervene directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibit not only 
armed force but also any other forms of interference or attempted 
threat against the personality of the state or against its political, 
economic and cultural element"-(64) 
The United States throughout its history in Latin America has demonstrated its 
willingness to disregard the norm of non-intervention. Such disregard is implemented 
under different interpretations and pretexts. The United States intervention, for 
example, in the Dominican Republic is a clear illustration. In the beginning the U. S. A 
justified its action under the concept of humanitarian intervention(65) but, later, shifted 
its justification to one of defeating or countering the communist aggression. In the 
President's words: 
" We are not the aggressor in the Dominican Republic. Forces came 
in there and overthrew the government and became aligned with evil 
persons who had been trained in overthrowing governments and in 
seizing governments and in establishing communist control, and we 
have resisted control and we have sought to protect our citizens 
against what would have taken place". (66) 
It is worth mentioning that this statement was preceded'by President Johnson's 
statement on the 2nd of May 1965 to the effect that the American troopsmission was 
not only for the evacuation of American citizens, but also to prevent the emergence of 
"another communist state in this hemisphere" -(67) However, following outside 
criticism that their action was against the principle of non-intervention, which allows 
states to settle their own affairs as they see proper, the President then claimed this as 
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justificadon: 
" what began as a popular democratic revolution committed to 
democracy and social justice was taken over ... and placed into the 
hands of a band of communist conspirators ... revolution in any 
country is a matter for that country to deal with. It becomes a matter 
calling for hemispheric action only when the object is the 
establishment of a communist dictatorship"-(68) 
This repeated shifting in their justifications for intervention lead one to conclude that 
the United States' attitude is not different from its counterpart, the Soviet Union. It is 
not really important, to the United States, whether or not there is a communist 
movement directed from abroad; rather they are concerned about their hegemony in 
Latin America. 71 berefore, if the leader of any country decides to distance itself from 
the orbit of the U. S. A, he would risk being charged arbitrarily with communist 
association and with that the imperative of the norm of non-intervention would be 
waived. Indeed, in the Dominican Republic ex-president Bosch proclaimed bitterly that: 
of a democratic revolution was smashed by the leading democracy of the world, '. (69) 
Criticism was made by many Latin American states which consider American 
military action as a blatant violation of the principle of non-intervention. (70) Under 
sheer pressure of criticism, the American government asserted that its intervention 
facilitated the introduction of OAS troops in order to bring peace and stability and at 
same time prevent a communist takeover(7 1) With that interpretation, it becomes clear 
that the norm on non-intervention is given no place in American policy especially 
whenever this norm challenges the United States interests. The American intervention 
in Guatemala in 1955, and Cuba in 1961 stands as a clear example-(72) However, 
before intervening in Guatemala the United States of America succeeded in having 
passed a resolution at the Caracas Conference where American states affirmed 
collectively: 
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" The domination or control of the political institution of any 
American states by the international communist movement, 
extending to this hemisphere the political system of extra continental 
power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political 
independence of the American states, endangering the peace of 
America and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the 
adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing 
treaties". (73) 
Following that declaration, the United States intervened in Guatemala and 
overthrew its legitimate government on the grounds of communist takeover. The 
assertion of United States of its right to intervene in Latin American states has prompted 
a spokesman for the Labour party in the U. K to say: 
"... I am afraid that Guatemala has left a rather unpleasant taste in 
one's mouth because, to illustrate the theme I was putting, it seems 
in some instances that the acceptance of the principles of the United 
Nations is subordinated to a hatred of communism',. (74) 
The precedent of Cuba also shows the extent to which the United States will go to 
prevent the establishment of a hostile regime within its orbit. The United States argued 
that the intervention in Cuba was undertaken to prevent Castro from delivering the 
revolution to an alien power, to promote the principle of self-determination of the 
Cuban people and to prevent Castro from meddling in the affairs of American 
Republics-(75) Therefore, American policy in Latin American States has demonstrated 
that the principle of non-intervention has less status than retaining their own 
interpretation of democracy; and whenever the two diverge, non-intervention must be 
sacrificed. 
As to American practice outside the domain of Latin American states the matter is 
not much different. To illustrate that attitude a reference can be made to Vietnam war. 
The Vietnam War demonstrates the ideological battle between the superpowers in which 
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the norm of non-intervention has no place. As the Soviet Union resurrected the concept 
of the "just war", the United States invoked the principle of invitation in order to negate 
the norm of non-intervention-(76) In Vietnam, the United States justified its 
intervention as a response to the invitation of the legitimate government of South 
Vietnam (77), and in conformity with the right of self defence-(78) 
Although the war in Vietnam was internal, the United States' characterization of it 
as an international war-(79), is only explicable by the strategic importance of Vietnam. 
Baldwin, a well known American , military observer, has pointed out to this fact: " 
whoever dominate s it (South Vietnam) will eventually control most of the Indonesian 
Archipelago". (80) This largely explains the very reason for intervention, despite 
Kennedy's previous insistence that the war ought to be fought by the Vitenamese 
people-(81) President Johnson affirmed that the policy of many American presidents, 
such as Eisenhower, Kennedy.. etc, had demonstrated over the eleven years their 
commitment to " help defend this small and valiant nation... over many years we have 
made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence". 
(82) Thus, to 
do otherwise, "would be unforgivably wrong". (83) 
The war in Vietnam clearly reflected the fragility of the norm of non-intervention in 
halting such interference. The violation of the norm was carried out under a variety of 
pretexts ranging from invitation, self-defence, humanitarian intervention to the 
promotion of freedom and democracy-(84) The United States pledge of promoting 
democracy was immutable and could not be repudiated 
(85) 
Summing up, the United States has, through its attitude and practice, demonstrated 
the fragility of the norm of non-intervention. The norm is repeatedly broken within the 
United States sphere of influence. In Latin American states, the United States reserved 
for itself the right to intervene whenever it deemed it necessary. Outside the Latin 
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American states, it states that the norm of non-intervetion must be respected, but an 
intervention can be. undertaken under many circumstances. Even when the United 
States failed to show good reasons for intervention, President Kennedy did not conceal 
his dissatisfaction with the norm: 
".. let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible. Should 
it ever appear that the Inter-American doctrine of non-interference 
merely conceals or excuses a policy of non-action if the nations of 
this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against 
outside communist penetration then I want it clearly understood that 
this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligation, 
which is the security of our nadon". (86) 
V- Concluding Remark. 
The preceding review has illustrated the existence of an international environment in 
which interventionist activities are on the increase. Most of that interventionist 
behaviour may be expected to be carried out in Third World countries. This is mainly 
due to the inherent weakness in the structure of many of these governments, where 
feudal and dictatorial rule are the prevailing pattern . It is to the detriment of these 
countries, that the norm of non-intervention fails to command respect. This concise 
review demonstrates that both Superpowers are willing to acknowledge the importance 
of the norm in international relations. However, through their practice and attitude they 
create a variety of exceptions which, if ever accepted, would leave the norm of non- 
intervention utterly meaningless. 
In the present decade many nations in different parts of the world intervene in their 
neighbours' affairs to change their government using, more or less, the same 
justification put forward by superpowers. 
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To what extent that attitude is reflected and extended to other states, particularly 
Syria, in its intervention in Lebanon is the main purpose of the present thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR AND ITS LEGAL CLASSIFICATION. 
Lebanon's existence as a state has passed through different stages and with every 
stage there was disagreement and outside interference. This process left its negative 
impact on Lebanon and contributed to more distrust, and greivences, amongst the 
Lebanese. 
The present civil war is a clear illustration of this fact. Ile present case has its own 
features. The existence of Palestinians on Lebanese soil has given rise to uncertainty 
regarding the real nature of the conflict. Since both parties to the conflict affirmed their 
different view about its real nature, the determination of the nature of the conflict 
becomes necessary. This became more urgent as the Lebanese conflict experienced 
direct Syrian intervention, which in turn highlighted the relevant question as to whether 
or not the Lebanese conflict was internal or not. 
In this Chapter, an attempt will be made to outline the history of Lebanon and the 
causes of the conflict and to identife of the participants. Moreover, it will discuss the 
Palestinian factor in the Lebanese conflict and its effect on the classification of the 
conflict. 
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IT- History of Lebanon 
A- From Inception until the French Mandate 
Throughout history, Lebanon experienced occupation and conquest which started 
with the Egyptians, Assyrians, Romans and Arabs who all had a great effect on the life 
of the Lebanese. The variety of occupiers can be explained by economic reasons, as 
Lebanon's location on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean qualified her as a liaison 
between the West and East. 
There are many stories about the origin of the Lebanese people, but the most 
reliable one is that Lebanon's existence in it's present form owed much to the flood of 
refugees who fled their homeland through the fear of persecption-(I) Because of 
Lebanon's formidable terrain and rugged nature, the refugees found it to be a secure 
haven for continuing their life. Those refugees can be broadly categorized into two 
religious groups: Muslim and Christians. Each group had its own reason for taking 
refuge in the Mount of Lebanon, from the Shi'ites who escaped Sunni fury, to the 
Armenians who fled from Turkish atrocities. However, when Lebanon came under 
Ottoman rule (1516-1918), the Mount of Lebanon was dominated by Christians 
(Maronite) and Druze. With the introduction of Ottoman rule, Lebanon as a political 
entity started evolving and taking shape. It was the battle of "Marj Dabiq" in 1516 
which marked the eclipse of the rule of Mamluk and the rise of Ottoman rule. 
Following the Ottoman victory, Lebanon's rule was bestowed upon the Druze dynasty, 
namely the Ma'ns dynasty. The Ma'ans dynasty ruled Lebanon from 1516 to 1697 
during which they managed to extend their influence over all part of Lebanon-(2) 
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Following the death of a Ma'ans prince who did not have any heirs, the rule of 
Lebanon transferred to another dynasty, Chabi. The origin of Chabi is Sunni Muslim 
and its rule over Lebanon was finally bestowed by virtue of the "AL-Sarnkanya" 
meeting. (3) Following that meeting, Amir Bashir 1 became the governor of Mount 
Lebanon. After his death (1707) his successor, Prince Malhim, ruled the country until 
1732. He was succeeded by Prince Haider who felt no desire to rule and instead 
preferred to pursue religious teaching. His two sons Yusuf and Kasam. converted to 
Christianity and, hence, when the princedom was transferred to Yusuf, it signalled the 
rising power of the Christians for the first time in the history of Lebanon(4). However, 
the princedom was again transferred to Bashir II after the execution of Yusuf by the 
Governor of Acre in 1788. The arrival of Bashir R sparked off hostility between the 
two sects, Druze and Christian. Taking advantage of the Egyptian military campaign 
which was designed to deal with the Greek revolt, Amir Bashir 11 attacked the Druze 
dynasty (Janmbalat family) destroyed their palace and confiscated their property-(5) 
Following the deterioration of the relationship between the Egyptian ruler M. Ali and 
the Ottoman Port, Amir Bashir II allied himself with the Egyptian ruler. 'ne Druze, on 
the other hand, supported the Ottoman authorities so that they could gain favour and at 
the same time avenge their old humiliation. For many reasons, the British supported the 
Port and the Druze, whereas the French gave their assistance to the Egyptian ruler and 
the Christians in Lebanon-(6) 71be Ottoman authorities managed to regain power in 
Syria and Lebanon through the assistance of the British and Austrians. The victory of 
the Ottomans, coupled with European meddling, gave rise to civil war in 1841 between 
the two main sects in Lebanon: Christian and Druze. That civil war came to an end after 
European mediation and gave way to a new agreement in 1843; the system of 
Kaymakam was introduced by which the princedom was divided into two 
administrative districts, with the Beirut-Damascus dividing line-(7) The Northern 
38 
District was to be ruled by a Christian governor and the Southern District by a Druze 
governor, but both governors were to be appointed by the Ottoman Empire-(8) 
The creation of the Kaymakam system was geographically misleading as the 
population of the Christians in the Southern District was greater than the Druze, which 
created sensitivity and distrust. Furthermore, the system reinforced the political 
division by increasing the economic and social divisions-(9) This system, as described 
by one observer, " was the formal organization of civil war in the country"-(10) Not 
long after, civil war erupted again in 1860 between the Druze and Christians. 
Again, Ottoman and European powers devised a new system for Lebanon, the 
Reglement Organique (Mutassarriffya). This system was the outcome of a hard 
compromise between internal and external parties which had great interest in 
Lebanon-0 1) According to that plan, the two district or Kaymakams were reunited 
into a single governorate, to be ruled by a Christian non-Lebanese governor whose 
appointment was made by Ottoman authorities with the approval of the European 
powers. Alongside the governor, a Council composed of twelve members representing 
various sects was established to aid and advise him on various issues-02) Under such 
a system, Lebanon's autonomous status was guaranteed by the European power. The 
system worked well and contributed to the maintenance of peace, but it had 
disadvantages as it constitutionalized communal representation. That system was intact 
until the First World War in 1914. 
Therefore, the development of events between 1516 and 1914 had established three 
features of Lebanon: the Christianity of the Governor, Confessional representation, and 
Christian orientation towards the west, particularly France. 
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B- From the French Mandate to Independence. 
When the First World War started, the whole area which was known as Great Syria 
(Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon) was under Turkish occupation. Following the 
Ottoman defeat in 1918, these countries came under the British and French Mandate. 
During the war, the British and their Allies promised Arab independence and unity in 
return for their support. On 30 September 1918 Prince Faisal (the Leader of the Arab 
revolution), after the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces, marched to Damascus and took 
control of the city and extended his authority to Transjordan. (13) However, such a 
development was not warmly received by the French authorities which objected to such 
measures as they contradicted the secret agreement drawn up during the war between 
British and French representatives (commonly known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement). 
According to that agreement, Syria and Lebanon became French spheres of influence, 
and Iraq and Palestine became British spheres of influence-04) Much to the 
disappointment of the Arabs, the peace conference at San Remo endorsed the division 
which was agreed on according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. (15) 
Attacks against French troops mounted by irregular Arab fighters led the French to 
demand the quick recognition of their Mandate and the punishment of irregular fighters 
who attacked French troops. Although Prince Faisal accepted the French demands, 
General Gouraud marched into the city and occupied it on 7th of October 1918. The 
French occupation had a great effect on Lebanon as Muslims viewed the French as 
occupiers whereas, Christians regarded them as saviours. 
On the Ist of 1920 September the French authorities, to the bitterness of the 
Muslims, declared the creation of Great Lebanon, cutting off parts of Syria, such as 
Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, and Akar, and added them to Lebanon. That artificial creation had 
a great effect on the harmony of Lebanon, since the population of the newly annexed 
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areas were predominantly Muslims. According to one eminent historian: 
"the annexed territory almost doubled the area of the country and 
increased it's population by about one half over 20,000 
predominantly Moslems ... what the country gained 
in area it lost in 
cohesion ... it lost its internal equilibrium". 
(16) 
In 1920, the French government introduced a new constitution which, in one way 
or another, was a mere mirror of the Mutussarriffya system which had been introduced 
during the Turkish occupation. As both communities, Christians and Muslims felt the 
disadvantage of the Mandate and, because of the surge of nationalism, demonstrators 
took to the street demanding independence. 
A new treaty was signed between France and Lebanon in which France was given 
some privileges in return for independence. That treaty was met with Muslim 
demonstrations and protest, but during the Second World War the French authorities 
suspended the Lebanese constitution, and Lebanon was again under French direct 
rule-07) During the Second World War, Lebanon and Syria received the promise of 
independence from France and Britain-08) On the 26th of November 1941, Lebanon 
was declared an independent state. In the process of independence, a temporary 
government was appointed to supervise the election headed by "Ayoub Thabt" who 
determined the number of parliamentary seats: 32 for Christian and 22 for Muslims. 
Following a serious protest by Muslims, a modification on 22nd of July 1942 was 
added by which Muslims were given 25 seats and the Christians 30, Le in a ratio of 5 
to 6. 
In 1943, the first President of Lebanon, Bashara Al kahoury was elected to rule 
Lebanon. He chose, Riyad al Solh as Prime Iýfinister and they both worked on a plan for 
the future ruling of Lebanon. That plan is commonly known as the "National Pact" by 
which the distribution of power among the various sects was determined. The content 
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of the National Pact was a compromise between the major sects at that time, Christian 
and Muslim. However, in the face of Christian insistence on the link with the West and 
Muslim insistence with the link with the Arab world, the National Pact affirmed 
Lebanon's Arabic face and its special ties with the West-09) The Christians pledged 
that they would not seek help from the west, whereas the Muslims pledged not to 
demand unity with Syria. Moreover, the Pact confirmed the confessional system which 
was established during the Turkish occupation, with minor modifications. According to 
the Pact, the President would be Christian whereas the Prime Minister will be Sunni 
Muslim and the Speaker of Parliament would be Sh'ite Muslim. Therefore, the Pact 
asserted three principles upon which the newly emerged Lebanon is governed: 
I- The Confessional system. 
2- Co-operation with Arabic countries should be carried out within the framework of 
Lebanese sovereignty and on the basis of equality. 
3- Ile neutrality of Lebanon, Lebanon having no alliance with the East or West.. 
With the conclusion of the Pact, Lebanon became a fully independent republic with 
its own features which brought the country into another civil war in 1958. That civil 
war was mainly due to the sharp cleavage between the Muslim Arab orientation and 
Christian western orientation. President Chammoun allied himself with the Eisenhower 
doctrine and refused to condemn the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez canal. (20) 
Fighting erupted between the opposition and security forces loyal to the President 
following charges that the President had rigged the election of that year. The 
government accused the United Arab Republic of subversion and appealed to the 
U. S. A for help. Following the United States intervention, the United Nations sent an 
observer group to investigate the Lebanese government's claims. (21) The United 
Nations mission's finding did not fully satisfy the Lebanese government, as it failed to 
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support the government's claims-(22) 
The crisis was eased after President Chammoun declared that he did not intend to 
offer himself for re-election. The Lebanese Parliament elected a new President, 
President Chihab. Successive Presidents came into power until 1970 when President 
Franjieh was elected . With the Franjieh election, and during his time in office, 
discontent and external factors led to the eruption of civil war in 1975. 
III- The causes of the Lebanese conflict. 
The crisis which entangled Lebanon cannot be attributed to only internal reasons, 
but external factors also played a great role in furthering the differences among the 
Lebanese people. Both internal and external factors knitted together and consequently 
paved the way for the eruption of civil war. In order to understand the causes of the 
civil war, a brief review of the internal and external factors is necessary. 
Many will agree that the internal structure of the Lebanese system has played a great 
role in the present crisis. Since independence, the system has failed to respond to the 
changes which the country have undergone. That failure left the system obsolete and 
not responsive to the demands of a new Lebanese generation. The confessional system 
is basically a by-product of the French legacy which left power in the hand of one sect 
to the exclusion of others. It is this system which has provoked other communities to 
demand a more equitable share of power. However, the Maronites who are favoured 
more any than other sect under the confessional system, declined to surrender their 
privileges. With the emergence of a new balance in Lebanon whereby the Christian 
Maronites are no longer a majority, the confessional system has become increasingly a 
source of instability. (23) Moreover, the prevalence of confessionalism increased the 
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sense of exclusiveness of each sect by adhering to the sects' values at the expense of 
the nation. In this regard, Khoury remarks: 
" Lebanon possesses a political community, but not much sense of 
community: it is a collection of ethno-religious sub 
communes(confession) bound together by common necessity, if 
that, and bridging the gap between the sub communes remains a 
crucial problem-(24) 
Others factors played a role, but still within the strictures of the confessional 
system. The process of modernization and the rising expectations of the Lebanese 
population, in the absence of government response, have widened the gap between the 
"haves" and "have nots". A survey undertaken in 1970 showed that 4 percent of the 
population of Lebanon received about 35 percent of all income, whilst the lower 50 
percent of the population received approximately 20 percent of all income. The income 
of the other 46 percent of the population was about 30 percent of overall income-(25) 
The inequality of distribution of national income worsened as a result of Lebanon's 
failure to hold to its strategic importance as an oasis for Arab and foreign financial 
capital. (26) The rise of Kuwait and Iraq in the seventies overshadowed Lebanon's 
financial role. What was worse was the government's failure to provide an alternative 
system of social welfare which could reasonably have reduced the sense of alienation 
and bitterness among the sects of Lebanon. (27) As the Lebanese divided on sectarian 
lines, consequently other sects, namely Muslims, naturally viewed the distribution of 
welfare with great scepticism. Added to this problem was the mass immigration of 
Lebanese from the South of Lebanon to the vicinity of Beirut searching for a better life 
and escaping Israeli attack in retaliation to commando attack from Lebanon against 
IsraeI. (28) That mass immigration is not limited to those who fled from Israeli raids, 
but also extends to economic migrants who were lured into the capital searching for 
better lives . (29) 
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The migration has provided the breeding ground for dissent, and has enabled the 
radical organizations or parties to attract dissident support. All these factors 
exacerbated the process of demand towards the elirrfination of the Confessional system 
which was regarded as the source of grievances to all sects save the Maronites. On the 
contrary, the Maronites refused to consider re-adjustment of the system and insisted 
that the danger was not in the system but in the presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon. 
The issue of the Palestinians, wittingly or unwittingly, was entangled in the Lebanese 
quagmire and hence the nature of the conflict became blurred. In fact, because of the 
absence of political institutions which could mitigate the crisis and provide a vehicle for 
dialogue and compromise, the Lebanese system, with its confessional features, was a 
source of complaint and bitterness, as Muslims demanded a more equitable share in the 
decision making power. 
Moreover many Arab countries, through their support for the Palestinians, managed 
to have access to Lebanese Politics. For example, Syria, through the Palestinian 
Organization Al- Saiqa, played a great role; by equal token Iraq, through its support for 
the Al Bath party, and Egypt, through its support for traditional leaders, influenced the 
political process in Lebanon. Under the banner of giving protection to the Palestinians 
in Lebanon, radical Arab regimes extended every possible support to the Palestinians 
and Leftist parties in Lebanon which were striving to reconstruct Lebanon on a radical 
basis-(30) Contrary to the radical Arab regimes, the conservative regimes, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, extended support and sympathy to conservatives in 
Lebanon. (3 1) 
In addition, the Israeli played their role as well. To the Israeli, the destruction of 
Lebanon as a model for future co-existence between the Jews and Palestinians is one of 
the important targets. By pitting the Palestinians and Christians against each other, the 
model of co-existence would collapse and, at the same time the Palestinians would 
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suffer and lose power in Lebanon-(32) 
External parties gained access to Lebanon through the Lebanese who for many 
reasons believed that soliciting support from outside would help to keep their sectional 
supremacy or help to achieve victory. In general the internal grievances of the Lebanese 
and the immovability of the system, supplemented by the negligence of the 
government, or its indifference, and its failure to respond to the rising expectation of 
the Lebanese, have played a great role in opening the door to external interference. It is 
undoubtedly the internal factors that helped the demise of stability in Lebanon, but 
external factors, on an equal footing, played a role in furthering and accelerating the 
process of the state's collapse which directly resulted in the ensuing civil war. 
IV- The Identification Of The Belligerents In The Lebanese Civil War. 
A- General. 
It is very important to identify the parties to the conflict. Identification will help in 
differentiating between internal and external parties which is necessary in any legal 
analysis. In the Lebanese civil war, parties to the conflict are numerous and diverse. 
The confusion between internal and external factors, at some point, is hard to separate. 
The existence of Palestinians and their participation played a great role in that 
confusion. However, in this classification, the Palestinians are included among the 
internal parties under the coalition of the Lebanese National Movement. A thorough 
review of their legal status will be undertaken latter. 
For reason of clarity and simplicity, the parties to the Lebanese conflict are divided 
into two groups: internal and external. Moreover, given the sheer numbers of internal 
parties, and their diverse claims, the present classification will include all the internal 
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parties into two main groups: Lebanese Front and the Lebanese National Movement. 
This classification is based on actual facts which were demonstrated during the war as 
the two main groups were the principal parties to the conflict. As such, the manifesto 
of small parties will be disregarded so long as they joined one of the principal parties 
and accepted its manifesto. 
B- Internal Parties to the conflict. 
1- The Lebanese Front. 
During the course of the war, and in response to the ensuing events, a new coalition 
came into being which is commonly known as the Lebanese Front. The Lebanese Front 
is a coalition basically established to pool the resources of Christians in order to 
confront those who, in the view of the LF, embarked on a policy of destroying 
Lebanon. 
The Lebanese Front is composed of parties or groups who took up arms to defend 
the fatherland from the Palestinians and Leftist forces. Despite the sheer number of 
groups and parties which joined the LF, it is easy to remark that the composition of the 
LF is made up of two major parties: the Phalange and Liberal parties. 
The Phalange party is the strongest and best equipped . Its existence preceded the 
civil war, as it was established in 1936-(33) Over time, the party became the main 
defender of Christian interests in Lebanon, especially those of Maronite Christians. 
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The second party is the Liberal Party which was formed in 1959 by ex-president 
Chammoun. The Liberal party shares with the Phalange party its values and goals. 
Besides the two main parties, there are other parties which emerged during the course 
of civil war such as the Cedar Guardian, AL Tanziem and Zgharta Liberation Army 
(formed by the then president Franjieh). 
The main concern of the LF was to defend Lebanon from foreigners and Leftist 
groups who pose a real danger to the unity of Lebanon. Therefore, they called for the 
repudiation of all agreements with Palestinians in order to restore Lebanese 
sovereignty- (34) The task of liberating Lebanon, in the absence of an effective 
government, was ultimately their responsibility. In general, the LF's main concern was 
the foreigners (Palestinians). They did not consider that there was a real internal 
problem in Lebanon(35), and any internal reform ought to be based on the National 
Pact of 1943. (36) 
2- The Lebanese National Movement. 
The National Movement also emerged to present a unitary vision of future Lebanon. 
The National Movement is a loose coalition of a variety of parties who are not 
ideologically alike, but share the same goals: dismantling the confessional system, and 
the protection of Palestinian resistance. 
The Lebanese National Movement, throughout the civil war, was composed of 
some major parties which constitute its backbone, as other parties were minor and not 
effective in any real sense. These major parties are follows : the Progressive Socialist 
Party headed by the leader of LNM, Kamal Junblat; the Syrian Socialist Party; the Arab 
Bath Socialist Party (actually there are two parties with the same name, one belonging 
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to Syria and the other to Iraq); and finally, the two organizations which emerged during 
the civil war, the Lebanese Arab Army (established following the breakdown of the 
Lebanese Army and which provided the LNM with immeasurable strength during the 
fight) and Murabutoun a pro-Palestinian Party and finally the Disinherited Movement, 
which was established by the charismatic religous leader Mousa Al Sader, which 
fought with the LNM at the first stage and later sided with the Syrian government. 
Other parties played a major role but these Parties are not Lebanese in the legal 
sense. The Palestinian rejectionst groups and the main stream of the PLO considered 
themselves part of the LNM. They joined the LNM to defend their right to be in 
Lebanon as the LF challenged their legal rights-(37) As mentioned earlier, the detailed 
analysis of the status of Palestinians in Lebanon and its effect on the classification of 
the Lebanese conflict will be considered later. 
Contrary to the LF, the LNM forwarded an argument which affirmed the internal 
character of the struggle. The LNM insisted that the real reason or cause of the conflict 
was the existence of the confessional system in Lebanon. Moreover, the LNM 
challenged the LFs claim that the Palestinians are foreigners-(38) 
Ile LNM presented its political programme as the most urgent goal to be realized at 
any price. According to that programme, the most important points are(39): 
I- The abolition of the confessional system. 
2- Democratic reform for popular representation; changing the electoral law 
3- Re-arranging the army on a non-sectarian basis. 
4- -Introducing constitutional reforms concerning parliament and creating a new 
institution 
5- Although not stipulated in the programme, nevertheless the LNM considered the 
LFs demand concerning the Palestinians as part of an international conspiracy to 
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liquidate the Palestinian revolution. (40) 
The LNM stipulated that no dialogue could be initiated with the LF unless its 
political and constitutional programme is fully recognised as the mainstay of any future 
construction for Lebanon. 
C- External Parties to the conflict. 
There were, in fact, many parties to the Lebanese conflict, but what is of primary 
concern here is those which were directly involved in the Lebanese civil war. The first 
interference was undertaken by both Israel and Syria. However the Syrian 
government, due to its close ties and Arab orientation, staged the first direct 
intervention but in different stages: mediation, indirect assistance to rebels and finally 
full fledged intervention on the side of the LF on the lst of June 1976-(41) 
The second external party was Israel which did not hesitate to declare its interest in 
the Lebanese civil war. According to the Israeli government, its interest in Lebanon was 
to keep the Palestinians away from the south of Lebanon and to stop the guerilla attacks 
on the northern border of Israel-(42) However, another interest was manifest in Ben 
Gurion's correspondence with his prime minister, Moshe Sharet, in which he urged the 
latter to encourage the partition of Lebanon through rendering support to the Maronites 
so that they could establish a Christian state-(43) 
In fact, the Israeli government did not intervene directly in the civil war during the 
year 1975-76 and it repeated its statement: " We do not have to intervene in what is 
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happening inside Lebanon as long as the conflict is confined to the Lebanese people 
themselves"(44) However, the Israeli government met many delegates of the LF and, 
in consequence, Israel pledged to extend ammunition and weapons to the LF. (45) The 
Israeli government refrained from any direct intervention until 1978. It was in March 
1978 that the Israelis invaded the South of Lebanon, in an operation named Litani 
River, to drive the PLO back deep into Lebanon and far from the Northern border-(46) 
Later the Israeli government supported renegades of the Lebanese army to form a state 
in the south of Lebanon which is commonly known as the Security Belt. The second 
Israeli intervention was in 1982 and culminated in the occupation of Lebanon's capital, 
Beirut, and the evacuation of military personnel of the PLO from Lebanon. 
The Israelis, in fact, did not intervene directly in 1975-76, but kept watching the 
Syrian forces' movement in Lebanon very closely. The illegality of the Israeli 
intervention in Lebanon is not addressed in the present thesis which is mainly 
concerned with the legal implication of the Syrian intervention. 
V- The Legal Nature of the Lebanese Conflict. 
A- Introduction. 
The participation of Palestinians in the Lebanese civil war has given rise to crucial 
difficulties concerning their legal status. 'Their classification as an internal or external 
party has become the centre of legal discussion. 
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The Lebanese Front argues that the Palestinians are strangers and hence the conflict 
is a war against them. In contrast, the Lebanese National Movement has rejected this 
explanation, and insisted on the internal character of the conflict. As such, the 
investigation into and the identification of the Palestinians' status is a major issue in the 
discussion of the Lebanese conflict and, consequently, of the Syrian intervention. 
Therefore, before proceeding to the analysis of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon, an 
attempt will be made to identify the legal status of Palestinians in Lebanon. The inquiry 
will cover a concise review of the meaning of civil war in international law , the 
Palestinians existence in Lebanon, and finally the validity of the Cairo Agreement and 
the attitude of the Lebanese and Palestinian parties towards it. 
B- The Legal Meaning Of Civil War. 
According to the Dictionary of Contemporary English, the term "civil war" is 
indicative of a" war between opposing groups of people from the same country fought 
within that country"-(47) . However, this description is not necessarily confined to the 
term civil war. In fact, there are many terms for civil war which mostly indicate the 
same meaning, such as insurrection, internal conflict, and rebellion. All these terms, 
although they differ , nevertheless all have a common factor which is that the war is 
carried out between indigenous people and within the territory of that country. 
Ile customary definition of civil war indicates the above features: 
" When a party is formed within the state which ceases to obey the 
sovereign and is strong enough to make a stand against it, or when a 
Republic is divided into two opposite factions and both sides take up 
arms, there exists a civil war"-(48) 
In 1863 Professor Francis Lieber identified civil war: 
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"A war between two or more portions of a country or state, each contending 
for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to be the legitimate government. 
The term is also sometimes applied to war of rebellion, when the rebellious 
provinces or portion of the state are contiguous to those containing the seat of 
government-09) 
Similarly, Oppenhiern's definition of civil war has, more or less, the same features. 
He defined civil war as being: 
" When two opposing parties within a state have recourse to arms 
for the purpose of obtaining power in the state, or when a large 
portion of the population of a state rises in arms against the 
legitimate govemment-(50) 
In a recent judgement on the issue of civil war the Israeli Supreme Court drew a 
concise definition which has the same features which are shown in the above 
definitions. In its judgment in Diab v Anorney General, the Court said: 
" Civil war is a war of the citizens for the purpose of obtaining 
power in the whole state or in part of it. The emphasis is on the 
word "citizen" that is to say, civil war always implies an armed 
struggle by a group of citizens against the established order in order 
to obtain power over its own state and not a war against another 
state trying to impose its will over the territory and the citizens of 
that state, that is to say, a foreign country. This is the legal meaning 
of the word, and it is also its normal and natural meaning for the 
general public and for historians"-(51) 
Therefore, most of the definitions, starting from the customary one to the most 
recent one by the Israeli Court, emphasize two factors: the indigenous population who 
are waging the war and the location of the conflict as carried out within the territory of 
the state. 
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Other factors, following the development of the subject of human rights and the 
need for regulation of internal conflict, were added to the definition of civil war. nose 
factors are mainly addressed to the material factor, that is to say the level of 
violence-(52) In order to bring the conflict under the regulation of the laws of war 
there must be a genuine armed conflict. This factor has the benefit of excluding trivial 
incidences such as rioting or disobedience from the category of civil war. (53) 
As such, civil war is a genuine armed conflict among the people of a country carried 
out within its territory for the purpose of changing or altering the legal structure of their 
govemment. 
That definition raises the question of Palestinian participation and their legal status. 
Since the Palestinians are not Lebanese citizens, their participation needs more factual 
and legal clarificadon. 
C- The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War. 
In any review of the legal status of the Palestinians in Lebanon, one has to look at 
the history of the Palestinian settlement in Lebanon in order to determine their legal 
status. A review has the advantage of clarifying their first legal settlement in Lebanon, 
that is to say, whether or not it was carried out in accordance with Lebanese Law. 
Palestinian settlement in Lebanon was not a natural migration from one country to 
another. Their existence in Lebanon was caused by extreme circumstances which 
forced them to leave their homeland and seek temporary settlement elsewhere. Their 
ordeal started with the establishment of the Israeli state. The Israelis have subjected the 
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native Palestinians to inhumane treatment which, at times, reached the point of mass 
killing. The systematic method of terror and killing transcended any reasonable limits 
and left the Palestinians with no choice but to leave their homes in order to save their 
lives. (54) These crimes were condemned by the United Nations and a variety of 
humanitarian organizations but this did not prevent or halt the immigration of 
Palestinians. 
Lebanon, amongst many Arab countries, responded to the events with great 
generosity and opened its borders to the Palestinian refugees. In opening the border to 
Palestinian refugees, and by providing them with the necessary requisites of life, 
Lebanon was acting as an Arab country which owed to Arab Palestinians such 
behaviour and, at the same time, was responding to its legal obligation under the 
Geneva Convention for the Protection of Refugees. (55) 
That Convention was the culmination of efforts of states to present a legal document 
ensuring full protection for refugees. Since 1921 the need for international action for 
refugees has been recognized. However, with the Geneva Convention the problem of 
refugees has been addressed properly. The Convention provides a legal framework for 
treatment of refugee, and facilitates their settlement in a foreign country. The merit of 
the Convention is its attempt to narrow the gap between the citizens of states and 
refugees in term of employment and social welfare. Thus, the rights and duties of 
refugees have been confirmed by a multilateral treaty which has limited states' rights 
concerning the treatment of refugees. 
Since Lebanon is one of the signatories to that Convention, the Palestinians in 
Lebanon, as refugees, have the benefit of it. An examination of that Convention will 
support the view that the refugees enjoy the same rights as citizens in matters relating to 
employment, security and social welfare-(56) Moreover, the Convention stresses the 
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fact that refugees must not be treated on an equal footing with aliens who have already 
enjoy the protection of their countries-(57) As such, refugees, under the Convention, 
enjoy to some extent the full rights that citizenship accords to citizens, save political 
rights. 
As far as Lebanon is concerned, Lebanon has failed to fulfill its obligations towards 
the Palestinians in accordance with the Geneva Convention. This failure could be the 
result of the nature of the Lebanese system. Since most of the Palestinians are Muslim, 
their presence raises the Christians' fear that an imbalance might emerge in the structure 
of the confessional system. However, that reason cannot remove the legal obligation 
that Lebanon owes to the refugees. Lebanon's reluctance to provide the basic needs of 
refugees is shown by the Lebanese Public Minister of Work: 
" ... Let me point out here that we did not welcome the Palestinians 
with open arms or take them to our heart. We did not make available 
to them the most basic necessities of life.. neither water, electricity, 
nor drainage facilities, or social services. It is we who deliberately 
put them near urban areas and not on the frontiers, in response to the 
wishes of businessmen for cheap labour"-(58) 
Therefore, the existence of the Palestinians in Lebanese cities was in response to the 
wishes of businessmen and government officials. Their legal status as refugees is fully 
affirmed by the Lebanese government. As such, the Palestinians did not cross the 
border in thousands against the wishes of the government, but rather the Lebanese 
government has welcomed them and classified them as refugees. However, the 
maltreatment that they received in Lebanon was the first step towards a conflict between 
them and the Lebanese government. As the exploitation of the Palestinians persisted, 
and because of encouragement for the militarization of refugees by the Arab regimes, a 
military conflict erupted between the Palestinians and the Lebanese government. The 
Lebanese government did not agree on drastic measures to solve the issue of 
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Palestinians who were demanding a special status in Lebanon. The Muslim Prime 
Minister declined to liquidate the newly bom military wing of the PLO when the 
Christians pressed hard to that end. A stalemate ensued and, under the mediation of 
Egypt both parties, the Lebanese government and the PLO, convened in Egypt to settle 
the Palestinian issue in Lebanon. The Lebanese representative was given full power to 
negotiate a settlement with the leader of the PLO, Yassar Arafat. The out-come of that 
negotiation was a new agreement which later came to be known as the " Cairo 
Agreement". 
With the agreement the Palesonians acquired a new status which was not available 
before. However, the point that needs to be stressed is that the Palestinians' existence 
in Lebanon was not contrary to Lebanese law nor against the sovereignty of Lebanon. 
Since the agreement came into existence, its legality shoud be looked at in order to 
clarify it and, at a later stage, to see whether or not the Agreement was in accordance 
with Lebanese constitutional law and not contrary to the Lebanese sovereignty. 
D- The Cairo Agreement. 
On the third of November 1969, the Lebanese representative, Emil Bastani, and the 
Palestinian representative, Yassar Arafat, met in Cairo under the auspices of Egypt's 
Foreign Minister, Mahmmoud Riyad, and War Minister Fawzi, to discuss the Lebanese 
crisis. The outcome of that meeting was a new agreement which is generally refen-ed to 
as the "Cairo Ageement"-(59) The main purpose of that Agreement was to prevent 
any future confrontation between the Lebanese government and Palestinians in 
Lebanon. 
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Ironically, that Agreement turned out to be the source of disagreement between the 
Palestinians and the Lebanese government on the one hand and the Lebanese 
themselves on the other. According to the Christians (Lebanese Front), the Agreement 
violates Lebanese sovereignty, whereas the Muslims (Lebanese National Movement) 
regard it as an instrument which justifies the military existence of Palestinians on 
Lebanese soil. The Cairo Agreement consists of two parts: the first deals with the 
Palestinians' presence in Lebanon, and the second addresses the activity of Palestinian 
commandos. 
As to the first part, the Agreement mentions the rights of Palestinians to work and 
residence-(60) This is a mere reiteration of what the Lebanese government had already 
committed itself to under the Geneva Convention of 1951. The right of Palestinians to 
compose a committee to take charge of Palestinians' interests in the camps was 
recognised; but that must be done in accordance with the full agreement of the Lebanese 
authorities and " within the context of Lebanese sovereignty"- (6 1) Moreover, Article 3 
and 4 granted the Palestinians the right to join the Palestinian revolution and the right of 
the Palestinians to carry arms in the camps, but in accordance with Lebanese law and 
sovereignty- (62) 
The second part of the Cairo Agreement was devoted entirely to the activities of 
Palestinian commandos. The Lebanese government pledged to furnish every possible 
assistance to the Palestinian commandos in order to attack the Israeli state. However, 
this was to be carried out from a designated area in the South of Lebanon. (63) Article 7 
of the Agreement envisaged the appointment of a Palestinian representative to the 
Lebanese military headquarters to participate in the resolution of all emergency matters. 
In addition, the Cairo Agreement affirmed the belief and determination of both the 
Lebanese government and the PLO to help the armed struggle of the Palestinians as " an 
activity in the interest of Lebanon as well as that of the Palestinian revolution and all 
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Arabs"-(64) 
As a whole, the Cairo Agreement transferred the legal status of the Palestinians 
from that of refugees under the Geneva Convention to a new status under the Cairo 
Agreement. The Agreement gave the Palestinians full freedom to act in Lebanon. 
However, such activities must be carried out in accordance with the Lebanese 
government and sovereignty; the Lebanese government by virtue of Article 13, has the 
full sovereignty and jurisidiction over all its territory without any exception. 
The Cairo Agreement, however, did not succeed in providing stability and accord 
between the government and the PLO. Clashes took place and a new protocol which is 
known as the "Melkart Protocol" came into being on 17th May 1973. (65) That 
Protocol referred to the Cairo Agreement as a basis for any new agreement. However, 
according to the Melkart Protocol, the Palestinian commandos had no right to operate 
militarily against the Israeli territory from the Lebanese border-(66) Moreover, the 
Protocol determined that the term foreigner is not meant to cover Arab commandos (67) 
Apart from that, the Melkart Protocol does not differ greatly from the Cairo Agreement. 
As was mentioned earlier, the Cairo Agreement was a source of discord among the 
Lebanese themselves and Christian Lebanese vis a vis the Palestinians. In the light of 
that, the legality of the Agreement becomes vital to the present study. 
E- Cairo Agreement and the Legal Standing of the Parties. 
The Lebanese belligerents have naturally expressed a different attitude towards the 
Cairo Agreement. The Lebanese Front considered it illegal. To the National 
Movement, it is a true reflection of the Lebanese commitment to the Palestinians' 
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cause. (68) 
The Lebanese Front's stand towards the Cairo Agreement was not, arguably, 
consistent or clear. The Lebanese Front declared on several occasions its intention to 
repudiate the Agreement-(69) On other occasions, the Lebanese Front, and especially 
the Phalange party, expressed its total respect for all agreements signed between the 
Lebanese government and the Palestinian Organization-(70) However, one can state 
that the Lebanese Front through various speeches affirmed its stand that the Cairo 
Agreement was no longer valid to regulate the Lebanese-Palestinians relations. It 
regards the Agreement as upsetting the internal equilibrium between various sects. On 
this ground, the Lebanese Front embarked on a policy of arming its members in order 
to meet the danger of Palestinian commandos. The former President of Lebanon and a 
president of the Lebanese Front questioned the Agreement which allowed Palestinians 
to carry weapons by saying: 
ft why have the foreigners and those seeking refuge in hospitable 
Lebanon the right to stage military training and carry arms, while 
Lebanon's sons have no right to do so in defence of their 
homeland? "- (7 1) 
Ile Lebanese Front regarded the agreement as a bridge upon which the Palestinians 
could occupy Lebanon. Therefore, according to the Lebanese Front, the sons of 
Lebanon have also full rights to use weapons and defend their land from Palestinian 
foreigners. The president of the Lebanese Front declared that " Christians of Lebanon 
fought a national battle to liberate their home land from Palestinian domination"-(72) 
Moreover, he considered the mere acceptance of the Cairo Agreement a surrender to 
Palestinians as he said: 
" despite the secrecy shrouding the agreement, it was becoming clear 
that it amounted to capitulation to the commandos demand to operate 
from Lebanon"-(73) 
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This view was shared by another Christian leader, Pierre Jamayle (the Phalangist 
leader) who voiced his discontent: 
" We accepted the agreement reluctantly although we had preferred it 
be unwritten, However, the agreement underlines the fact that 
Lebanese sovereignty no longer exists yet we acceded to it to save or 
preserve the national unity"-(74) 
The issue of lost sovereignty was raised by another Christian leader Charel Al 
Hallau in whose term of presidency the agreement was signed. He declared that: 
" The Cairo Agreement contradicts the existence of the state, but at 
that time it was impossible to compromise between the concept of 
Palestinian revolution and Lebanese sovereignty. Thus, the Cairo 
Agreement was the best of the worst". (75) 
Another objection to the Cairo Agreement was introduced by the Monk Order of 
Lebanon. They argued, in a memorandum submitted to the Lebanese Parliament, 'that 
the agreement violates the constitution of Lebanon since it upsets the National Pact of 
1945. The National Pact, according to the said Memorandum, ensures Lebanon's 
neutrality vis a vis West and East-(76) According to this, had the Cairo Agreement 
been an element in the Pact when it was drawn up, the Pact would have been different, 
or might never been concluded-(77) Thus, since the Pact is a part of a constitution, this 
Agreement must be invalid according to the constitution. 
Others, in the wake of Israeli retaliation and the mass destruction of life and 
property, argued that the Agreement is invalid since the circumstances have 
changed. (78) In general, the Lebanese Front's objection could be summarized under 
four legal objections: 
(1) The agmement was against the will of the Lebanese government. 
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(2) It runs against the Lebanese constitution 
(3) The circumstances have changed underlying the need to repudiate that agreement. 
(4) The agreement violates Lebanese sovereignty 
As to the National Movement, the above arguments were rejected as unconstitutional 
and part of an imperialist attack on the Palestinian revolution. (79) 
Therefore, as far as the Lebanese Front is concerned the Cairo Agreement is no 
longer valid for the above reasons. And if the Agreement is not valid, then the 
Palestinians, by carrying arms and weapons, violate Lebanese sovereignty and give rise 
to the Lebanese Front's right to defend Lebanon from Palestinian foreigners. In order 
to evaluate the validity of the Lebanese Front's claims, an assessment will be carried 
out in order to affmn whether or not the Cairo Agreement is valid. 
F- The Validity of the Cairo Agreement. 
Before proceeding to discuss the legal objections of the Lebanese Front, some legal 
points have to be highlighted. The conclusion of an Agreement with the PLO raises 
some difficulties, since the PLO is not a state. Moreover, the term "Agreement" is not 
free of controversy. In view of that, two important questions must be answered: What 
is the legal nature of the Cairo Agreement ? Is it a treaty subject to international law, or 
a mere agreement subject to Lebanese Law . 9. 
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The choice of the term "Agreement" which was given to the document concluded 
between the PLO and the Lebanese government, does not create any problem. The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 does not stipulate that a specific term, 
such as treaty, is a necessary requisite for a legal document to be a treaty-(80) 
Accordingly, Article 2 (1) of the Convention defined treaty as an international 
instrument concluded between states and in a written form-(81) Moreover, in a 
comment on the Law of Treaties, it was mentioned that " the fact seems to be that 
names are frequently given to the international instruments for reasons which have 
nothing to do with the legal significance of a particular term..,,. (82) 
Therefore, the term Cairo Agreement does not affect its legal importance since there 
are no requirements relating to the choice of terms. It is a matter relating to 
constitutional law which sometimes stipulates a certain procedures in matters relating to 
the conclusion of a treaty or an Agreement. For example, in the United States, for a 
treaty to be constitutionally valid it must be approved by the Senate and the President, 
the Supreme Court held that a postal convention concluded by the Postmaster General 
under the authority of an Act of Congress and approved by the President without the 
advice and the consent of the Senate was not a treaty according to constitutional and 
municipal law of the United States-(83) 
Therefore, the terms treaty or agreement are matters relevant to the parties and 
subject to their internal law, and have nothing to do with the law of treaties. According 
to Lebanese law, a treaty must be signed by the President and the Prime Mnister and 
approved by Parliament-(84) These requirements were strictly observed in the Cairo 
Agreement. Therefore, the Cairo Agreement, as far as Lebanese Law is concerned, is a 
treaty signed between the Lebanese government and the PLO. However, a major 
d ifficulty arises as to the right of the PLO to conclude a treaty; Article 2 (1) of the 
Vienna convention provides that a treaty must be concluded between states. Since the 
PLO is not representing a state, it might be argued that it has no right to conclude a 
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treaty. 
However, that assertion is incorrect. It was argued that the PLO does not represent 
Palestine but it is surely representing the refugees. (85) It follows that the the PLO has 
a non-state character. Its status may be compared to a national liberation movement. 
However, the National Liberation Movement status, although controversial (86), has a 
legal personality which qualifies it to conclude a treaty with a state-(87) There are many 
precedents to support this conclusion. For example, the French government signed a 
treaty (Evian Treaty in 1962) with the Algerian Liberation Front, and the United States 
signed an agreement in Paris on January 27,1973 with the National Liberation 
Movement of Vietnam. Moreover, during the Second World War, western powers 
recognized national fronts which were fighting for the liberation of their land from the 
Nazi occupation and were treated by western countries as governments in exile-(88) 
All these precedents suggest that the PLO does have the legal personality to 
conclude an agreement. The PLO was recognized by the Lebanese government as the 
legitimate representative of the Palestinians and that recognition is easily inferred from 
the actual meeting with the representative of PLO. Lauterpacht affirms in this regard 
that: 
"Logic seems to demand that a state cannot become a party to a 
treaty with a state or government which it does not recognise that is 
to say, whose existence it denies - and that therefore the conclusion 
of a treaty amounts to recognition. Occasional pronouncements by 
governments substantiate that point,,. (89) 
However, given the special status of the PLO in Lebanon, it seems unreasonable to 
suggest 'that it has the capacity which a state normallyý has. The PLO's presence in 
Lebanon is a temporary one and that agreement is a mere arrangement of external 
relations between the Lebanese government and the PLO. Therefore, the Accord that 
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was concluded between the Lebanese government and PLO has an international 
character, at least within certain measures-(90) 
Given the character of the PLO and the recognition that was accorded to it by the 
Lebanese government one tends to view the Cairo Agreement as an international 
accord. 
It follows that if this thesis is right, that the Lebanese Front objections regarding the 
invalidity of the agreement must be looked at in the light of international law in order to 
determine the legitimacy of their claims. For if their claims are not valid then the 
Palestinian presence in Lebanon could not be considered in violation of lebanese law. 
(1)- The agreement was forced on the will of the Lebanese government. 
The argument that the Cairo Agreement was reached under duress needs more 
elaboration and examination in order to ascertain the legality of the said claim. Article 
(5 1) of the Vienna Convention reads: 
"The expression of a state's consent to be bound by a treaty which 
has been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts 
or threats directed agains them shall be without any legal effect". (91) 
Moreover, Article (52) of the same Convention reads: 
"A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or 
use of force in violation of the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations . (92) 
In view of both Articles, an agreement becomes void if it is concluded under 
coercion. To what extent the Lebanese Front's claims are legally valid is entirely 
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dependent on the facts. In the absence of an impartial court to rule on that matter, one 
may rely on certain external features to see whether or not the treaty was forced on the 
will of the Lebanese sovereign state. 
There is no doubt that the Lebanese government was fully aware of the 
consequences of that agreement and thus accepted it. The Lebanese President himself 
affirmed that the conclusion of the treaty was necessary in order to preserve national 
unity(93). Lebanese public opinion was fully in support of Palestinians and their right 
to self-determination through the armed struggle and precisely from the Lebanese 
border against Israeli state. In November 1969, an independent public opinion poll 
showed that 85 per cent of the Lebanese population favoured commando activity in 
general and 62 per cent supported commando activity run from Lebanese territory-(94) 
Moreover, the Cairo Agreement was signed under the auspices of the Egyptian 
delegation and was later ratified by the Lebanese Parliament-(95) The claim that the 
Agreement was signed under duress seems unreasonable since the Lebanese 
government could have by its sheer military power, suppressed the Palestinian 
commandos and consequently avoided signing the treaty. There is no evidence 
furnished by the Lebanese Front that force was used to induce the will of the Lebanese 
sovereign. The existence of physical force is vital for nullifying the agreement as a mere 
economic or political pressure cannot be considered on its own-(96) In view of that, 
and in the absence of fact to the contrary, one can conclude that the Cairo Agreement 
was not signed under duress. 
(2) The Agreement runs against the Lebanese constitution. 
The claims that Cairo Agreement was signed in violation of the Lebanese 
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constitution is from international perspective not of much importance. 
In fact, Article 46 of Vienna Convention reads: 
"A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a 
treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal 
law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its 
consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned with a rule 
of its internal law of fundamental importance". (97) 
To the Lebanese Monk, the Cairo Agreement violated an important rule of the 
unwritten Lebanese constitution (the National Pact). That violation justified the 
nullification of the Agreement. However, such a claim cannot be taken at face value. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice in its advisory opinion in the Treatment 
of Polish Nationals in Danzig affirmed: 
"It should, however, be observed that, while on the one hand, 
according to the generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as 
against another State, on the provisions of the latter's Constitution, 
but only on international law and international obligations duly 
accepted, on the other hand and conversely, a State cannot adduce as 
against another State its Constitution with a view to evading 
obligation incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in 
force,,. (98) 
In fact, there are two schools of thought on this subject. One school considers that 
a treaty is void so long as it goes against the internal constitutional regulations-(99) The 
other school, on the contrary, considers that a treaty is valid, despite its violation of 
internal constitutional procedures- G 00) However, it seems that the former school of 
thought goes against the major policy aim which encourages the stability of 
intemadonal arrangement through treaties. The first view " lays a burden upon other 
states to satisfy themselves in every case that the constitutional limitations of a State 
with which they desire to enter into a treaty are not breached"- G0 1) In the light of 
practice, however, the second school is gaining predominance over the the first 
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school-002) 
As such, the Monk's claim as far as the invalidity of the Cairo Agreement is 
concerned looks irrelevant. However, one is tempted to take the matter further by 
questioning the status of the National Pact in the Lebanese context. 
The National Pact itself suffers from the absence of precision. Many Lebanese 
officials played down the importance of the National Pact and considered it a mere 
temporary stage upon which the national leaders in 1943 reached a consensus regarding 
the future Lebanon. However, as Lebanon had passed that sensitive period, the Prime 
Minister, R. Karami, declared on the 25th of November 1975, that " ... there 
is a 
dispute which does have a confessional aspect because things have developed in 
Lebanon between 1943 and 1975" and confirmed that the Pact is no longer operative 
since " the new generation differs from that of the past". 003) It was not only the 
Prime Minister, but also many Lebanese officials who showed their negative attitudes 
towards the Pact-004) 
The fact remains that the Pact was an essential ingredient for building Lebanon at 
the time of independence. It envisaged the distribution of power amongst sects which, 
with the passing of time proved to be detrimental to Lebanon's future. It is the National 
Pact which gave rise to disagreement amongst the Lebanese as it was perceived by one 
party to be a manifestation of inequality and a stumbling block in the process of 
building a new Lebanon. It seems unreasonable, in such a context, to affirm that the 
National Pact has a supremacy which permits it to repudiate a treaty. Therefore, the 
National Pact does not have the power to repudiate the Cairo Agreement under 
international law; nor is it any longer valid in the Lebanese context since its existence 
has given rise to the civil war. 
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(3)-The circumstances have changed (Rebus Sic Stanibus). 
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads: 
"A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with 
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, 
and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked 
as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty 
unless: 
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis 
of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of 
obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 
This concept is reflected in the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case(105), where the Court affirmed that change of 
circumstances " under certain conditions, afford the party affected a ground for 
invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty". It is not exclusively on the 
grounds of fairness that a treaty can be terminated, but rather than on the " 
disappearance of the foundation upon which it rests". (106) This conforms to the main 
policy which is concerned with the stability of international obligations by narrowing 
down the scope of auto interpretation- (107) 
In ascertaining the existence of any fundemental change of circumstances, ý the 
intention of the parties to the agreement plays a decisive role. McNair adhered to the 
device of intention by saying: " Nevertheless the main object of interpretation of a treaty 
being to give effect to the intention of the parties in using the language employed by 
them, it is reasonable to expect that circumstances should arise (as they do in the sphere 
of private law contracts) in which it is necessary to imply a condition in order to give 
effect to this intention "- (108) Others such as Professor Bishop(109), Professor 
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Briggs(l 10) and Hyde(I 11) concluded that the criterion of intention is the decisive 
factor in the concept of changed circumstances ( rebus sic stantibus). The intention of 
the parties could be inferred from the raison detre or the cause of the treaty. Therefore, 
the concept of rebus sic stantibus must be limited to " cases in which the parties 
contracted with reference to a set of conditions which have changed" which, if it had 
been foreseen at the time of conclusion of the treaty, one " would have said that the 
treaty should lapse"-(112) This policy was affirmed in the Intemational Law 
Commission debate on the concept of fundamental change of circumstances as the 
Commission reported " .. A general desire to emphasize the need for the stability of 
treaties and the narrow and exceptional character of the doctrine of changing 
circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) . (113) 
Therefore, the question which needs an answer is, does the Cairo Agreement fit 
within such a description ? Or, in other words, do the subsequent events that led to 
Israeli retaliation against guerilla attacks bring the concept of changed circumstances 
into operation? 
To answer this question one has to rely on the intention of the parties at the time of 
concluding the Agreement. In other words, were the parties aware of the consequences 
of that Agreement and, if so, would they have declined to conclude it ? This question is 
not difficult to answer. A state permitting its territory to be used as a base against 
another state, would logically be subject to retaliation. The Lebanese government not 
only permitted its territory to be used in this way but at the same time pledged its full 
support for the guerilla operation-0 14) Moreover, the mere signing of such an 
agreement would affirm the intention of the Lebanese government to violate the cease- 
fire agreement signed on 23rd of April 1949 between the government of Israel and 
Lebanon. That on its own suggests that Israeli retaliation was foreseeable at the time of 
signing the Cairo Agreement. If that is correct, then the invocation of the concept of 
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changed circumstances is out of place. 
Moreover, and assuming that the circumstances were not foreseeable at that time, it 
is still arguable that the Cairo Agreement cannot be repudiated as a whole. The Cairo 
Agreement was not originally signed for the sake of permitting the guerilla attack from 
the Lebanese border, but mainly for regulating the presence of Palestinians on 
Lebanese soil regarding work, travel etc.. The clause which is related to military 
operations from Lebanese territory could be terminated without invalidating the whole 
Agreement. This is supported by the fact that the intention of the parties was to regulate 
the Palestinians presence in Lebanon. 
Therefore, the Cairo Agreement cannot be terminated on the ground of changed 
circumstance, since both of the parties were fully aware of its consequences at the time 
of its conclusion. 
(4) The Agreement violates Lebanese sovereignty. 
The core of the argument focus on the rights which have been given to Palestinians 
in the Cairo Agreement. Palestinians have the right to establish bases in Lebanon and 
carry out military training on Lebanese territory. These sets of rights were perceived by 
the Lebanese Front as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty. Since sovereignty is of 
paramount importance, the Agreement must be void as it violates sovereignty. Ibis 
argument raises the question as to whether or not a state has the right to conclude an 
agreement which runs against or limits its sovereignty. 
In fact, the principle of sovereignty is no longer as it used to be in the past 
especially in the 19th century where it was perceived as absolute. The development of 
international society and interdependence has given rise to a concept of limited 
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sovereignty. The emergence of the EC and other international and regional 
organizations is a clear example of that concept. The member states of the EC have 
transferred some of their power to conclude treaties with different subjects of 
international law in certain fields with the implication that these states no longer have 
the power to pursue individual relations with other states in such fields which a 
redelegated to the Community-0 15) In view of this, member states have limited or 
transfer-red their sovereignty in certain fields-0 16) 
Another illustration of the state's right to limit its sovereignty is fully demonstrated 
in the Wimbledon case. ne Permanent Court of Justice in its ruling against Germany 
for not permitting the S. S Wimbledon a free passage through the Kiel Canal under the 
term of Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles aff=ed: 
" .. No doubt any convention creating an obligation of this kind 
places a restriction upon the exercise of sovereign rights of the state, 
in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. 
But the right of entering into international engagement is an attribute 
of state sovereignty-. (117) 
Friedmann's view is not different from the above case, as he asserts that " it is 
certainly within the right of any state represented by its government, to surrender its 
national sovereignty"- G 18) Therefore, the surrender of sovereignty by the Lebanese 
state does not justify the termination of the treaty. As it is phrased by Permanent Court 
of Justice, "entering into international engagement is an attribute of sovereignty". 
Moreover, the Cairo Agreement does not in any sense surrender Lebanese sovereignty 
to the PLO. In the introduction to the Agreement, respect for Lebanese sovereignty is 
fully recognised; the Lebanese government and the PLO confirm their brotherhood and 
common destiny, and stress positive co-operation for the benefit of Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Revolution within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty-0 19) Article 
(13) confirms the Lebanese government's right to exercise full authority over all the 
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Palestinians camps within the Lebanese tenitory-(120) 
Therefore, it is clear that the Cairo Agreement does not violate the Lebanese 
sovereignty since the will of Lebanese sovereign validated this agreement. The 
Lebanese Front's claim, therefore, seems irrelevant, so long as the Front is not a party 
to that Agreement. That is to say, if there is a challenge to that Agreement, it must be 
exercised by the Lebanese state and not the Lebanese Front. For the Lebanese Front 
represent a portion of the population of Lebanon and this does not qualify it to speak 
for all Lebanese. 
On the whole, it becomes clear that the Cairo Agreement legitin-dzed the presence of 
Palestinians in Lebanon including the PLO. It follows that the Palestinians did not cross 
the border illegally and threaten the Lebanese government. Their presence was 
originally enhanced by the Geneva Convention for Refugees and later by the Cairo 
Agreement. That evidence suggests that the Palestinians are not an indigenous or an 
external party; their status is of a special nature since they settled legally in Lebanon and 
long before the eruption of internal conflict, and at the same time, given the 
impossibility of their return to Palestine, their presence in Lebanon becomes imperative. 
However, one may wonder whether or not the Palestinians have the right to participate 
in the Lebanese conflict. 
V- The Cairo Agreement and the validity of Palestinian participation in 
the Lebanese civil war. 
There is no doubt that the Palestinians have no legal ground to engage actively in 
Lebanese internal affairs as such activity goes beyond the letter of the Cairo Agreement. 
However, such a violation of the Cairo Agreement does not necessarily lead to the 
classification of Palestinian participation as an external intervention in any real sense. 
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The Palestinians have insisted constantly on their neutral role in the Lebanese 
conflict. The Executive Committee of the PLO declared its neutrality and affmned that 
...... the Palestinian presence in Lebanon is not a political clique 
affiliated to any specific quarter nor does it wish to be, and the 
stability of Lebanon is the stability of the Palestinian revolution ... the 
Palestinian revolution is bearing arms only for the sake of liberation 
and for defence of its existence, these are inseparable twins... the 
Palestinian revolution has nothing to say on whatever political 
social, and economic system, regime and legislation Lebanon may 
choose for herself, except to wish her continuing prosperity and 
greater success"-(121) 
Despite the existence of some Palestinian organizations which did not conceal their 
support for the Lebanese National Movement, the PLO, represented by Arafat, insisted 
on its respect for Lebanese sovereignty and Lebanese law and refused to discuss any 
problem concerning the Palestinians's presence with the Lebanese Front on the ground 
that LF is not a party to the Cairo Agreement and do not represent the Lebanese 
state-022) 
In asserting of the neutral role of Palestinians, the Mufti of Lebanon testified to this 
end: 
".. Every one must realise that this ordeal is purely internal.. the 
crisis has no connection with anyone-the Palestinian revolution 
grasped this truth and stood aside, witnessing our pain with still 
greater pain, binding our wounds while its own bleed"-(123) 
As the Lebanese war escalated to engulf many parts of Lebanon, the Palestinians 
found themselves in an awkward position. The Lebanese Front declared its aim to 
uproot them from Lebanon, and did not hesitate to attack the Palestinian camps. The LF 
attacks forced the camps' inhabitants to leave, and left the PLO with no choice but to 
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join the Lebanese National Movement openly-024) The active participation of 
Palestinians beyond doubt goes against the Cairo Agreement, but in view of the 
circumstances their participation is justifiable. Under the concept of self-defence every 
one has the right to defend himself. It is a natural right which gives every human being 
the legal right to ward off any threat to his life. Thus, the Palestinian participation could 
be equated with the right of self-defence as they have no choice but to defend their 
camps. The Lebanese Front attack has, in one way or another, justified Palestinian 
participation. In evidence to the Lebanese Parliament, the Prime Minister of Lebanon 
accused the Phalange party of a plot to drag the Palestinians into the Lebanese conflict: 
" The clear proof of the responsibility of the Kataib (phalange) party 
for this incident (Ayen Al Rummana massacre) is made evident 
when we think of it with its precedents and with the attempts that 
followed to expand the fighting so as to include fighting between the 
Lebanese and Palestinians and the Lebanese themselves"-(125) 
In view of the above arguments, Palestinian participation in the conflict was not 
voluntary but rather a measure to ensure survival. Such participation does not run 
counter to the Cairo Agreement which permits the Palestinians to defend their camps 
against any attack. However, Palestinian participation must be restricted to the defence 
of camps. Participation in fighting for reasons or goals beyond the protection of 
ýalestinians is illegitimate as it contradicts the Cairo Agreement and the Lebanese right 
to determine its future as it wishes. However, given the religious and cultural features 
of the conflict, it is hard to draw a line between the defence of the camps and 
involvement in civil war in order to secure the victory of one party. It is that features 
which makes the task of legal classification very difficult. 
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VI- Conclusion. 
The Lebanese conflict has presented a difficult dilemma as to its legal nature. The 
existence of Palestinians and their participation in the conflict has given rise to the belief 
that the conflict is not a civil war. However, it is a civil war as it is contains the three 
essential features: it is between indigenous people, within the boundaries of the state, 
and a genuine armed conflict. The Palestinians did not cross the Lebanese border 
against the wishes of the Lebanese sovereign nor against Lebanese law. 17heir presence 
was legitimized by the Geneva Convention and the Cairo Agreement. The latter 
Agreement gave the Palestinians the right to carry weapons and settle legally in 
Lebanon under the protection of the Lebanese government. As the Lebanese 
government disintegrated and civil war erupted, the Palestinians participation could be 
justified under the right of self-defence. Their active participation beyond the protection 
of camps , however could be regarded as an extension of self-defence, as the victory of 
the LF would pose a real threat to their existence in Lebanon. The religious orientation 
and cultural similarity, not to mention their long presence in Lebanon, between 
Palestinians and Lebanese make the distinction between them very difficult. All these 
factors militate against the classification of Palestinians as an external party. The 
Lebanese Front claim that the Palestinians are occupiers of Lebanon is not valid under 
the Cairo Agreement. 
Therefore, since the Palestinians did not cross the border against Lebanese law or 
threaten the sovereignty of Lebanon, their presence in Lebanon is legal. They are an 
internal party of special status and cannot be regarded an external party in the legal 
sense. As such, the Lebanese civil war is a war between the internal parties within the 
territory of Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SYRIAN INTERVENTION UPON THE REQUEST OF THE REBELS. 
I-Factural record: From 13th April 1975 to 4th January 1976. 
Following the massacre of Ain-Rumaneh, the Lebanese internal parties to the 
conflict were further apart than ever before; a compromise amongst them seemed 
impossible. The leader of the Left Junmblat, having accused the Phalange of the 
massacre, demanded the exclusion of the party from the then government-G) In 
retaliation, two ministers of the Phalange party resigned, followed shortly by another 
three ministers from the Liberal party. (2) With the resignation of six ministers from the 
cabinet, the prime minister Solh, unable to perform his duties, offered his resignation 
on the 15th of May 1975. 
On the 23rd of May 1975, president Franjieh nominated a retired military officer, 
Nour Al Refay, to form a government. As the new prime minister formed his 
cabinet(3), a series of angry protests from the Left and traditional Muslims ensued; and 
both the Left and traditional leaders demanded the immediate resignation of Al Refay's 
govemment-(4) 
71be formation of a military cabinet as such provoked Syria to voice its concern over 
such a government-0) In the meantime, the fight continued to spread in the capital and 
its vicinity. Under such circumstances, the Lebanese president bowed to external and 
internal pressure, and hence the military government offered its resignation. (6) A new 
government, headed by Karami, was formed and included some representatives of all 
the Lebanese parties. However, such a government did not succeed in halting the spate 
of violence which at that time spread beyond the capital to the centre and North of 
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Lebanon-(7) A deadlock ensued as to whether to use the Lebanese army to halt the 
fight; the Christians insisted on its use whereas the Left and traditionalists refused its 
deployment. (8) Furthermore, when the government of Karami agreed on the 
deployment of the army only in the north of the capital, charges were levelled against its 
impartiality-(9) 
In such a context, the Syrian government moved to offer its mediation in order to 
ease the tension between the Lebanese parties, but with an implicit threat that unless the 
parties considered its initiative, other measures could be resorted in order to stop the 
fight-00) The Syrian initiative culminated in the formation of the Committee of 
National Reconciliation which was composed of the two opposing groups: the Left 
(LNM) and the Right (I-F)-(l 1) Despite the formation of such a committee, internal 
differences persisted as the LNM insisted on the implementation of its political reforms, 
whereas the LF insisted on maintaining law and order before any discussion of internal 
reforms-02) 
Fighting continued to rage on, which again forced the Syrian government to take a 
new initiative resulting in the formation of a new body, the " Higher Co-ordination 
Committee" which included both the LF and LNM-(13) Like its predecessor, the 
committee failed to produce any results, and fighting erupted once more between the 
parties. 
On the fourth of January 1976 the forces of the Lebanese Front initiated its major 
offensive on the Lebanese National Movement in an attempt to eradicate any Muslim 
presence in the Eastern sector. Their attempt resulted in laying siege to the major 
Palestinian camps Tall-Al Zatar and Jusr-Al Basha-04) The seige of the Palestinian 
camps dragged the reluctant Palestinian organisation (PLO) into the field of 
combat-05) 
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With Palestinian participation, however, the course of fighting took a new dramatic 
course on both the domestic and regional levels. On the domestic level the Leftist 
forces retaliated by shelling the Christian coastal town on the Lebanese coast (Al- 
Damour) to pressurize the Right forces (LF) and to ease the seige of the two camps. In 
response, the right forces took the dramatic step of occupying another Palestinian camp 
(Al-Dabaya) and destroying it completely. Following the fall of camp Al-Dabaya a 
chain of retaliation took place. Leftist forces launched a major attack on the Christian 
town, Al-Damour, and Right forces attacked the Muslim slum area in Al-Masalkh and 
Al-Karantina and razed it to the ground after killing thousands of its inhabitants-(16) 
The Left attack on Al-Damour ran into difficulties as their forces engaged in battle with 
the Lebanese Army which used its fighters to repel the attackers. The Muslim Prime 
Minister, Karami, was infuriated as his orders for the army withdrawal from combat 
fell on deaf ears, and news of a new massacre in the slum area (Al-Karantina and Al- 
Masalkh) left him with only one option, which was to offer his resignation. 
On the regional level, the domestic development awakened Syria to the critical 
development which was taking shape in Lebanon. The attack on Palestinian camps and 
the engagement of the Lebanese Army aroused a reasonable fear in the minds of the 
Syrian decision-makers. As Syria perceives itself as the beating heart of Arabism and 
the champion of the Palestinians, dislodging Muslims from the Christian sector in order 
to set up a Christian state was utterly unacceptable to Syria. The defeat of the 
Palestinians and the Lebanese National Movement would lead to the defeat of Syrian 
policy and interest-07) To Syria, the events in Lebanon were of Syrian concern and 
any development should bear the Syrian seal of approval. The Syrian attitude towards 
the LF policy of attacking the Palestinians was made very clear in a statement made by 
the foreign minister, Kaddam: "This is a very sensitive situation in relation to us in 
Syria, and in relation to the presence of Palestinian resistance there"418) 
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The Syrian Foreign Minister determined that his country's attitude was that 
Lebanon's partition was unacceptable. The occupation of the Al-Karanitina and Al- 
Masalkh enhanced the belief that the LF was strengthening its position in an enclave 
which could be a prelude to a sessionist policy. In response to that Mr Kaddarn 
affirmed Syria's stand vis a vis the LF policy by saying: 
"We made it clear in a decisive manner, that we would not permit the 
partition of Lebanon, any initiative for partition would mean our 
immediate intervention. For Lebanon was part of Syria and we 
would restore it with any attempt at partition -(19) 
The Lebanese Front, however, did not give any regard to the Syrian warning, and 
on the contrary, its forces continued their attack on the Leftist positions. In the wake of 
these events, the Syrian decision makers decided to intervene to correct the imbalance in 
the Lebanese equation. 
11- The Syrian justification 
President Assad, in his famous and major speech regarding Syrian policy in 
Lebanon, explained his government's policy and the legal ground upon which the 
Syrian troops intervened in Lebanon. He drew his people's attention to the international 
conspiracy that beset Lebanon and the Syrian duty bound to foil it so defending the 
unity of Lebanon. He plainly outlined his government's option in such terms: "... we 
said that this plot cannot achieve its objectives except through fighting. Therefore, in 
order to foil the plot, we had to stop the fighting. " Therefore, according to Assad's 
calculation the only way to stop the fight, was by rendering support to the left forces as 
"... the balance of forces was not equal, and fighting could not have stopped. This is 
why we were compelled to give weapons and ammunition"- (20) 
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The legal ground upon which the President relied to explain his action of providing 
weapons to the rebel forces was largely explained in terms of policy, not law. 
However, regarding the dispatch of the PLA (The Palestinian Liberation Army ), he 
vaguely referred to the legal justifications by pointing to the "Arumun summit" which, 
in the view of the President, provided the legal backbone to the Syrian intervention. In 
Assad's account, the Arumun summit which included various Muslims and Left leaders 
asked President Assad to contact the Lebanese President to arrange for a cease fire and 
prevent the right forces from storming the Western sector. Despite Assad's 
unwillingness, the fighting resumed and hence the participants of Arumun summit 
contacted him again urging him to save them from imminent defeat 
The next day, the President received the leaders of nationalist parties (LNM) and 
assured them that Syria would be on their side by saying: 
"... we are with you and with the Lebanese people. We will oppose 
the massacres. We will oppose the liquidation because this is in the 
interest of all the parties in Lebanon. We sent in the PLA and other 
forces, and matters were supposed to return to normal"421) 
The sending in of the PLA was the only option available to the Syrian government, 
for the presence of the Syrian Army would have provoked an Israeli retaliation. This 
assumption was inferred from Assad's statement: 
'"rhus, we said, we must go in to save Resistance. We decided to go 
in under the name of the PLA. The PLA began to go into Lebanon 
and nobody knew of this"-(22) 
With the Syrian intervention under the guise of the PLA, the only relevant question 
is whether or not Syria could intervene legally under such a justification. An 
intervention on the side of the rebel forces in the Lebanese civil war is not an ordinary 
event, irrespective of the invitation of Arumun summit; an evaluation of its legality is to 
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a great extent dependent on the legal status of the rebel forces at the time of 
intervention. In order to assess the legality of the Syrian intervention, two questions 
have to be answered: 
(a)- Is the Syrian intervention consistent with the rules of customary international law ? 
(b)- Is the Arumun Summit's invitation a valid justification under international law 
To answer the first question, a general review of the customary rules of civil war is 
necessary. And if the inquiry proves that the Syrian government had no legal ground to 
intervene under the customary rules of international law, then the second question will 
be considered under the contemporary rules of international law. 
In order to analyse the Syrian military action and determine its legality, one has to 
go through the existing norms of customary International Law and see to what extent 
the Syrians adhered to the said rules. In dealing with the customary law of civil war, 
however, one has to bear in mind the fragility of the rules in question and the strong 
tendency of most contemporary writers to regard it as irrelevant and outmoded. 
However, since there is no set of coherent and recognised rules bearing on the subject, 
the customary rules of International Law are indispensable. 
11- The classical rules of International Law. 
Customary International Law regarded the existence of a civil war as a domestic 
matter which has no legal connection with the subject of International Law. Ibis view 
in one way or another accelerated the trend towards its dernise, given the great effect 
that civil war has on the international arena. Despite this fact, many writers still regard 
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the customary law of great help in considering civil war by establishing the boundaries 
between domestic and international matters and moreover by determining the rights and 
duties of foreign states towards the parties of the civil conflict-(23) 
The customary Law's crucial thrust is the norm of non-intervention which binds 
foreign states to refrain from any action that violate the norms. In doing so the law 
offers a set of rules which precisely determine at what stage foreign states could regard 
the ensuing events in a state as being no longer within its domestic jurisdiction. So long 
as the matter is within a state's jurisdiction, foreign states have no legal right to 
intervene since they have no right to pass judgement on the merit of any case which is 
taking shape in the said state. This principle dates back to the time of Vattel who 
strongly asserted that: 
"foreign nations must not interfere in the affairs of an independent 
state. It is not their part to decide between citizens whose civil 
discord has driven them to take up arms, nor between sovereign and 
his subject"-(24) 
From such premises the customary law proceeded to deal with the subject of 
International Law and hence classified it into three categories. The categories, in view 
of the law, redraw the relation between the parent states and the parties and both of 
them with the outside states. The categorization of the conflict cover these three stages: 
rebellion, insurgency and belligerency. 
The first category is identifiable with the surge of violence and spread of 
disobedience in the civil society. Precisely, it is a term applicable to "an uprising against 
a lawful authority which is lacking in any resemblance tojustice-(25) Or it refers to this 
kind of domestic violence in which "there is sufficient evidence that the police force of 
the parent state will reduce the seditious party to respect the municipal law-(26) Then, 
it follows, according to customary law, that as long as the domestic violence is within 
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the said category, the parent state has the monopoly to deal with the matter as it is 
essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. Whatever the means employed by the parent 
government, the rule is very clear that foreign states have no right to intervene-(27) It 
follows that foreign assistance to the rebellious party constitutes a violation of the norm 
of non-intervention which is a pillar upon which sovereignty and independence stand. 
Thus, assistance is asymmetrical whereby assistance to the incumbent government is 
legal, and to rebel forces , illegal. 
The implicit rationale of this rule'clearly emanates from the perception that rebel 
forces were perceived by both the parent government and foreign states as mere law 
breakers fitting neatly into the category of robbers and criminals-(28) Therefore, 
customary law regards rebel forces as havin g no status in International Law at all, and 
by implication there is no acknowledged place for rebellion in International Law-(29) 
The second category is insurgency where the violence stretches out beyond the 
definition of the first category. As a matter of fact, the status of insurgency is imbued 
with ambiguity and confusion. It serves as an indication of the fact that the military 
struggle by the rebel forces is no longer within the confined Emit of the rebellion, that is 
to say, it is "an intermediate stage between a state of tranquility and a state of civil 
war"(30) Thus, with the status of insurgency, the violence is not on a small scale 
which the police force could suppress, but a new stage in which the insurgents 
strengthen their grip on a certain territory and the incumbent government seems unable 
to contain their military power or suppress it. Insurgency, then floats the cause of the 
insurgents to the surface when this happens, foreign states should take note of the 
existing development inside other states especially when such developments affect their 
interest. 
Foreign states cannot treat the issue with indifference, as insurgency gives rise to 
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the application of certain rules especially those relating to humanitarian law. However, 
insurgency is not very successful in bringing the insurgents to an equal footing with the 
incumbent govemment, and their position is virtually the same as the first stage of 
rebellion. The fact remains that, as long as the status of belligerency is not achieved, 
the incumbent govemment is still regarded in the eye of Intemational Law as the 
constitutional authority to which all assistance is permissible. It was argued that 
insurgency is a mere recognition or proclamation of civil war and an indication that the 
insurgents have de facto status with respect to some issues, such as protection of 
foreign property or nationals in a sense that foreign states could be in contact with 
insurgents regarding these issues without prejudicing the right of the incumbent 
govemment. However, such a recognition does not give rise to any legally binding 
obligation on foreign states which are still bound by law to continue their support for 
the incumbent govemment; and hence any support for the insurgents will run against 
the existing law-(31) 
Bearing this point in mind, the United States Department ruling during the 1930 
revolution in Brazil supports the preceding view. Ilie Department's decision prohibited 
the shipment of all arms to that country (Brazil) except to the incumbent government: 
".. until belligerency is recognised and the duty of neutrality arises, 
all the human predispositions towards stability of government , the 
preservation of international amity and the protection of established 
intercourse between nations are in favour of the existing 
govemment". (32) 
Therefore, in general, the status of insurgency does not differ practically from the 
status of rebellion; it gives states only more freedom and flexibility in determining their 
reaction or attitude according to their interest whenever the occasion arises, but it does 
not breach the limitation of law which prohibits assistance to the insurgents. The 
interest in question is only that related to the protection of property and nationals where 
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necessity forces foreign states to do so, since the incumbent government is incapable of 
securing the foreign states interest. However, in assigning to states the right to 
determine the quantum of legal relations subjectively, the law at this point transcends 
the criterion of objectivity and replaces it with expediency. . 
It is no wonder that the status of insurgency was regarded as such "a catch all 
designation provided by international law to allow states to determine the quantum of 
legal relations to be established with the insurgents ',. (33) As a whole, insurgency is " 
an international acknowledgment of the existence of internal war, but it leaves each state 
substantially free to control the consequences of this acknowledgement. It also serves 
as a partial internationalization of the conflict without bringing the status of belligerency 
into being"-(34) 
Ile third category is the status of belligerency in which the conflict takes a dramatic 
course and the conflict can no longer be regarded as a domestic issue. Belligerency 
transfers the conflict from its domestic concern into an international arena and thereby 
brings the rules of neutrality into operation. 
The recognition of belligerency by the foreign state is the acknowledgment of the 
fact that the incumbent government is no longer the sole beneficiary of assistance but, 
on the contrary, is on equal footing with its opponents. However, belligerency is not to 
be granted without any qualification at all: there are certain criteria which ought to be 
fulfilled and respected. Oppenheim determined the conditions that need to exist before 
granting the status of belligerency. To him, these conditions are as such: 
The existence of civil war accompanied by a state of general 
hostilities; occupation and a measure of orderly administration of a 
substantial part of national territory by the insurgent forces acting 
under a responsible authority; the practical necessity for the third 
state to define their attitude to civil war". (35) 
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Oppenheim's statement surnmarized the universal conditions regarding the status of 
belligerency; foreign states are under a legal duty to extend their recognition of 
belligerency-whenever these conditions exist. (36) To recap, the status of belligerency 
required the existence of four conditions: First, the existence of general hostilities 
which means that the fighting is conducted on a large scale which makes it completely 
different from sporadic fighting. Second, the occupation of a large portion of territory 
and the administering of it by the insurgents. Third, the conducting of hostilities by the 
insurgents in accordance with the law of war by setting up a responsible command and 
having organized forces. Fourth, there is a need, in view of the circumstances for 
outside states, to grant the recognition of the status of belligerency. The existence of all 
four conditions gives rise to the need to recognise the status of belligerency. However, 
there is no agreement that the recognition is legally obligatory, as most states affirin that 
recognition is a political and not a legal act. However, recognition of belligerency, on 
the other hand, before the existence of the said conditions is a premature recognition 
which the law perceives as illegal and a violation of the norm of non-intervention. 
Therefore, with the status of rebellion, insurgency and finally belligerency, one could 
proceed to analyse the Syrian intervention in the light of the above classification. 
I'he crucial questions which arise in this context are: what was the status of the 
Lebanese National Movement when Syria intervened on its side against the established 
legal government and its allies; and, consequently, was the Syrian government justified 
in its military action? Another question is of special relevence: to what extent had 
customary law managed to cope with foreign intervention in civil war; or to put it 
differently: does the law offer suitable rules that could control the violence emanating 
from civil war? 
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IV-The legal assessment of the Syrian intervention under customary 
International Law 
The Syrian government's indirect intervention, to shore up the waning power of the 
Leftist forces (LNM) and Palestinian resistance, could hardly be regarded as consistent 
with the customary law of civil war. The Syrian government did not offer any legal 
argument regarding the status of the parties in order to justify their action. The 
government's failure, leaves one with the task of analysing the Syrian action by relying 
only on their actual conduct and their various political statements. 
Intervention on the side of the Leftist forces was not the only step which was taken 
by Syria but on the contrary, they extended every possible help to the leftist forces 
before their collapse. The Syrian President explained this with surprise when witnessed 
the collapse of the leftist forces by saying: 
it we have offered everything we could ... despite our political and 
military effort as far as offering arms and ammunition in large 
quantities and various types, one day the front of the nationalist 
parties and the front of the Palestinian resistance collapsed, '. (37) 
Tle collapse itself presented Syria with the awkward dilemma which was projected 
by Assad as follows: 
"either we do not intervene and the resistance in Lebanon collapses 
and is liquidated in the view of the military situation and in the need 
for help; or we do intervene and save the resistance". (38) 
The Syrian military action, however, was not in line with the wishes of the 
legitimate Lebanese government which protested against the Syrian measures. 'nie 
Syrian response was very clear as Assad recalled the conversation between himself and 
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the Lebanese President over the issue, where he affirrned to the latter that, "our stand 
[the Syrian] towards the Palestinians was consistent and that as far as the Palestinians 
were concerned there was a red line that we would absolutely not allow any one to go 
beyond"-(39) However, to what extent the Syrians were justified in rendering military 
assistance and finally crossing the border under the banner of the PLA, is the crucial 
question. 
The only possible interpretation of their military action lies in the likelihood that the 
Syrian government viewed the conflict as one falling neither in the category of rebellion 
nor insurgency. For the simple fact is that insurgency and rebellion do not offer a 
legitimate excuse for their conduct since the only permissible assistance is that accorded 
to the legitimate government, not rebels. 
Therefore, the only category left is the status of belligerency where neutrality is 
supposed to be the norin whenever the foreign government recognises -the status of 
belligerency. Despite the fact that the concept of belligerency has not been much in use 
since the American Civil War, various states in explaining their military assistance to 
the rebel forces, recognised them as the legitimate government. During the Spanish 
Civil War, the Franco regime was recognised by Germany and Italy and hence they 
offered it full military assistance which culminated in its victory. Therefore, recognizing 
the rebel forces as the legitimate government, could offer the justification needed, 
provided there was a legal ground for such a recognition; otherwise, it would constitute 
a hostile act to grant premature recognition-00) 
Assuming that the Syrian government recognised the Leftist forces as the legitimate 
government, one wonders whether or not such a recognition was premature. The rebel 
forces far from satisfying the four conditions laid down earlier in order to be recognised 
as belligerents, failed to hold on to any territory and they were far from fighting under a 
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unified command. Moreover, the rebels themselves did not declare their own 
government nor considered the Lebanese government illegal, and the most they 
demanded was the reform of the Lebanese system. (41) On the contrary, the Lebanese 
government was in full control politically and militarily, despite the differences amongst 
the Lebanese leaders regarding the deployment of the Army. It would not be unrealistic 
to view the status of the LNM as that of mere rebellion, where the army could manage 
quickly to suppress it if it was given the proper legal and political authorization. In view 
of the foregoing fact, the Syrian assistance to the LNM and Palestinians through the 
flood of arms and ammunition, was illegal under the customary rules of the 
International Law. 
Customary International Law viewed such assistance as violative of International 
Law and the sovereignty of the state in question. International Law prescribes 
assistance to rebel forces so long as they did not achieve the status of belligerency and 
were recognised by foreign states as such. In 1900, the Institute of International Law 
adopted a resolution relating to foreign intervention and the rights and duties of states. 
The resolution under the chapter of duties of foreign powers towards the incumbent 
government and in particular Article 1(2) as such states: "It is bound not to furnish the 
insurgents with either arms, ammunition, military goods, or financial aid. " More 
relevant is section 3 of Article (1) which reads: 
"It is especially forbidden for any third power to allow any hostile 
expedition against an established and recognised. government to be 
organized within its domain"-(42) 
Since the Syrian government did not declare its recognition of the rebel forces as the 
legitimate government-(43) and so long as there was no ground to view the LNM as the 
full belligerent enjoying an equal status to the Lebanese government, the Syrian action 
was illegal and was a violation of the norm of customary International Law. This 
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verdict is consistent with contemporary international law where the use of force is 
prohibited and considered one of the most serious crimes. Article 2 (4) of the United 
Nations Charter makes it clear that the use of force in international relations is no longer 
permissible. Moreover, the General Assembly Resolutions, and in particular the 1970 
Declaration on the Principles of International Law aff=* that: 
" no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate 
subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent 
overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in 
another state"-(44) 
Relevant to the discussion is the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression 
which in Article (1) says that: 
" Aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations, as set out in this definition". 
And Article (3) of the Definition of Aggression and in particular paragraph (g) 
which reads: 
"The sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another state of such gravity as to amount to the act listed 
above, or its substantial involvement therein"-(45) 
However, the International Court of Justice in its ruling in the Nicaragua case did 
not strictly agree with the above view, as the court demanded the existence of a 
substantial involvement in order to consider irregular or mercenary attacks as acts of 
aggression. The Court went on to say: 
" It may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be 
understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces 
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on an international border, but also the sending by or on behalf of a 
state of armed bands, group, irregular or mercenaries, which carry 
out acts of armed force against another state of such gravity as to 
amount to (interalia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular 
forces or its substantial involvement therein"-(46) 
However, such a conclusion was neither agreed upon amongst international 
Lawyers nor amongst the Judges who ruled in the Nicaragua case. Judge Schwebel in 
his dissenting opinion affu-rned that: 
"Let us assume, arguendo, that the court is correct in holding that 
provision of weapons or logistical support to rebels of themselves 
may not be tantamount to armed attack (an assumption which I do 
not share, not least because the term ' logistical support ' is so open 
ended, including , as it may, the transport, quartering and 
provisioning of armies). It does not follow that a state's 
involvement in the sending of armed bands is not to be construed as 
tantamount to armed attack when, cumulatively, it is so substantial 
as to embrace not only the provision of weapons and logistical 
support, but also participation in the re-organization of the rebellion; 
provision of command-and- control facilities on its territory ..., 
provision of training facilities for those armed bands on its territory 
and the facilitation of passage of foreign insurgents to third 
countries,,. (74) 
Many writers among them Brownlie, affirmed the same view by saying: 
" It is conceivable that a co-ordinated and general campaign by 
powerful bands or irregular troops, with obvious or easily proven 
complicity of a government of a state from which they operate 
would constitute an armed attack". (48) 
Therefore, since the Syrian government sent the PLA troops into the territory of 
Lebanon to support the Leftist Forces and Palestinians against the wishes of the 
Lebanese Government, their action clearly falls within the above description. The 
Syrian president himself recognised the difficulty of giving assistance to rebel forces, 
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as he recollected in his speech the conversation between him and the president of 
Lebanon as to the entry of the PLA into Lebanon to save the resistance and the National 
Movement by saying " This what I said to President Franjieh [saving the resistance ] 
while knowing that such talk between two heads of state is more than necessary and 
more than what is acceptable". 09) Therefore, since the PLA was commanded and 
directed by the Syrian government and since the President of Syria admitted such an 
action, the military intervention on the side of rebel forces was illegal and against the 
customary rules of civil war and contemporary international law. 
V- The Validity Of Arumun Summit's Invitation. 
The reference to the Arumun Summit by the Syrian president deserves close 
scrutiny. So as to give legality to the Syrian action, the Syrian president emphasised 
that amongst the convenors in Arumun was the Lebanese prime minister. As far as the 
Arumun Summit is concerned , there are two questions: was there really an invitation ? 
and if that was answered positively then what is the nature of invitation and apart from 
its content, is it really valid under contemporary international law ?. 
In fact, there is ample evidence that the Summit of Arumun appealed to the Syrian 
president, and indeed the summit at that time had held regular meetings which included 
most of the Muslim and Leftist leaders at that time. However, the most important 
question is: did the Arumun Summit invite the Syrian president to send his army into 
Lebanon? As far as this question is concerned, there is no clear evidence that an 
invitation was issued and the only mention of that invitation is by Assad himself. 
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Assuming there was an invitation, it was hardly acceptable under international law. 
After all, the Summit of Arumun had no legal or constitutional status to invite foreign 
troops into the country against the wishes of the legitimate government. 
However, since the prime minister was present, and if the assumption as to the 
existence of an invitation was still valid, then a line of legality could be established. 'Me 
prime minister being the representative of government may give a ground of legality for 
the Syrian military action. This was not, however, the case, as the prime minister 
under the Lebanese constitutional law had no power to invite or sign a treaty with a 
foreign nation without the approval of the Lebanese president and parliament-(50) 
Such an invitation is illegal unless approved by the president and parliament. Moreover, 
the Prime Minister, following the use of Lebanese army against the rebel forces, 
offered his resignation-01), and hence he had no constitutional authority whatsoever. 
As such, the citing of the Arumun summit as a justification is not legally valid since that 
summit of Arumun could at best be considered as a council of opposition which had no 
constitutional character. 
Apart from the illegality of the Arumun Summit, an invitation from such a body, 
assuming it was to represent to some extent the rebel's view, is of no legal importance 
in international law. An invitation from the rebel forces is illegal under customary and 
contemporary international law-(52) The International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua 
case asserted this view :, 
" It is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non- 
intervention in international law if intervention, which is already 
allowable at the request of the government of a state, were also to 
allowed at the request of the opposition. This would permit any state 
to intervene at any moment in the internal affairs of another state, 
whether at the request of the government or at the request of its 
opposition. Such a situation does not in the Court's view 
correspond to the present state of international law" . (53) 
104 
It is beyond any doubt, that an invitation from any groups other than the 
government is invalid under the rules of international law. For admitting the invitation 
of the rebels would represent a fundemental change in the present rules of international 
law. 
What is more relevant, apart from the illegality of the invitation by the Arumun 
Summit is the content of the invitation. President Assad himself conceded that the 
Arumun Summit asked him to speak to the Lebanese president on their behalf to stop 
the use of the army and prevent the LF from moving closer to their military 
positions-(54) As such, the use of force by the Syrian president is clearly beyond the 
actual request. 
More to the point, no invitation for military intervention was ever issued. Saab 
Salam, the ex-prime minister, testified that the Arumun Summit did not issue any 
invitation. What was revealed was " the council of Arumun did not request a military 
intervention, and the Council's acquiescence to Syrian political mediation could hardly 
be interpreted as a sanction to military interventionlt. (55) 
Therefore, since there was no such invitation, and even if there had been, the 
invitation could hardly have been regarded as valid, given the legal status of the 
Arumun Summit and since the invitation by the rebels was invalid under contemporary 
international law, then the Syrian intervention in response to the Armun Summit was an 
illegal intervention. 
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Vl- CONCLUSION. 
Intervention, upon the rebels request, is not a matter which directly falls within 
foreign state decision-makers powers. Customary international law set the conditions 
for such a decision to be made. In a civil war, customary international law recognised 
three stages which foreign state must recognise. These stages are rebellion, insurgency 
and belligerency. The first two categories gives a foreign state no right to render any 
support to the rebel forces. On the contrary the government is the main beneficiary 
through the two said categories. However, a point has to be made that the traditional or 
customary rules of civil war are quite inadequate for the present type of civil war. In 
fact, the said rules were devised to respond to the old type of civil war and cannot meet 
the present complexities of modem civil war. According to such law an intervening 
state could cloth intervention with legality by recognizing the insurgents as belligerents. 
As there is no impartial body to determine the gradation of status of rebels or 
insurgents, states are left to determine subjectively whatever pleases them or serves 
their interest. 
As far as the Syrian intervention is concerned, an intervention following the 
Lebanese Leftist forces request is not permitted under customary international law. The 
Lebanese Leftist forces at that stage were far from achieving the status of belligerency. 
Their status at best could be categorized as insurgency, if not rebellion, and as such, the 
Syrian intervention was a clear violation of customary international law. Moreover, the 
Syrian intervention is also a violation of contemporary international law; it is against the 
Charter of the United Nations and especially Article 2 (4) and various General 
Assembly resolutions. 
As to the invitation of the Arumun Summit, the invitation was not issued from a 
proper constitutional body. Moreover, the invitation was not valid under international 
law which does not recognize as legal an invitation from rebel forces. Relevant to the 
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point is the content of the invitation, as it only requested Syrian officials to continue 
their political mediation but did not invite them to initiate military intervention. As a 
whole, the Syrian intervention clearly countered against both customary international 
law of civil war and the United Nations Charter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SYRIAN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION. 
INTRODUCTTO 
After the 15th of April the Lebanese civil war escalated to an unprecedented level of 
violence which by then was not restricted to the capital and its vicinity but to engulfed 
all of the Lebanese territory. By the end of May 1976 the balance of power shifted to 
the side of the Lebanese National Movement. Thus the leftist coalition pushed their 
forces to squash the Lebanese Front in an attempt to put an end to the confessional 
system. In response to this challenge the Lebanese Front aired their well-known 
partition plan as a last resort. 
Such a development was mainly due to the disintegration of the Lebanese Army 
whose well trained soldiers and officers, once disbanded, contributed to these dramatic 
events. Thus, with the breakdown of the army which until then was the symbol of the 
Lebanese government and its powerful tc*l, the prospect of a one party victory loomed 
more than ever before. 
The unfolding events in Lebanon were such that they disturbed Syria and set its 
leaders into motion. For the Syrians, the elin-dnation or subjugation of one Party to the 
will of the other was not acceptable at any price. The Syrian decision makers 
experienced a great deal of difficulty in their effort to reach a settlement to the conflict. 
The Syrian officials failed to do so because their perception of the events greatly 
differed from that of the parties concerned. To Syria, the Lebanese civil war was not a 
war emanating primarily from internal discontent rather than from an international 
conspiracy designed to implicate Syria and weaken its stand against Israel and the 
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United States and furthermore to drag Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
into the Lebanese quagmire. 
From the beginning of the civil war, the Syrian officials employed a variety of 
techniques ranging from negotiations, assistance to one party or another, and 
application pressure whenever it was deemed necessary. However, their mediation was 
met with extreme resistance from the Lebanese National Movement which considered 
the sanction of confessionalism as a serious blow to its programme and a Syrian 
betrayal to the principles of socialism. In Jumbalat's words "All our present woes 
stem from this political confessionalism .... what we have now is a crusade by all 
patriotic Muslim and Christians for the secularization of the Lebanese state, the 
elimination of political confessionalism, and the establishment of a unitary state on a 
civilian foundation". 0) Left with no option, the National Movement after a long 
discussion resorted to the military option to implement the envisaged reforms. In 
taking this road, the Lebanese National Movement was assuming that the Syrians 
would stand idle. 
Suddenly, and apparently without the knowledge of the National Movement, a 
battalion of the newly formed Arab Lebanese Army surrounded a Christian town in the 
extreme north of Lebanon and demanded the surrendering of the town or its total 
destruction. That very day, the people of the town appealed to the president of Syria, 
imploring him to intervene to save the people of the besieged town. Responding to 
this appeal, the Syrian army crossed the border under the banner of humanity to lift the 
siege and stop the bloodshed in Lebanon. Their intervention was classified as 
humanitarian and at the same time they stressed the fact that they had been invited by 
the Lebanese government. However, this chapter is mainly concerned with 
humanitarian justification and the next chapter will deal with the legitimacy of 
intervention under the concept of invitation . 
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With the Syrian intervention, the Lebanese civil war took on a new dimension and 
the conflict was transformed into an international conflict. Bearing this in mind, the 
question is: to what extent were the Syrians justified in their invocation of the concept 
of humanitarian intervention, and does such a right exist under contemporary 
international law? Iberefore, as far as this chapter is concerned, the Syrian intervention 
will be dealt with in such a way as to answer the above questions. 'Mis chapter will be 
divided into the following sections : 
(1) Prelude to the Syrian intervention A factual record. 
(2) The Syrian justification of their intervention. 
(3) The concept of humanitarian intervention under contemporary international law. 
(4) Legal analysis of the Syrian intervention 
(5) Conclusion. 
I-Prelude To The Syrian Intervention: A Factual Record 
Since the 20th January 1976 and especially after the intervention by the PLA and 
until March of 1976 everything appeared unworkable; the Lebanese conflict was raging 
on and the prospect of a cease fire was remote. The Syrian plan for reforming the 
Lebanese system which was introduced following the PLA intervention was a catalyst 
which aggravated the situation. (2) Many steps were undertaken to reduce the tension 
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amongst the parties but to no avail. With total opposition from the LNM to the Syrian 
plan which was known as the document of 14th February, the prospect of a 
settlement seemed impossible. Adding to the tension, was the disintegration of the 
Lebanese Army, the last symbol of Lebanese unity and government's control. The 
bulk of that Army joined the LNM and declared its loyalty to its leader and insisted on 
the implementation of the LNM political programme. 
In an attempt to stop the disintegration of the Lebanese Army a pre-planned coup 
was staged by an old officer with the help of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO). The Palestinian involvement in the coup is quite puzzling. However, many 
factors suggested that the Palestinian leaders were unhappy about the total 
disintegration of the Lebanese government. One of these was the potential risk inherent 
in the disappearance of the Lebanese government which could open the door to a Syrian 
or Israeli intervention. However, the coup was not successful due to the extreme 
polarization of Lebanese society and the limited number of soldiers that was available to 
General Ahdab ; the leader of the coup. (3) Although the coup was a complete failure, it 
brought about a new issue in the political theatre: the resignation of the Lebanese 
president as a way out of the crisis. The president responded by declaring that his 
resignation could only be considered when the Lebanese parliament requested him to do 
so. Although, parliament did so, the president refused to resign. (4) 
Confronted with this impasse the LNM, with the assistance of the Arab Lebanese 
Army (ALA), marched to the presidential palace in an effort to force the president to 
step down. However, the military expedition advancement was halted when their way 
was blocked by the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and a unit of the Saqia. Those 
units were acting under orders from the president of Syria who personally declared in 
his famous speech that such an option would not be tolerated. (5) 
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Given the impossibility of breaking through the barrier, the ALA commander 
ordered the shelling of the presidential palace by artillery to convey the message that he 
was no longer secure. Indeed, the president, under artillery bombardment fled the 
palace and took refuge in the bastion of the Lebanese Front. At this juncture the Syrian 
government warned the Leftist forces that if they did not terminate the military 
offensive, the Syrian army would be forced to intervene. 
Bowing to this pressure, the LNM accepted a Syrian plan to amend the constitution 
and to clear the way for the election of a new president before the end of president 
Franjieh's term in office. However, the election of a new president did not solve the 
problem as the leftist forces accused Syria of imposing her candidate Le Elias Sarkis. 
Added to this, the ex-president refused to hand over power to the newly elected 
president before the end of his term. This impasse led to a new round of fierce fighting 
in which the victory of the LNM was a reality. The leader of the Phalange Party in his 
appeal to the Christians reflected this reality when he said: 
" Our people and our army are dispersed .. there is no legislature , 
no judiciary, no sovereignty .... Ruin and destruction spread over 
villages and cities, towns and mountains. I appeal to you, men and 
women to unite for the homeland. (6) 
By that time, Syrian decision makers could not wait any longer as the intransigence 
of the leader of the LNM and PLO reached its climax. The Syrians interpreted this as a 
threat to its policies in Lebanon. On the 29th of May, a dramatic event took place when 
a battalion of the ALA surrounded two villages in the north of Lebanon. The officer of 
the force made his demands very clear, " I am intending to destroy these towns if 
Franjieh does not give up the presidency". (7) Responding to such a dramatic event the 
Syrian government finally decided to intervene directly in the Lebanese civil war, and 
put an end to the existing tragedy. In their intervention the Syrian government presented 
two justifications: Humanitarian and upon invitation. 
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Il- The Syrian Government's Reference to Humanitarian Intervention. 
The Syrian government advanced the argument that their intervention was initiated 
primarily to ease the suffering of the two besieged towns. Syrian officials were very 
quick to publicise the two messages which were addressed to the president of Syria. 
The two messages urged the president to take necessary action as soon as possible, 
otherwise the lives of people of the said towns would be put in jeopardy. In one of two 
messages, the people of "Kybiat" appealed to the president"... and the brotherly Syrian 
people, to rescue them who are for three and half days consecutively experiencing a 
massacre performed by the ALA and foreign mercenaries. We are confident that so 
long as we are enjoying the sanctuary of neighborhood, surely the noble Syrian people 
will not hesitate to halt the massacre". (8) 
The other message which was telegrammed by the deputy of the town urged the 
Syrian president to halt the massacre by saying : 
"In my name and on behalf of thirty thousand innocent people who, 
most of them perish beneath the debris of their destroyed houses, as 
a result of artillery bombardment directed by communist and their 
saboteur agents who are perpetuating their crime in the wake of 
unmindful civilized world .... In the name of thirty thousands who 
are experiencing onslaughter and torture, we appeal to your 
excellency to halt the bloodshed ...... (9) 
Indeed the official radio referred to these messages in their justification of the 
military intervention by broadcasting that ".. Syrian intervention was a clear response to 
the variety of appeals and cables that were sent to president Assad to help the people of 
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Kybiat and Ayndicat. (10) The humanitarian motive was spelled out by the Syrian 
president in an interview, when he mentioned : 
"We did not hesitate to respond to the request for help we received at 
the time, we saw that we had a fraternal and humanitarian duty 
toward our brother in Lebanon .... we could not stand by and watch 
the massacres which were taking place every day in Lebanon. (I 1) 
Therefore, it becomes clear that the Syrian government was justifying its military 
action in Lebanon on humanitarian grounds. To what extent, the Syrian government 
claim is legitimate under international law is the main concern of the next section. 
IV- Humanitarian Intervention under International Law. 
A- General 
Ile revival of the theory of Humanitarian intervention in contemporary international 
law, undoubtedly, sheds new light on the theory and the validity thereoL 'ne much 
increased use of the theory by states is to justify their recourse to force despite the ban 
which is enshrined in the charter, in particular article 2 (4). 
The Congo operation in 1960, the American intervention in the Dominican Republic 
in 1965, the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 and the Syrian intervention in 
Lebanon, suggest that the theory is no longer tied to historical events of the nineteenth 
century. However, the revival of the theory was not embraced wholeheartedly as a rule 
of contemporary international law. On the contrary, the theory was criticized and 
rejected by many scholars as inadequate because it represented an explicit violation of 
the complete ban on the use of force in the United Nations charter. 
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To what extent could this theory be accommodated under the charter and, if 
accepted, under what conditions would it become operational ?. Therefore, whether or 
not the theory constitutes a part of customary international law, as to the true meaning 
of humanitarian intervention in addition to its validity under the charter, are all 
questions which fall within the preview of this section and consequently the legality of 
the Syrian intervention will be analysed. 
B- The Meaning Of Humanitarian Intervention. 
In comparison with the definition of intervention in general, the determination of 
humanitarian intervention does not constitute a hard problem per se. For illegal 
intervention, as defined earlier, is a convention-breaking and coercive act carried out 
intentionally in the domain of another state in order to alter or influence the authority 
structure of the target state. 02) 
As far as humanitarian intervention is concerned, the invocation of it requires 
special circumstances. Humanitarian intervention is only operative when a state is 
guilty of violating the minimum standards of humanity which is recognised amongst 
civilized nations. The test or the level of violation which could trigger the right of 
intervention is identified by Oppenheim: 
" When a state renders itself guilty of cruelty against and persecution 
of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human 
rights and to shock the conscience of mankind". 03) 
It is thus the events which shock the conscience of mankind which constitute'the 
setting up of the criterion for action. Others perceive the right of humanitarian 
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intervention as only operative when a state exceeds the limit of its authority. Stowell, 
in this regard, sees humanitarian intervention as: 
The reliance upon force for justiriable purposes of protecting the 
inhabitants of another state from treatment which is arbitrary and 
persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of authority with which 
the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice. 0 4) 
As such, humanitarian intervention is only invoked in order to prevent or stop a 
gross violation of human rights which is taking place in any state. It totally differs from 
other kind of illegal intervention which have already been defined. For humanitarian 
intervention is neither performed wilfully nor to alter the authority structure of the target 
state. Although in the case of humanitarian intervention, recognizably force must be 
kept to a minumim, deviations some times take place, but it is still valid to argue that 
force must be directed to restore the rights in question. 
There is, in general, a clear uncertainty surrounding the subject of intervention: that 
is to say, who are the main beneficiaries of intervention? Many writers either 
differentiate or ignore the differences between the two categories: Intervention to save 
nationals of the intervening state and nationals of the target state which in this sense can 
be called intervention per se. Some argued that the first category does not fall within 
the meaning of humanitarian intervention. For to rescue nationals is only justified on a 
different legal ground. In this case the intervening state could rely on or invoke the link 
of nationality as a basis for its military intervention. 05) That link gives rise to the right 
of self-defence; an attack on the nationals abroad is tantamount to an armed attack on 
the state itself. 06) For nationals [one component of population] are one of the 
essential ingredients of the statehood and hence an attack on them could be regarded as 
an attack on the state. (17) However, this argument is quite untenable. Allowing the 
concept of self-defence to be operative whenever nationals were exposed to danger 
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outside their country, is a way of readjusting the principle of self-defence to give a new 
interpretation. 
Self-defence is only operative when there is an attack on the territory of the 
state. 08) To do otherwise, is to enlarge the right of self-defence which the charter of 
the United Nations tends to restrict. Even if one concedes this, it is still hard to justify 
intervention on the basis of self-defence, as intervention, in some cases, involves 
rescuing other nationals with whom the intervening state has no link of nationality. In 
that case, it cannot be argued that intervention to save nationals is based on self-defence 
because rescuing others is based on something other than shared nationality. Another 
reason was introduced, in view of the difference between intervention to save nationals 
and intervention per se; intervention to save nationals is: 
"Jimited in effect since the purpose of the intervention can be 
achieved quite simply by this act of repatriation. The latter End of 
intervention [intervention per se] .. to achieve its purpose, almost 
inevitably involves the imposition of fundamental changes in the 
structure, government, and/or boundaries of the state intervened 
against". (19) 
Borchard in his writing on the subject indicated that the protection of nationals 
abroad was devised by civilized nations to guarantee their nationals liberty and 
property and since such an intervention had nothing to do with the political 
independence of a state it could be regarded as self-help, and in such a context was 
not an intervention. (20) This distinction, however, does not stand as clear evidence, 
since in practice many interventions carried out to rescue nationals resulted in a 
change to the structure of the government as was the case in the Dominican Republic, 
Grenada and Panama etc. 
The irony of Ns view is weR conunented on by Lauterpacht: 
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" The individual in his capacity as an alien enjoys a larger measure 
of protection by international law than in his character as the 
citizen of his own state. (21) 
This is true, and any arguments based on the right of intervention to rescue 
nationals on the ground of practicality is morally and logically invalid. It is illogical 
because reality shows that intervention will result in a change of government, and if 
not, it at least affects its conduct. And it is immoral, since the subject of that 
intervention is only the nationals of the intervening state with the exclusion of other 
nationals that is to say the target state's nationals. On what moral ground can an 
intervention be justified so as to rush and save a handful of foreign nationals and at 
same time ignore the plight of thousands who are experiencing torture and murder at the 
hands of a tyrant? If that is true, then the moral aspect of the law has to be questioned: 
the law that provides every possible help to certain nationals at a certain time and 
disregards those who are in great need of urgent help, is not the law that should be 
upheld by civilized nations. It is not the nationality nor practicality which determines 
the subjects who could benefit from humanitarian intervention, if recognized by 
international law, but the practice of the target state which " shocks the conscience of 
mankind" which necessitates humanitarian intervention. (22)' Humanitarian 
intervention is only directed to rescue those who are suffering abuse of their basic 
rights, Le right to life, in the hands of their state or foreign state. Ibis intervention 
must be carried out for that purpose only, otherwise it will become an abuse of state 
sovereignty. (23) 
Therefore, it becomes clear that. humanitarian intervention is a short term use of 
force to re-establish exclusively respect for human rights without affecting the political 
independence or the territorial integrity of the state in whose territory the abuse of basic 
human rights is carried out on a massive scale to an extent which shocks the conscience 
of mankind. If humanitarian intervention is such, then the next question is whether or 
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not it is part of customary international law. 
C- Customary International Law And The Right Of Humanitarian 
Intervention 
There is a general agreement among early writers of international law that the right 
of humanitarian intervention was a part of customary international law. 
(24) The 
principle, although well known throughout history, evolved as a principle of customary 
international law and its crystallization began at the beginning of the 19th century. From 
that time, states invoked the principle as a justification for their use of force in order to 
redress or prevent injustice. 
Given the nature of humanitarian intervention as an exception to the broad principle 
of non-intervention, and in view of the scarcity of cases relating to massive violation of 
human rights which provoked states to take action, there is no wonder that there are 
few precedents in history. In general most of these cases occured in the domain of the 
Turkish Empire, especially during the period of its gradual disintegration. However, in 
order to establish the existence of the right of humanitarian intervention one is not 
bound to review all those cases. It is more appropriate in the present inquiry, to re- 
examine some of the controversial cases which left many international writers doubting 
the existence of the right. 
One of the first controversial cases is the European power intervention in Greece. 
Great Britain, Russia and France concluded a treaty in London on July 6 1827 which 
primarily aimed at the protection of the Christian minorities whom, in the opinion of the 
said states, were subjected to a policy of discrimination and torture by the Turkish 
authorities. The out-come of their intervention culminated in Greek independence. 
(25) 
Humanitarian intervention was the justification claimed by the intervening powers. 
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In the treaty for Greek pacification, the signatories to the said treaty unequivocally 
affirmed that their intervention was motivated, " ... No less by sentiments of humanity 
than by interest for tranquility of Europe". (26) Ibis characterization by virtue of treaty 
is a progressive illustration of the existence of the right. However, one of the writers 
dismissed it as irrelevant to the legal process of custom-formation. Brownlie 
commented on that precedent by saying it " cannot be discussed in term of legal concept 
which probably did not exist at that time". (27) Reflecting the same view, another 
writer explained the precedent in more detail, and he considered the above example of 
European power intervention as far removed from accepting it as a precedent 
contributing to the emergence of custom. In his opinion, since that practice had taken 
place in the era of unequal states, the practice could not be relied on to produce custom, 
because " community of law which prefers one socio-religious system over another and 
in which civilized states exercise de facto tutorial right over an " uncivilized" one. They 
are therefore of little precendential value in the contemporary world". (28) 
This argument, at first glance, does not sound unreasonable, but taken further will 
present a serious challenge to the existence of international law. To disregard all the 
customary rules of international law on the ground that during their evolution into 
custom, unequal relations between states existed, is not a widely accepted criticism. 
For if this criticism stood, one should also have to reject the greater bulk of the corpus 
of rules which evolved during that same era. It is therefore more sound to view the 
Greek precedent as one of the finest example of humanitarian intervention. (29) 
The second precedent of humanitarian intervention is the French intervention in 
Syria in 1860. Following a massacre of Moranite Christians in which more than five 
thousand were reported to have been killed, the French navy intervened to halt the 
massacres and to prevent their recurrence. It is commonly agreed that the unfortunate 
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events were implicitly encouraged by the Turkish authorities. 
(30) As far as this 
intervention is concerned, the reaction of contemporary writers was warm and 
encouraging; especially as one of the fiercest opponents of the right of humanitarian 
intervention considered it one of the most genuine examples of humanitarian 
interventionP 1) Despite this positive reaction, there are two writers who have held 
different opinions. Frank and Rodely, relying on a single official document from the 
British cornmission which exclusively blamed the Christians for the trouble, concluded: 
" If the Mount of Lebanon intervention is made law, it is a law 
which favours confrontional and insurgents tactics by dissident 
groups, an insufficiently calibrated response to the problem if 
injustice which is probably against the public policy and best 
interest of international community. There are every where fanatical 
leaders of schismatic groups willing to stir up and sacrifice their 
fellow if they can thereby secure the benevolent intervention of 
foreign super powers. (32) 
While such an argument is convincing with respect to the French intervention in 
Lebanon, nevertheless it is invalid for a conclusion to be reached in unequivocal terms 
from a single British document. In order to confirm such a conclusion more factual 
evidence is required. The British authorities after all sided with the Druz in their 
struggle for dominance in the Mount of Lebanon, and hence their finding was not 
impartial. The French intervention came at a time when the Turkish authority acted 
quickly and swiftly by sending a special envoy with great power to restore peace and 
tranquillity to the Mount of Lebanon. (33) In view of that, Pogany in a recent article 
affimned that the French intervention cannot be considered humanitarian since the 
Turkish authority had already succeeded in ending the episode of violence. (34) 
However, it is still open to discussion that the mere sending of a navy by the French 
authority could have, as it did, accelerated the Turkish response in order to prevent any 
justified foreign intervention in Lebanon. In the end, and due to foreign pressure, a 
plan was devised to secure and guarantee the co-existence in Lebanon among its 
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various sects. (35) In general, whatever the French motive was, it is still valid to argue 
that the intervention had halted the massacre and prevented, for a considerable time, the 
recurrence of violence. 
Other examples of humanitarian intervention are to be found in Eastern Europe and 
Latin American states. In Eastern Europe there was the Russian declaration of war on 
the Sultan of Turkey following the latter's refusal to implement certain reforms in the 
Balkans; such reforms were believed to guarantee specific obligation and a policy of 
non-discrimination towards the minorities in that area. The Russian intervention did 
not escape criticism either. It was contested by some writers as an intervention justified 
by virtue of a treaty, and hence could not be taken as a humanitarian precedent. 
Fonteyne in his defence of the customary right of humanitarian intervention proved 
conclusively the indefensibility of such a proposition. (36) He cited an, official 
correspondence communicated to the-Turkish government by the Russians which reads: 
" His Imperial Majesty does not want war ... but is determined not to 
hesitate as long as the principles that have been recognized as 
equitable, human, necessary by the whole of Europe.... have not 
received full execution in effective guarantee". (37) 
That correspondence illustrated beyond doubt the Russian claim that the use of 
force would not be considered so long as humans rights were observed. 
In Latin American states, there were many precedents, amongst them the American 
intervention in Cuba in 1848. This intervention did not provoke a hostile reaction from 
contemporary writers. Ile atrocities which were taking place in Cuba and which were 
being tolerated by the Spanish government was the reason for an American 
intervention. In the congressional Resolution of April 20 1898, the humanitarian reason 
was very clear: 
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" Where as the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more 
than three years in the Island of Cuba, so near our own border, have 
shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States". (38) 
Similar to the reaction of European intervention in Turkish domain, American 
intervention was not well received by international writers; such an intervention was a 
clear example of self-interest. The criticism was directed at the fact that the American 
government was primarily concerned with huge sugar investments, and the search for a 
new market. Rodely and Frank, the staunch opponents of the principle, surprisingly 
conceded that the Cuban precedent formed a case of possible exception. (39) 
What is surprising is that although the present two writers along with Brownlie 
rejected the right of humanitarian intervention, they nevertheless considered two 
exceptions but without agreement on the exception. Brownlie rejected the Cuban case 
but accepted the Syrian one; the others reversed both these decisions. 
If there is anything to be inferred from such a contradiction it is that the 
determination of the existence of the right is mainly dependent on the facts which were 
not the same to the said writers. Tbus, it would be absurd to affirm the non-existence 
of the right while one cannot be totally sure of the method of investigation. Moreover, 
the right of humanitarian intervention was well practiced by states and as such, apart 
from its sincerity, forms a solid basis for considering it as a part of customary 
international law. Although there is a strong claim that the intervention was motivated 
by the desire of self-interest, nevertheless the existence of self-interest cannot on its 
own repudiate the right. In fact, humanitarian consideration will never be the only 
factors which could lead to the operation of the principle; other factor could exist as 
well. (40) 
Another claim is that humanitarian intervention was not well practiced in the sense 
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that there were many instances of violation of human rights where states did not react at 
all solely because there was no positive self-interest behind an intervention. (41) 
However, such an inconsistency by itself cannot repudiate the right of humanitarian 
intervention. (42) Althougfi the process of custom formation requires states practice tO 
be consistent and uniform, nevertheless such a process is not supposed to be 
implemented rigidly. The ICJ in its ruling in the Nicaragua case addressed this 
question and affirmed: 
" It is not to be expected that in the practice of states, the application 
of the rule in question should have been perfect.. the court does not 
consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the 
corresponding practice must not be absolute rigours conformity with 
the rule". (43) 
Moreover, Teson regar8s the issue of humanitarian intervention as an exception to 
the normal rule and as such a flexible approach should be adopted whenever one is 
dealing with the issue. 
- 
He addressed this problem as the customary right of 
humanitarian intervention by saying: 
" The decision as to whether custom exists in this regard should take 
the exceptionality into account and adopt a flexible standard for the 
analysis of state practices". (44) 
Given these views, and in the light of the discussed precedents, humanitarian 
intervention cannot be dismissed as falling outside the corpus of international law. This 
view is strengthened by many classical writers of the 19th century who vigorously 
defended it. Grotious, Wheaton, Woolsey, Vattel, Hyde and many others affirmed the 
validity of the right. (45) Therefore, humanitarian intervention by virtue of state 
practices and the writing of writers which is a secondary source of international law, 
the right of humanitarian intervention is part of customary international law. If it is so, 
then the second question is, to what extent is humanitarian intervention valid under the 
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United Nations Charter ? 
C- HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER THE UNITED 
NATIONS CHARTER. 
The moýt persistent question that normally arises concerning the right of 
humanitarian intervention is whether or not it has survived the ban on the use of force 
under the United Nations charter. Answering this question is a troublesome task, given 
the diversity of opinions and the practices of states. However, the bulk of the 
arguments is centered, to a great extent, on two methods of interpretation: textual and 
contextual interpretations. The subject of that interpretation is in particular Article 2 (4) 
and its relation to other provisions of the Charter in general. Therefore, for the purpose 
of convenience the following anaylsis will review the two methods of interpretation 
with the aim of discovering whether or not there is a ground for humanitarian 
intervention under the Charter of the United Nations. 
A-Textual interpretation. 
The ma or thrust in the argument is Article 2(4) of the United Nations charter and its i 
flat prohibition of the use of force. Article 2 (4) reads as follows: 
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purpose of the United Nadons". (46) 
Opponents of the right of humanitarian intervention have pointed vigoroursly to 
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Article 2 (4) arguing that any use of force or threat of force thereof is ultimately illegal. 
Whenever humanitarian intervention, therefore, is accompanied by the use of force, the 
right naturally becomes illegal as it contravenes with the flat ban enshrined in Article 
2(4). (47) To this conclusion, Professor Henkin pointed out that any unilateral 
intervention would be against the territorial integrity and political independence of a 
state; it constitutes a literal violation of Article 2(4). (48) 
Proponents of the right of humanitarian intervention play down such an 
interpretation and reject, what they call, the simple reading of Article 2 (4). One of the 
most vigorous authorities who defended the right of the state to use force to defend 
human rights, postulates that Article 2 (4) must be interpreted with reference to Articles 
l(l), 51, and certain general provisions of the Charter. (49) He argues that since Article 
51 reserved the inherent right of a state to use force in cases of self-defence, states 
could employ this right to include rights " far beyond that reserved in Article 51 ". (50) 
As such, Stone affirms that all customary rights of self-help could be enjoyed by a state 
as long as it was not directed against the prohibition of Article 2 (4); the territorial 
integrity and political independence of a state. (5 1) 
This construction is wholeheartedly embraced by many writers such as Lillich who 
argues that Article 2 (4) has two qualifications: it should not be against the territorial 
integrity and political independence nor be inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations Charter. (52) As such, humanitarian intervention which respects the above 
qualification is, in fact, desirable as it corresponds with the purposes of the Charter, to 
argue against this interpretation would amount to a deliberate distortion of the 
fundamentals of the Charter. (53) 
Brownlie, on the other hand, rejects the arguments that Article 2 (4) has any 
qualification. In cases of ambiguity, he argues, resort to traveaux preparations for 
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clarifying the ambiguity, is imperative. After reviewing the traveaux, he asserts that the 
phrase " against territorial integrity and political independance of a sovereign state was 
not intended to be restricted rather than to give a guarantee to small states for the 
purpose of providing them with maximum protection". (54) Teson, however, rejects 
Brownlie's argument regarding the reference to traveaux preparations and regards it as 
"a venturous proposition". (55) He rightly affirmed that: 
" An examination of original intent cannot determine the present 
states of humanitarian intervention doctrine. The traveaux 
preparations of the United Nations Charter can be read either way 
.... regardless of how one reads the drafting history, it is implausible 
to assume that the drafters of the Charter intended to repeal the 
whole corpus of customary Iaw. (56) 
The search for the intent of the'drafters of the charter is not consistent with the 
method of interpretation of an organic treaty like the Charter. For, an interpretation of 
the Charter must be in accordance with the present purposes and expectations of 
international community. (57) Moreover, Damato challenges the opponents' thesis by 
asserting that the phrasing of Article 2 (4) is intended as such, to give way to the above 
qualification, and had it not been intended, the term inviolability would have been 
inserted. Damato offers a historical review of the term inviolability and in the wake of it 
he clings to the view that Article 2 (4) has the above two qualifications. (58) The tug of 
arguments between the opponents and proponents of humanitarian intervention has not 
yielded any fruitful conclusion. However, the phrasing of Article 2 (4) in a way 
affirms the thesis that intervention which is not directed at political independence or 
territorial integrity is not illegal. Neither is the invocation of traveaux preparation of 
great help, since the drafters' intention is difficult to ascertain; and had the drafters 
intended to make no exception they would have chosen the term inviolable rather than 
territorial integrity. As such, it will be very difficult to give weight to the opponent's 
view regarding the interpretation of Article 2 (4). It would be more accurate or helpful 
to look for another method of interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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13- Contextual interpretation. 
Ilis method of interpretation is entirely dependent not on one provision of a treaty 
but rather than on its purposes and its overall provisions. Thus, in the case of 
ambiguity the general rule is that "a treaty provision should be read in its entirety ... it 
must be placed in its legal context as supplied by the other provisions of the charter and 
the principles of international law,,. (59) As such, opponents of the right of 
humanitarian intervention affirm again, in the view of this method, that the ban on the 
use of force is absolute and overrides all purposes. (60) Akehurst refers to Article (1) 
of the Charter which numerates the various goals which ought to be realized by 
peaceful means. To give an effect, Akehurst adds, to these goals by forceful means will 
inevitably run a mock of the Charter of the United Nations. (61) rhere is no place for 
the use of force in the Charter, save the exception in Article 51 which is an exception to 
the general rule and as such it must be interpreted narrowly in order not to undermine 
the general rule Le the maintainance of peace. (62) In line with this, Article 2 (4) cannot 
be divorced from Article 2 (3) which stipulates that an international dispute, must be 
settled by peaceful means only . 
(63) 
During the debate in the Security Council regarding the Indian intervention in East 
Pakistan, the Pakistani representative argued that "A principle basic to the maintainance 
of peace is that no political, economic, strategical, social, or ideological consideration 
might be invoked by one state to justify its interference in the internal affairs of another 
state" . 
(64) Supporting this view, Professor Frank asserts: 
" Humanitarian intervention has in practice become a legal concept 
which whether or not it violates the provision of the Article 2 (4 ) 
and 2 (7) of the Charter [as I believe it does], certainly violates the 
public policy which underlies the Charter and its provisions for 
equality, independence and self-detenýnination of states"05) 
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Proponents of the right of humanitarian intervention have persistently and strongly 
refuted the above legal construction. The thrust of their argument is dependent on 
lessening the privilege of the state. In other words, they argue that , by virtue of 
development of international law regarding human rights, the Charter and the variety of 
resolutions confirm the existence of humanitarian intervention. Like their opponents, 
they invoked the Charter's articles to justify their view; Article (1) of the Charter 
enlisted the major purposes of the United Nations, the maintainance of peace and 
principle of equal rights, principle of self-determination and the promotion of human 
rights. Article 1(3) affirms the link between the respect of the principle of self- 
determination and the promotion of human rights. In the opening of the first meeting of 
the General Assembly, Clement observed that: 
" The Charter of the United Nations does not deal only with the 
Governments and states or with politics and war, but with the 
simple elemental needs of human beings whatever be their race, their 
colour, or their creed. In the Charter we reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights. We see the freedom of the individual in 
the state as an essential complement to the freedom of the state in the 
world community of nations. We stress too, that social justice and 
the best possible standards of life for all are essential factors in 
promoting and maintaining the peace of the world.. ". (66) 
The General Assembly, in its resolution 217 (111) of 1948, adopted the Universal 
Declaration Of Human Rights which affirms the Charter's pledge towards human 
rights. In the preamble, the declaration affirms the nexus between peace and human 
right especially in paragraph (1) which reads: " .. the inherent dignity and.... equaland 
inalienable rights of all members of the human families is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world". (67) Paragraph (4) goes further to affirm that 
".. disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of manldnd". (68) The declaration is seen, by some writers, as 
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an "authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order". 
(69) 
Humphrey embraces the declaration and affirms that by virtue of the development 
of new customary rule " the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has become an 
authentic interpretation of the Charter" and he went further to assert that " its 
provisions, like those of the Charter itself, bind all member states". (70) 
The preamble of the Charter of the United Nations explicitly refers to the will of the 
people of the world and its determination " to reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in equal rights of men and 
women". (7 1) Commenting on the preamble's phrasing, Professor Reisman sheds light 
on the importance of human rights which, in his view, outweighs the restriction on the 
use of force by saying: 
" It is significant that, in the following paragraph of the preamble, 
there is a commitment [ to ensure, by the acceptance of principles 
and the institution of methods, that armed forces shall not be used 
save in the common interest ]. Hence the preamble statement of the 
Charter confirms that the use of force in common interest such as for 
self defence or humanitarian purposes continues to be lawful". (72) 
With such emphasis on the protection of human rights, the issue becomes clearer 
that " the use of force for urgent protection of such right is no less authorized than other 
forms of self-help". (73) The interpretation of the Charter, in such a way, is more in 
line with the Charter's commitment to the protection of human rights which were 
trampled on during the Second World War which to some writers, is a war which was 
originally initiated to vindicate human rights. (74) It is contended that the dr-afters of the 
Charter were aware of this and thus they were determined not to permit " an emergence 
(75) 
of a new Hitler" 
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Therefore, any contextual interpretation cannot rule out the importance of human 
rights and at the same time insist on the paramount importance of peace; the two are in 
fact inseparable. Judge Lauterpact affmns: 
".. Ile correlation between peace and observance of fundamental 
human rights is now a generally recognised fact. The circumstances 
that the legal duty to respect fundamental human rights has become 
part and parcel of the new international system upon which peace 
depends [add emphasis] to that immediate connection". (76) 
In fact, whatever the choice would be, that is to say absolute ban the use of force in 
the name of peace or to permit the use of force for the sake of humanity, is entirely 
dependent on the choice of value which an intervening state ought to make. Ronzitti, 
has the value of peace in mind as he says: 
" ... it is difficult to agree that the value protected by duty to 
safeguard human rights should prevail over the value protected by 
the duty which forbids the use of force". (77) 
Teson on the other hand, reprds the prohibition of massive violation of human 
rights a rule of jus congens; it is the " value assigned to a rule that determines its status 
as jus congens" and if it is so, then why the value of peace must prevail over the 
massive violation of human rights. (78) Moore, not different from Teson, considers 
that inaction in the face of massive violation of human rights is of great consequence. 
He observes that, "The protection of fundamental human rights should be permitted if 
carefully circumscribed. Although it is recognized that legitimizing such an intervention 
entails substantial risks, however, fiot permitting the necessary actions for the 
prevention of genocide or other major abuse of human rights seems to present a greater 
risk". (79) 
This exclusive reliance on the pledge of the Charter regarding human rights to 
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legitimýise humanitarian intervention is not a convincing premise. Although the Charter 
pledges promotion of human rights, nevertheless it never explicitly legitimizes the use 
of force unilaterally for such purposes. In our decentralized legal system, there is no 
ethical standard for establishing a jurisprudential basis for humanitarian intervention; 
international law depends on the will of the state as a basis of obligation. (80) As such, 
a state will resist any attempt to limit its sovereign right over its subjects by another 
state. Watson commented on a state's desire to avoid committing themselves to human 
rights which entails the restriction of their sovereign rightý and he plays down the 
importance of the Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights by saying: 
" The Key questions which remains unanswered are how the 
Covenant became so authoritative and what kind of authority it has. 
It may be ethically authoritative, it may be legally authoritative, it 
may be neither. If it is legally authoritative,.. one is faced with the 
difficult task of proving as generally authoritative a document which 
has been ratified by only 28 percent of the nations of the 
world.. ". (81) 
The refusal of states not to sign any agreement which restricts their freedom is very 
common in a decentralized legal system, and if they sign, the implementation of it will 
ultimately fall in the hand of the state. Furthermore, in the face of mass killing which 
some governments embarked upon as was the case in Cambodia, the Middle East, and 
Uganda and many other countries , the undesirablity of humanitarian intervention 
becomes very obvious. However, the harsh reality of a states' indifference to the mass 
killing which is practised infrequently, brings the law as it stands into collision with 
reality. 
There are in fact many provisions in the Charter and in various documents on 
human rights which legitimise a community's response to the violation of human 
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rights, basically the right to life. When thousands or millions of people are massacred, 
one must discount the jurisprudential basis of any rules that does not halt the mass 
killing. After all, the Charter was concluded to provide real protection to inhabitants of 
states, and not to abandon them to the mercy of a state which is primarily accepted in 
the international society on the basis of affording respect to human rights and the 
promotion of the well being of its citizens. 
Ile argument that peace should take priority over the issue of human rights is not 
very convincing. There is no peace without securing and promoting respect for human 
rights. That link between peace and human right is dialectical. Apart from that, 
accepting the view that peace, according to the Charter, must take priority, is an entirely 
subjective-valued decision. That unilateral decision could differ from one person to 
another and from state to another. Therefore, to aff=i one's value and disregard the 
other is not an objective method of interpreting the Charter. The Charter as a whole, 
contains many provisions which, if read together will furnish the necessary ground for 
humanitarian intervention. 
In reading the Charter in such a way as to ascertain the legality of humanitarian 
intervention, one has to make a delicate choice: either the people die because no one has 
the right to intervene in a sovereign state or an intervention ought to be undertaken. 
The first suggestion is very hard to accept deliberately as it at best strips us of our 
humanity and degrades our civilization; the second one is entirely dependent on whether 
or not it is to be undertaken unilaterally or collectively under the auspices of the United 
Nations. However, before proceeding to discuss this, a more important question has to 
be dealt with regarding Article 2 (7) which prescribes intervention in the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state, and whether or not human rights fall within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state. 
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E- Humanitarian Intervention and Domestic Jurisdiction 
Most of the critics of humanitarian intervention are quick to point to the 
impermissiblity of such action on the ground on interference in the domestic j urisdiction 
of a state. The Charter makes clear that interference in the domestic jurisdiction is no 
longer permissible. The existence of Article 2(7) is very clear on this issue. Article 
2(7) reads: 
"Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorise the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present charter, but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter Vlj',. (82) 
Therefore, the question is, to what extent does the said Article affect the right of 
unilateral intervention? As such, one has to define clearly the meaning of the domestic 
jurisdiction and to affmn whether or not the issue of human rights could be considered 
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. 
There is no doubt that the issue of human rights in recent years has achieved 
universal acceptance and is no longer merely the concern of certain states but the 
concern of every participant in the International system. Judge Lauterphact refers to the 
issue of domestic jurisdiction with rrspect to human rights and confirms that: 
"Human rights and freedom, having become the subject of a solemn 
International obligation and of one of the fundamental purposes of 
the charter, are no longer a matter which is essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the members of the United Nations.. ". (83) 
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To this end, Dr Verwey's comments on the advisory opinion concerning the 
Nationality Decree between Tunis and Morocco in 1923 confirms that a matter which 
is regulated by International treaty is no longer within the state jurisdiction . 
(84) 
Regarding the issue of human rights, some suggested that the prohibition is only 
applicable to the United Nations as Article 2 (7) is only addressed to it. As such, the 
United Nations is exclusively restricted by the article and states are outside this 
prescription. However, such an interpretation is not illuminating and is, to some extent 
superficial. For it is recognised that any United Nations action is not motivated by self- 
interest and despite that, the prohibition did not exclude it. Thus it would be more 
appropriate and in line with the spirit of the Charter to contemplate that what is 
prescribed for the United Nations is also fitting to states, at least in such a context. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to reiterate to the thesis that the universality of 
human rights and its incorporation into a variety of treaties have given rise to the 
concept of human rights as outside the domestic jurisdiction of a state. The 
proliferation of many treaties on the subject of human rights is indicative of this trend. 
The sovereign state is no longer shielded by the concept of domestic jurisdiction to the 
extent that it can escape community action in matters related to human rights. 
The International Court of Justice in its recent ruling in Nicaragua affirmed that: 
"Nicaragua is accused by the 1985 finding of the United States 
congress of violating human rights. 'Mis particular point needs to be 
studied separately of the question of existence of a legal commitment 
by Nicaragua towards the Organization of American states to respect 
these rights; the absence of such a commitment would not mean that 
Nicaragua could with impunity violate human rights. (85) 
To this end Ermacom concluded that; 
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'The right to Self-determination and the protection of human rights 
in matter of discrimination as far as 'gross violation' or consistent 
pattern of violation are concerned are no longer essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state". (86) 
Moreover, the United Nations action regarding the unilateral declaration of 
Rhodesia's independence is a clear example of the sanctuary of human rights in 
contemporary international law. (87) The United Nations took an enforcement measure 
which is only reserved for the threat of peace. As such, the United Nations considered 
that declaration as a clear violation of the black peoples'right in Rhodesia to have equal 
participation in the government of their country. (88) Thus, since violation of human 
rights is no longer within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, a question might arise as 
to the determination of any issue which falls outside the domestic jurisdiction of a state. 
In this context it is wise to consider that the determination of the matter is not to be the 
privilege of a state. This conviction is supported by the legislative history of Article 
2(7) as the participants of the San Francisco conference " do not confirm that each 
individual state holds the right to decide matters of domestic j urisdiction,,. (89) 
In the Norwegian Loans case, the argument was rejected that a party to a treaty can 
determine his obligation "for an instrument in which a party is entitled to determine the 
existence of its obligation is not valid and enforceable legal instrument of which a court 
of law can take cognizant". (90) Then Article 2(7) with respect to the subject of human 
rights is not an obstacle which might impede the United Nations from taking action to 
remedy the violation of human rights. It is only the United Nations which is qualified to 
determine whether or not the matter is within the jurisdiction of a state. In this respect, 
the United Nations is equipped with the necessary provisions to deal with such a 
violation. This violation could be looked at according to Article 24 and 39 of the 
Charter which the violation, in light of these articles could constitute a "threat to peace" 
or "breach of peace", or an act of aggression, a situation with which the Security 
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Council is entitled to deal with under chapter V1 I of the charter. (91) However, should 
the Security Council fail to take the necessary action, then the General Assembly under 
the Uniting For Peace Resolution will hold secondary competence to deal with the 
violation by force. 
Therefore, as far as domestic jurisdiction is concerned, states are no longer 
protected by the shield of domestic jurisdiction whenever the subject touches the issue 
of human rights. However, a question which still awaits an answer concerns the 
legitimacy of a state's action to protect human rights in the absence of any action on the 
part of the United Nations. That is to say whether or not a state can take unilateral 
action in the defence of human rights. 
F- Unilateral or Collective Intervention. 
Heretofore, the discussion shows that the right of humanitarian intervention, as an 
exceptional measure, is permissable. A state's right regarding its citizens is no longer 
absolute nor within its exclusive domestic jurisdiction. Although an intervention, in 
principle, runs against the sovereignty of states, nevertheless sovereignty cannot be 
absolute as to challenge the will of the community. There is no ground whatsoever for 
a state to massacre its own people and at the same time argue that it is no one else's 
business; accepting such an argument will inevitably put the validity of the United 
Nations in question. For it would be unrealistic to argue that the Charter insisted only 
on the promotion of human rights and encouraged co-operation'(92) and at the same 
time payed no serious attention to more urgent issues reflected in the mass IdIling which 
at its roots may destroy the spirit of co-operation. 
Intervention to halt mass killing has a strong moral appeal and in some cases, it 
could legitimize what is generally perceived as a violation of the norm of non- 
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intervention. (93) There is no doubt that an intervention by the United Nations is the 
ultimate hope as it harbours no interest save the protection of human rights. (94) 
However, the present decentralized system with animosity and division among the 
major powers, underlines the conviction that an action by the United Nations is a 
remote possibility. In the absence of collective action by the United Nations, the only 
remaining possibility is to give a cover of legality for a state to undertake unilateral 
action. Unilateral action by a state, recognizablly, is fraught with danger and is at the 
same time illegal. 
The International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case rejected the British 
justification and affied that the unilateral use of force: 
". Given rise to most serious abuse and as such cannot, whatever be 
the present defects in international Organization find a place in 
international law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the 
particular form it would take here; for, from the nature of the thing, 
it would be reserved for the most powerful state, and might easily 
lead to perverting the administration of international justice 
itself'. (95) 
While the court finding is very logical and persuasive, however, it cannot be 
projected as a defence against humanitarian intervention. The court in the Corfu 
Channel case is basically concerned with the right to secure evidence and the term 
"whatever defect" could be related to the shortcoming of an organization in gathering 
evidence and as such is not addressed to Chapter VI 1 of the United Nations 
Charter. (96) The issue of discovering evidence which the Court tackled is not as the 
issue of massive violation of human rights and had the court considered the Iatter, it 
would have most probably declined to give a similar verdict. 
The international Organization, apart from the division amongst its members, lacks 
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the necessary procedures to guard against violation of human rights. (97) Also it is 
quite puzzling to see many provisions in the Charter addressing human rights, yet there 
are no procedures for enforcing such provisions. This is only explainable by the fact 
that the omission is'not deliberate; rather the drafters were fully concerned with 
affirming the importance of human rights and left to a later day the method by which 
these provisions of the Charter might be made effective. (98) Whatever the rationale for 
the omission, it is a recognized fact today that the International Organization is 
ineffective and unresponsive to the violation of human rights. This ineffectiveness 
urged the most staunch opponents of the right of humanitarian intervention, Eric Lane, 
to conclude that: 
"Complaints of mass killing were lodged in both cases, several year 
passed and, in the end, nothing was done. Evidence was not taken, 
studies were not made, and recommendations were not forthcoming. 
Thus, even the mechanics necessary for affording the meagre of 
United Nations sanctions were, in essence, not undertaken. In the 
end, ironically, it was only war which has apparently ended the 
killing"09) 
The inaction by itself gives weight to the thesis that so long as the International 
Organization is unable to perform its task to afford protection of human rights, a state 
feels at liberty to invoke the traditional right of humanitarian intervention. 000) There 
is a valid argument that the pre-existing right of self help is relinquished on the basis of 
the United Nations mechanism of enforcement action; if the latter fails the former surely 
will revive. Reisman espouses this argument in his defence of a unilateral action by a 
state: 
"Historically this may be the correct interpretation of the Charter in 
general and Article 2 (4) in particular. However, subsequent 
dissention among the great powers in the Security Council has 
clearly rendered this construction caducous; rigorous adherence to 
the historical view means that self help measures are rendered 
unlawful, but no other fon-ns of enforcement take their place". (I 0 1) 
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Recognizing this, Reisman affirms that the right of humanitarian intervention is 
legitimate " in so far the International Organization can assume the role of enforcer, 
when it cannot, self helP will revive. 002) The reality of a decentralized system, 
coupled with the persistent violation of human rights, urged the most astonished 
defender of the role of U. N to concede that: 
" ... It would seem that the only possible arguments against the 
substitution of collective measures under the Security Council for 
individual measures by a single state would be the inability of the 
international organization to act with the speed requisite to preserve 
life. It may take some time before the Council, with its military staff 
committee, and the pledged national contingents are in a state of 
readiness to act in such cases, but the Charter contemplates that 
international action shall be timely as well as powerful',. (103) 
'Iberefore, since the Charter pledges to afford protection and promote human rights 
and since the International organization is unable to enforce that protection, a unilateral 
action by a state in extreme violation of human rights is not unlawful. In fact, there are 
certain provisions in the Charter which could be relied on to justify the unilateral action. 
Article 56 reads: 
" All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
cooperation with the Organization for the acheivement of the 
purposes set forth in Article 55". 004) 
This Article per se according to Reisman justifies humanitarian intervention as it 
perceives that " members may act jointly with the Organization in what might be termed 
a new organized, explicit, statutory, humanitarian intervention. In the contemporary 
world there is no other way the most fundamental purposes of the Charter, in relation to 
human rights, can be made effective". 005) Following the Indian intervention in E. 
Pakistan, a committee of international jurists revised the case thoroughly and concluded 
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that 
"Indian's armed intervention would have been justified if she had 
acted under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and further that 
India would have been entitled to act unilaterally under this doctrine 
in the view of the inability of the International Organization to take 
any effective action to bring to an end the massive violation of human 
rights in East Pakistan". 006) 
Therefore, a unilateral intervention could be undertaken to protect a massive 
violation of human rights. The thesis that the ban on the use of force is an absolute 
virtue is not totally valid if it is "weighed against other values as well". 007) This 
conclusion is quite right as to assume that the prohibition on the use of force is absolute 
whatever the case might be, is to also assume the conclusion that law and justice are 
incompatible. Confronted with the two concepts, the legal, which prescribes any 
unilateral action, and the moral, which encourages the unilateral action, one must give 
priority to the latter. However, in defending the right of humanitarian intervention, one 
has to be aware of the possible abuse of the right by the intervening state. It may be that 
a state, or states, have an ulterior motive in embarking on humanitarian intervention. 
Therefore, if humanitarian intervention is to be permitted safeguards must be 
introduced. 
G- Humanitarian intervention and the search for a criteria 
Having admitted that humanitarian intervention is possible whenever there is a 
massive violation of human rights which shocks the conscience of mankind, a problem 
emerges as to the protection of that right by an intervening state. In fact, the opponents 
ofýthe theory have a good case when arguing that humanitarian intervention can allow 
an intervening state to promote its self-interest. As such, charges were levelled that, 
whatever the purpose of intervention was, the outcome of it would have a direct bearing 
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on the authority structure of the target state. The reality of this fear has been well 
demonstrated in the Indian and Tanzanian interventions and in other cases. 
To some, this is a kind of rhetoric since humanitarian intervention ought effectively 
to stop the violation and to deter in future a potential violator. (108) For an intervention 
to protect human rights acheives two aims: "easing the suffering of the victim" and 
"could have a deterrent for a potential violator". (109) However, admitting that a state, 
by intervening, could change the structure of the government is very serious and surely 
falls outside the scope of humanitarian intervention. It would have great repercussions 
on the international system, and may trigger an international war. For, it becomes too 
easy for the powerful states to use the said intervention as a cloak and hence change the 
governments of small states. Such possibilities are not theoretical: Hitler did use the 
humanitarian motto to occupy Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939. He referred to 
of assault on the life and liberty of minorities" as the main cause which prompted him to 
intervene. 010) 
The fear of such fabrication was voiced by many writers such as Brownlie(l 11) 
and Professor Henkin who contended that, "A humanitarian reason for military 
intervention is too easy to fabricate". 0 12) However, this fabrication is not enough by 
itself to justify the denial of the right of humanitarian intervention. Any humanitarian 
intervention, nowadays, ought to be cross-examined by the international community 
and the intervening state's action afterwards should be judged as to whether or not it 
was motivated by self-interest. This review by the international community would be 
very important since it chellanges the reputation of the intervening state. Professor 
McDougal and Felicino explored this point fully and concluded that: 
'The characterisation is, of course, made by an individual state at its 
own peril. It partakes, in other words, of the nature of a provisional 
detern-lination in precisely the same way that a claim of self defence 
does, and remains subject both to the subsequent review that the 
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organised community may eventually exercise. A policy of 
permitting individual initiative is, of course, again like the policy of 
allowing self defence, susceptible to perverting abuse; but this 
susceptibility is an attribute common to all legal policy, doctrine or 
rule". 0 13) 
Although, McDougal's and Felicino's observation is realistic and of great 
importance, nevertheless it is still questionable as to whether or not the international 
community could manage to distinguish between real and false humanitarian 
interventions, especially in some complex cases. In the Congo operation which was 
carried out under the banner of humanitarian intervention, the Brazzaville delegate to the 
United Nations voiced his bitterness concerning the right of humanitarian intervention 
by saying, "The humanitarian operation referred to was fundamentally only a 
pretext ... what humanitarian principles are at stake, when, on the pretext of saving lives 
of an insignificant number of whites, tens of thousands of blacks are massacred...? 
(114) Ilerefore, in the Congo operation and others, the international community has 
differed on the subject of the motive of the humanitarian intervention, and hence the 
intervening state or states secured their objectives through the invocation of the theory 
of humanitarian intervention. Thus, a close scrutiny of objection will certainly reveal 
that the most critical and sensitive aspect of the theory is its potential abuse by states . 
To minimise the effect of abuse, some suggest that the principle of proportionality 
and disinterestedness are most needed in this regard. In the Congo operation, for 
example, the black Africans aired their protest by emphasizing the fact which touches 
the heart of the theory of humanitarian intervention: it is for the "sake of an insignificant 
number of whites, tens of thousand of blacks are massacred. ". (l 15) This criticism is 
not confined to the officials of some states, but is espoused by one of the most 
respected authorities who questioned the practicality of this right in terms of the 
outcome of it by saying "what is the price, in human terms of intervention? What were 
the casualty ratios in the Stanleyville operation in 1964, the Dominican Republic in 
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1965 and other possible examples. "(1 16) This criticism is very important, in the light 
of the theory, and therefore if a humanitarian intervention is to be relied upon, a state 
has to comply with the principle of proportionality which is applicable in the case of 
self defence. On this point, some suggest that the principle of proportionality in the 
context of humanitarian intervention "should be modified to reflect not only a 
proportional use of force which does not threaten a greater destruction of values than 
the human rights at stake but also a requirement of minimum force necessary to achieve 
the lawful humanitarian objectives". 017) Such an application will, undoubtedly, 
reduce the risk and minimise the number of casualties to a great extent. 
The second condition which is of great importance is that the intervening state has 
to comply with the condition of disinterestedness. In other words, the intervening state 
is supposed to have no interest whatsoever save the pure motive of safeguarding the 
lives of people who are facing slaughter and torture. On this condition, many writers 
doubted that the absolute disinterestedness could exist and therefore dismissed it as 
being unrealistic. (118) As Bogen observed, states always intervene whenever their 
interest requires, and there is "... no single government willing to expand the money 
and manpower necessary for action unless it has some definite interest". 0 19) 
However, the question which arises is how can one justify this in having an interest 
apart from the humanitarian one in such a situation, and to what extent is a state 
justified, especially in the case of civil war? 
77here is no doubt that the condition of disinterestedness is the most critical in the 
context of civil war. To intervene in a civil war is surely to affect the outcome of the 
conflict which is totally prohibited under the doctrine of non-intervention. It is likely 
that a state intervening in a civil war to save one party from total elimination will result 
in the destruction of the opposing party, and the victory of the party for whom the 
intervention was undertaken. This fact was well reflected in Pakistan, the Congo and 
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Uganda where the victim turned his defeat into victory due to the intervention of the 
external party. Bearing this in mind, it would be very naive to concede that a state 
could be allowed to have a national interest which has nothing to do with humanity. 
A state must be permitted to initiate an intervention only to save human rights and 
nothing else. Failure to take notice of this danger will result in the manipulation of the 
conflict, and the intervening state under the banner of human rights could achieve its 
national interest and hence disregard the prohibition in Article 2 (4) and furthermore 
prevent the realisation of the principle of self-determination. To avert this abuse, the 
condition of necessity is very helpful in this context. A state ought not to intervene 
unless there is an overwhelming necessity which leaves no moment for deliberation and 
therefore, an action could be justified. However, this action must be limited in time and 
space. A state contemplating a humanitarian intervention must direct its intervention in 
accordance with the these mentioned conditions and seek no interest save that of easing 
the suffering of the victims. 
It is very obvious then, that a state must leave the country as soon as the operation 
achieves its purpose in easing the suffering and must not proceed to pursue other goals 
which in the end will help the intervening state more than the original victim. In 
addition to these conditions, others have suggested that requisite for forceful action 
taken in defence of human rights in another country is that this action must be submitted 
later to the Security Council in order to sanction the humanitarian intervention. 020) 
Because such reporting will put the action before the international forum or regional 
organisation, [if the former fails to discuss it] it will reduce the danger that is inherent in 
every unilateral intervention. Added to this factor is that if humanitarian intervention is 
to be taken, it would be preferable to be collective rather than unilateral. 021) Aware of 
the fact that a collective intervention does not gain more legality than a unilateral one 
just for being collective, it is still valid that a collective intervention would more likely 
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be disinterested than a unilateral intervention. (122) Out of the above, one could argue 
that unilateral intervention by a state in order to remedy a massive violation of human 
rights after the failure of United Nations to take action, and the exhaustion of peaceful 
means by the intervening state, would be legal and desirable if it satisfied the foregoing 
criteria. For states confronted with a situation which might endanger or increase its 
interest, would not hesitate to intervene. As Professor Baxter puts it, a state confronted 
with a situation in which its nationals are at risk, the decision-makers would say "no, it 
is more important that we should respect Article 2( 4) of the charter and allow these 
people to perish". In such a situation they would surely have disregarded Article 
2(4). (123) 
It is understandable that whenever a choice between Article 2 (4) and human rights 
is to be made, it seems to come down on the side of the latter. This is so because it is 
"contrary to all that is decent, moral and logical to require a state to sit back and watch 
while the slaughter of innocent people take place in order to comply with some blank or 
black letter prohibited against the use of force at the expense of more fundamental 
human values". 024) 
Therefore, it becomes clear that a unilateral intervention for the protection of human 
rights is not fully violative of the_United Nations Charter provided the intervening state 
adheres to criteria which at least minimise the danger of abuse of the theory in question. 
These criteria, noted below, must be complied with in full: 
(1) Exhaustion of Peaceful means 
(2) Proportionality 
(3) Necessity 
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(4) Duration 
(5) Disinterestedness 
V- Legal analysis of the Syrian intervention. 
The fear of fabrication and the abuse of the right of intervention have urged many 
writers and authorities to lay down a set of conditions with which the intervening state 
must comply. These conditions may indicate or help to provide a legal assessment of 
any intervention that may arise. The Syrian intervention under the banner of humanity, 
and its subsequent consequences, necessitates an overall review of the said intervention 
in the light of the established criteria, for if Syria failed to meet the criteria, then its 
intervention would constitute a violation of the established norms of international law. 
A- Exhaustion of peaceful means 
Despite the controversy surrounding the concept of humanitarian intervention, it has 
been accepted as a last resort to remedy an extreme situation. However, to be 
successfully invoked, it must first of all be seen that there has been an exhaustion of 
peaceful means to restore the situation in conformity with Article (33) of U. N Charter. 
A state is thus obliged to pursue all the peaceful measures that could ease the tension 
and remove the threat to the life of the people in question. However, a peaceful 
initiative should be pursued with due respect to the wishes of the parties involved in the 
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civil war. That is to say, a state should not exert any illegal pressure to subjugate 
parties to its will or to subdue one party to another. Moreover, a state must be aware 
that in such a context its behaviour is strictly controlled by the rules of the civil war. It 
is in this framework that the Syrian intervention is best understood and analysed. 
However, due to the long process of mediation that the Syrian government followedthe 
analysis of these processes is classified into three phases. 
Phase (1): 24 May 1975 
From the beginning of the civil war the Syrian government viewed the events that 
were taking place in Lebanon as of great importance. On 24th of May and following the 
formation of a military government, the Syrian president dispatched his foreign minister 
to moderate the crisis which had erupted between the belligerents. The mediation was 
crowned by the installation of a new government headed by a pro-Syrian Premier 
(Rashid Karami). However, the Syrian initiative was widely seen as a move to enhance 
Syrian interest. 025) For the Syrian government foresaw a military government as a 
great threat to the existence of the PLO and LNM and thus to Syrian interest. 
026) 
Therefore, at this stage the peaceful Syrian initiative, one can say, was not based on 
humanitarian motives but rather on a desire to keep the various parties under its control. 
Phase(2): 4 January 1976 
During this phase the intensity of fighting and the possibility of a victory by the 
Lebanese Front alerted Syria to the sensitivity of the situation. Syria, which at the time 
was pre-occupied with the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, considered the 
continuing civil strife in Lebanon as a sabotage of its policy there. Ilierefore, Syria 
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made it clear that they would not permit the partition of Lebanon, and hence, when the 
occasion arose . ..... It would lead only to our direct intervention, as Lebanon used to be 
a part of Syria, and we are ready to restore it if there is any attempt of 
partition ...... 
(127) 
Indeed, the Syrian government, faced with an invasion by Lebanese forces of 
Muslim areas (Karantina and Maslakh) and in response to a leftist and Muslims appeal, 
intervened indirectly under the banner of the Palestinian Liberation Army. In Assad's 
words: 
".. I phoned president Franjieh ... and agreed on a cease fire .. but the fighting was going on, and so we convened in Damascus to think of 
a way to solve the impasse as we gave them( Leftist Forces) weapon 
, ammunition, but to no avail and finally we agreed to intervene 
under the banner of the Palestinian Liberation Army". (128) 
As a result of this, the LNM with the help of the PLA occupied the Christian town 
(Al-Damour) and razed it to the ground in revenge for Karantina and Maslakh. 
Therefore, the Syrian mediation could hardly be regarded as a peaceful means of 
restoring the situation; rather, it was an intervention in the internal affair of a sovereign 
country, which escalated the conflict and brought about a massive destruction of life 
and property. 
Phase(3): 9 February 1976 
Ile distinction of this phase is the emergence of the LNM as a victorious party due 
to Syrian assistance. However, differences between the Syrians and LNM were 
becoming intense and bitter. 
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On the 14th of February 1976 the Syrian government in collaboration with the 
Lebanese President unveiled their plan for Lebanese reforms which came later to be 
known as the "constitutional document". 029) This document contributed to the break 
down between the LNM and the Syrian leader who described the leader of the former 
as a" stratum of leader and zaIms" who benefitted from confessionalism and feared a 
loss of privilege if the system was dismantled. (130) On the other hand, the leader of 
the LNM, Kamal Junmblat, dubbed the document a" caricature of parliamentary 
democracy" and he further said: "Our Syrian friends wanted to solve the Lebanese 
problem in their way, from above, artificially, with no genuine development of the 
constitutional law of a democratic parliamentary regime.. ". (131) 
Confronted with such a rejection the Syrian gopvemment switched their support to 
the Lebanese Front. Thus the crisis reached its climax when the Syrian government 
succeeded in imposing its candidate for the Lebanese presidency in collaboration with 
the LF. As the gap between the Syrian government and the LNM widened and in the 
face of the success of the latter in pressing on the Lebanese Front towards a political 
accommodation, the event of the besieged town in the north of Lebanon gave the Syrian 
government the pretext they desperately needed at that time. On that occasion, the 
Syrian government did not make the slightest effort to defuse peacefully the threat to the 
besieged people in the said town. Iley quickly proceeded with military action, despite 
the denial of involvement in the seige by the LNM and their condemnation of it. 
Out of the above, the Syrian government in its alleged effort to resolve the crisis, 
had indirectly contributed to the process of escalation and confrontation. However, in 
every mediatory move, the Syrian government was concerned with its prestige and its 
interest. They saw themselves as the only arbitrator of the crisis and refused and 
hindered the Arab League's effort and other foreign initiative to settle the issue. 
Therefore, during the mediatory phase the Syrian government did not meet the 
155 
requirements of the exhaustion of the peaceful means but, on the contrary, it pursued its 
mediation by illegal means through switching its alliance to suit its national interest. 
B- Necessity. 
The criterion of necessity is an essential pre-condition for the opemtion of the right 
of humanitarian intervention, for its existence contributes to the legitin-dzation of the 
principle of humanitarian intervention. Although, the criterion of necessity is applicable 
particularly in the case of self-defence, nevertheless its utilization-in the context of 
humanitarian intervention has its own importance. When the lives of certain people are 
in imminent danger and there is no altemative way to save them, then the right of 
humanitarian intervention arises. For " subsequent action, remedy ... or compensation 
cannot bring the dead to life or restore the limbs to the maimed. There is no remedy 
except prevention". 0 32) The right of humanitarian intervention - becomes 
understandable whenever the necessity is " instant, overwhelming, and leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation". 033) 
In the light of such an argument, the Syrian intervention on June 1 1976 under the 
pretext of humanitarian intervention could hardly meet the requirement of necessity. As 
far as the Kubyat is concerned, the town was, according to a variety of sources well 
defended and its eventual surrender was not inevitable. 034) Parallel to this, the attack 
on the city was not directed by the command of the Lebanese National Movement but, 
on the contrary, was condemned by both the LNM and PLO and was considered as a 
Syrian ploy to justify its intervention. 0 35) 
Furthermore, the besieged town was engaged in shelling nearby villages and as 
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such they were in a strong position which excluded any possible massacre. To this 
end, the President of the LF in his memoirs discredited the humanitarian motive of the 
Syrian government by affirming that the Syrian troops forced the Christian fighters to 
surrender their stronghold. (136) All these facts, lead to one conclusion that the city 
was in no way under imminent danger and the necessity was not instant and 
overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. 
Moreover, events that followed the Syrian intervention indeed created an 
atmosphere of necessity which, ironically, necessitated an intervention to halt the 
tragedy and killing which was precipitated by the Syrian military action. It is very 
surprising to note the timing of the Syrian military action. Why was the Syrian 
government not spurred into action by the looting and killing which had been raging in 
Lebanon before the siege of that isolated town on the Syrian border? 
The inaction and indifference to the events in Lebanon before June 1976 coupled 
with the Syrian government material assistance to the internal parties is indeed very 
perplexing. However, this contradiction could be explained by the fact that the Syrian 
intervention on the first of June 1976 under the pretext of humanitarian intervention, 
was undertaken for purely political goals and had nothing to do with humanitarian 
sentiments. The Los Angeles Times commented on the Syrian intervention suggesting 
that if President Assad wanted to invade Lebanon " for the purpose not of conquering 
or destroying anyone but to bringing settlement and reaping the credit for it, the perfect 
time would have been in January or February, or even earlier, at the moment when the 
choice of a new president and specifying of political and social reforms... were open 
for negotiation [but when the Syrian government committed themselves in March to the 
conservative party] they earned the thorough mistrust of the opposition and imposed 
themselves by force; and if they persist in doing this, taking it upon themselves to shed 
a lot of Palestinian and Lebanese blood, it could be a political disaster for Assad's 
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regime". 037) 
C- Duration. 
An intervening state which is raising the banner of humanity as the only cause for 
its intervention, ought to do the job with as much speed as possible and leave the 
country in question with the same speed. For any delay on the part of the intervening 
state could result in the violation of the territorial integrity and political independence of 
the state which is experiencing the intervention. 
Therefore, the criterion of duration is an important indication which could 
differentiate between justifiable and unjustifiable intervention on humanitarian grounds. 
In Falk's words: 
"The duration of the interference is an important way of 
distinguishing interventions that are more or less a genuine sanction 
(self-help) from those that are mere dictatorial interferences 
(aggression). (138) 
The rationale behind such reasoning is implicit in the fact that whenever a state 
intervenes and does not effect its withdrawal with the required speed, then the 
assumption is that the state is no longer performing a humanitarian task; it is rather, 
asserting its own interest. 
In the Dominican Republic, the American intervention was condemned for not 
adhering to the criterion of duration. Senator Fullbright criticized the American 
intervention for not promptly withdrawing after evacuating their nationals, and had they 
done so " no fair minded observer at home or abroad would have considered the United 
States to have exceeded its rights and responsibilities". 039) 
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In the Syrian intervention the criterion was also not observed. The Syrian 
government made it clear that the rescuing of besieged people was no longer the main 
objective of their intervention; but it was to enable Lebanon to restore its stability and 
peace in order to continue the struggle against Israel. (140) Moreover, the Syrian 
president in justifying the action, asserted that: 
"no one must object to our presence in Lebanon as Lebanon is an 
Arab country and the Syrian presence in that country ... is not a 
foreign presence as far as Lebanon is concemed... Tbe Arabs are one 
nation " and thus " we will perform our duties toward Lebanon fully 
at all times and we will do everything in our power to halt the 
fighting"-(141) 
Tbe Syrian claims matches to a great extent American and Soviet Union claims. The 
American assertion in the Dominican crisis was that the continuing presence of the 
American troops was essential to prevent a communist take over and to bring the 
country back to the process of democracy. 042) While the American intervention was 
labelled as an illegal intervention and a perpetual stick policy, the Syrian intervention 
was not dissimilar. Dr Lillich commented on the American intervention in the 
Dominican Republic by suggesting that the prolonged presence of the American 
marines in the Dominican Republic required a legal justification other than the 
traditional forcible self-help doctrine. 043) He further remarked that: " the longer 
troops remain in another country the more their presence begins to look like 
intervention ". 0 44) Indeed, the Syrians brought about another justification as they 
referred to the concept of Arabism in order to legitimate their long presence. However, 
as Lillich remarked, as far as the right of humanitarian intervention is concerned, there 
are no grounds for any delay. 
In such a context, one can only regard the prolonged presence of the Syrian army 
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on Lebanese territory and the escalation which followed, to demonstrate beyond any 
doubt the illegality of the Syrian intervention. Therefore, as far as the factor of duration 
is concerned, the Syrian government failed to meet this criterion. 
D- Proportionality. 
Again, in order for a state to justify its recourse to force, the compliance with the 
criterion of proportionality is imperative. The universality of this principle was bome 
out of the Caroline incident on December 29,1837 in which Webster, Secretary of 
State, observed that in order to accept the British arguments, the latter had to show that, 
"they did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of 
self-defence must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it',. (145) 
In view of that, the measure undertaken must be proportional to the danger and 
must not go beyond what is necessary for the protection of the subjects in question. 
The French representative at the United Nations forum and pending the debate on the 
American intervention in the Dominican Republic, warned that a forcible action in the 
context of rescuing nationals must " ... be limited in objective, duration, and scale or 
run the risk of becoming armed intervention". 046) Bearing this in mind, the Syrian 
military intervention to rescue the besieged people could be disqualified as a 
humanitarian intervention. The introduction of four thousand soldiers to the besieged 
town coupled with nine thousand soldiers to the Baqqa valley in the centre of Ubanon 
were clearly disproportionate. 047) The forces successfully lifted the siege without 
any considerable bloodshed. However, on 2nd of June 1976 the Syrian government 
increased th. e number of troops to fifteen thousand which were fully equipped with two 
hundred tanks. (148) 
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After completion of their mission, that is to say the lifting the siege, the Syrian 
government demanded the surrender of the LNM's weapons to the Syrian forces. 
049) 
Following the refusal by the LNM to such a demand, the fighting between the Syrian 
troops and LNM escalated on a large scale. In such a context, the Syrian intervention 
could hardly be described as proportional. The size of the Syrian army which was 
introduced manifestly exceeded the number which was required to break the siege of 
the town. It is implausible to argue that such a number was necessary, since the unit of 
the Arab Lebanese Army which surrounded the town did not exceed a few hundred. 
Moreover, the Syrian intervention clearly went beyond the proclaimed objective as 
it extended the geographical location of the fighting. The demand that the LNM must 
surrender its weapons had nothing whatsoever to do with humanitarian intervention. 
Yet it may be argued that in order to Preserve the life of people in Lebanon, who were 
in general caught up in the quagmire of the civil war, required drastic action on the part 
of the Syrians in order to disarm the rebels. However, this assumption is also very 
superficial. The subsequent engagement of the Syrian troops with the LNM 
exacerbated the setting and raised the number of casualties to an unprecedented level. 
The high number of casualties prompted the hitherto staunch ally of Syria (USSR) to 
voice its protest: 
" Syrian Arab Republic has repeatedly stated that the mission of the 
troops sent by it to Lebanon was to help stop bloodshed. Attention, 
must, however, be drawn to the fact that an ever-swelling river of 
blood continues to flow in Lebanon today . The first thing to be 
done in Lebanon therefore, is to stop the bloodshed. All those 
parties involved in the Lebanese events, in one way or another, must 
cease fire ...... 
(150) 
With the scope of the Syrian military operation no longer restricted to the north of 
Lebanon, but extended to reach the South of Lebanon where there was no confessional 
or sectarian fighting, the adherence to the principle of proportionality becomes very 
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doubtful. 
It is very possible to criticise the Syrian intervention on the criterion of 
proportionality which is demanded in cases of humanitarian intervention. Professor 
J. Moore affirmed that the principle of proportionality in the context of humanitarian 
intervention " should be modified to reflect not only a proportional use of force which 
does not threaten greater destruction of values than the human rights at stake, but also a 
requirement of minimum force necessary to achieve the lawful humanitarian 
objectives". 051) 
With this qualified description of the principle of proportionality, one can rule that 
the Syrian intervention was not in line with the requirement of the principle of 
proportionality regarding the size, objective and finally the scope of the operation. 
E- Disinterestedness. 
Supporters of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention have strongly defended the 
thesis that an intervening state should in no way be discredited on the grounds that its 
intervention was prompted by national interest. However, they did not determine or 
define precisely the interest in question. 
On this point, one cannot regard the toppling of the existing government or paving 
the way for the victory of one party in a civil war as an interest that the intervening state 
ought to protect. Accepting this presumption would be =tamount to negating all of the 
Charter provisions and various resolutions regarding the prohibition of the use of force 
for such purposes. In this context, the use of force would fall within the definition of 
illegal intervention. 
162 
In a humanitarian intervention, the only interest which is permissible is that an 
intervening state must do its best to stop the fighting and save lives without ulterior 
motives. Lawrence affirmed that humanitarian intervention could escape condemnation 
if it is " undertaken with a single eye to the object in view and without an ulterior 
consideration of self-interest and ambition". 052) Apart from that, international law 
recognises no validity of any action beyond that and consequently such an action will 
be illegal. Bearing this in mind, one wonders whether or not the Syrian motive was in 
line with the said interest. 
From the beginning of the civil war, the Syrian government made it clear that it had 
a great stake in Lebanon. Following the Egyptian-Israeli agreement with its inevitable 
outcome leaving Syria alone to face Israel, the Syrian government embarked on a policy 
of consolidating its position through an alliance with the PLO and Jordan to prevent any 
further separate deal; and to enhance its bargaining position in any future 
settlement. 053) This was only achievable through the control of Lebanon and the 
subjugation of the PLO-054) Moreover, the Syrian forces feared any Leftist victory 
which would leave them vulnerable to Israel. (155) All these factors provided a 
stimulus to Syria to commit its troops in Lebanon. Added to this, the success of the 
LNM on both military and diplomatic fronts irritated Syria and enticed it into Lebanon 
even before events became difficult to control. (156) Ilis is very evident in the Syrian 
move to liquidate the LNM and subjugate the PLO which clearly runs beyond 
humanitarian motives. According to Kamal Jumbalat, the leader of the LNM, President 
Assad [ this account was declared by Assad's speech] told him: " listen, for me this is 
an historic opportunity to re-orient the Maronites towards Syria. I cannot allow you to 
defeat the Christians' camp .. " and when Jumbalat told him that the LF did not 
represent the Christians but the isolationist, he replied: " nonetheless I cannot allow you 
to beat the isolationists ...... 
(157) It seems that the Syrian government in rendering 
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support to Christians, was motivated by winning them over and hence the control of 
Lebanon through them. 058) 
Significantly, the Syrian action was undertaken at a time when the parties to the 
conflict were engaged in dialogue to secure a cease fire and lasting settlement. 
According to the most influential man of the LF, Bashir Al Jammual: 
" We were in the middle of negotiations, when the Syrian military 
intervention took us by surprise. To my mind we [ the warring par 
ties] were on the verge of reaching an agreement when the Syrian 
troops intervened and reshuffled the cards. This is also the view 
expressed by Kamal Jumbalat yesterday. The intervention toppled 
everything". (159) 
As such, the criterion of disinterestedness was not complied with by the Syrian 
government. The Syrian government demonstrated that its intervention was not 
initiated for humanitarian purposes but rather for self-interest. This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that a state intervening in another state's affairs to protect human 
rights must have a clean record on this matter. Following the Belgium and U. S. A 
intervention in the Congo, and during the debate in the Security Council many 
representatives made the point that when a state is violating human rights at home and at 
the same time appearing through its intervention to protect human rights, must have its 
intervention dismissed summarily. (160) The Syrian government's record on the 
subject of human rights is not very impressive-061) . 
Therefore, having established that the Syrian motive was not to protect Christians 
but rather to protect its own national interest, and since their record on human rights 
was deplorable, their action in Lebanon cannot satisfy the criterion of disinterestedness. 
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VI-CONCLUSION. 
Humanitarian intervention is still one of the most controversial issues in 
international law. Although it is part of customary international law few writers agree 
on its validity under the United Nation Charter. However, the increased importance of 
human rights which is reflected in the Charter and in many declarations and treaties, has 
paved the way for its acceptance in the corpus of international law as a last resort. 
States can no longer escape censor for the violation of human rights under the 
pretext that it is within the domestic jurisdiction. The internationalization of human 
rights has effected states' right in this matter. However, due to the absence of 
procedures in the United Nations Charter to deal with the potential violation of human 
rights, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the United Nations due to its horizontal 
structure, the principle of humanitarian intervention cannot be dismissed at first hand. 
Since the United Nations is unable to defend the issue of human rights, especially those 
which involve practices which shake the conscience of mankind, any state may 
intervene to uphold respect for human rights. 
Although humanitarian intervention is violative of a state's sovereignty and may be 
used as a cloak for aggression, one cannot at the same time assert that the state is free to 
massacre its own people without impunity. As collective intervention under the 
auspices of United Nations in such an intemational system does not occur, unilateral 
intervention could be accepted if it was carried out in accordance with certain criteria. 
From this perspective, the Syrian intervention could be accepted provided that it 
satisfied the established criteria: the exhaustion of peaceful means, necessity, duration, 
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proportionality and disinterestedness. Syria has failed to comply with each of these 
criteria. What is more, the Syrian intervention unequivocally violated these criteria and 
served neither restored human rights nor observed Lebanon's sovereignty. 
Therefore, one can assert on both sides that if there is humanitarian intervention in 
contemporary international law, the Syrian intervention was illegal since it failed to 
meet the requirements which are attached to that right. On the other hand, if there is no 
such right, then a fortoiori Syrian intervention was illegal. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AN INTERVENTION UPON THE INVITATION OF THE LEBANESE 
GOVERNMENT. 
I- INTRODUCTION. 
The Syrian government's allegation that its intervention was in response to the 
request of Lebanese legal authorities has revived a heated debate over the 
appropriateness of the concept of invitation in international law. As a matter of fact, the 
principle is surrounded by ambiguity and inaccuracy which in one way or another helps 
to undermine its legal relevance in contemporary international law. Generally, the 
principle is recognized, as an exception to the widely recognized norm of non- 
intervention. However, since this principle has been violated many times, the premise 
upon which the principle stands had been undermined. The best illustrative example of 
this fact is to be found in the records of history. In 1939 Hitler received an invitation 
from the government of Czechoslovakia to intervene in its country.. Years later the 
content of the letter was revealed to the public which was outrageous and shocking. 
Hitler addressed the Czech president in an aggressive manner: 
" Of course we would like to have an invitation from you for 
Czechoslovakia to become a German protectorate; and we would 
like to warn you that if you do not give us that invitation we would 
be obliged to invade Czechoslovakia and your beautiful city of 
Prague would be destroyed on the first day". 
0) 
Unfortunately, Hitler's example is not the only precedent of the misuse of the 
concept. In the following years, many states invoked the pretext of invitation to 
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demonstrate the legality of their military action. 
Interestingly enough, the issue of invitation is not as confusing nor as uncertain as 
in the case of civil war, where the identity of the representative of the government is the 
vital element to be established. Despite such an indeterminacy, international law has 
not yet responded effectively to the challenge that the civil war has brought into light. 
Many states still cling to the notion that the goverrunent of any state could validly invite 
any foreign state to help in putting down an insurgency which had challenged the 
existing government. (2) On the other hand, other states challenge this notion and insist 
on a new norm which lends support not to the government, but to the insurgents. (3) 
However, whatever their divergences of views over this issue, an invitation by a 
government is still not contrary to international law T'his notion of legitimacy is carried 
over from traditional law which prescribes that a government, by virtue of its 
representation of a state, has the right to, whenever it encounters difficulties, invite 
another friendly nation to assist it in easing the difficulties -which, in most cases, is to 
put down a rebellion. 
As international law has undergone major changes, one wonders to what extent the 
right of invitation is still valid. If an invitation is still recognised in international law, 
the inquiry will be focused on the Syrian intervention under the principle of invitation 
and to see whether or not such an invitation is still valid under international law and 
Lebanese constitutional law. 
Il- The Syrian government justification 
Following its intervention on the first of June 1976, the Syrian government relied 
on the invitation of the Lebanese government as well as on humanitarian intervention as 
the legal basis for its military action. The Syrian government strongly defended its 
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military action by reference to the invitation of the Lebanese government. As a matter of 
factý on no occasion did the Syrian government abandon the claim that their intervention 
was in response to such an invitation. Mr Khaddem, a Syrian foreign minister on his 
visit to France following his country's intervention, affirmed to his French counterpart 
after a brief meeting that, Syrian intervention was in response to the Lebanese 
government's invitation. The French foreign minister affirmed this by saying: 
I "Mr Kaddern assured us that Syria intervened in Lebanon upon the 
request of a great portion of Lebanese public opinion and the 
Lebanese authority and the intervention was necessary to save life 
and losses". (4) 
Moreover, President Assad in an interview to the American newspaper 
Washington Post declared that, his forces, " entered Lebanese villages in order to 
bring peace and stability and after having been requested by many Lebanese officials to 
offer such assistance, '. (5) 
As the intervention was basically justified by an invitation from the Lebanese legal 
authority and moreover, by reference to Lebanese public opinion, the major question is 
whether or not Syria was justified in its intervention under such ground, and in 
particular what is the legality of an intervention upon the request of the majority of 
Lebanese people ? These issues could be summarized into four questions which will all 
need an answer in order to affirm the legality or illegality of the Syrian intervention. 
These are as follows: 
(I)- was there in fact any invitation fi-om the legitimate authority 
(2)- What is the validity of that invitation under international law ? 
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(3)- What is the constitutionality of that invitation under the Lebanese constitutional 
law? 
(4)- Finally what is the legal basis for intervention upon the request of the majority of 
people, that is to say self- determination ? 
III- The Existence Of An Invitation by the Lebanese Government. 
The Syrian government, on many occasions specifically affirmed that they 
intervened upon the request of the Lebanese government. The Syrian authorities, 
however, did not name in any way the officials who invited them. The determination 
of those who issued the invitation is of great importance since the validity of the 
intervention is dependent on that. The existence of a consent by the state will change 
the nature of intervention from an illegal act into a legal one. Thus, determination of the 
officials will ease the question of consent by reference to Lebanese constitutional law 
which ultimately detern-iines whether the officials thereof were empowered to issue an 
invitation. 
The absence of such a specification, however, leaves room for speculation 
regarding the issuer of the invitation. Moreover, such intervention by foreign troops 
must not take effect unless there is at least a written request or anything which could 
confirm the foreign government's claim. Given the absence of any evidence 
concerning the Syrian intervention, one is therefore left with speculation. 
Since the Syrian government referred to the Lebanese govemment without 
indicating which member of the cabinet invited them, then an assumption can be made; 
either the prime minister on his own initiative, or the president invited the Syrians into 
Lebanon. Or perhaps there was a treaty between the two countries which gave legality 
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to the Syrian intervention. Therefore, a thorough review of these questions is vital to 
the inquiry in question. 
A-The Prime Minister's Request 
The question as to whether or not the prime minister invited the Syrian troops into 
Lebanon is not too complex to answer. The prime minister has preserved a reputation 
of being a man of dialogue and peace. His policy towards the Lebanese civil war is 
based on dialogue with various parties as he always advocated the point that violence 
never resolves a crisis. The prime minister's commitment to a peaceful resolution of 
the civil war has never waned even during the most critical time of the crisis. (6) 
Against this background, an invitation by him to the Syrian troops would seem at 
odds with his beliefs. Indeed the prime minister voiced his concern over the Syrian 
intervention as he also discarded any military options. Despite his long standing 
support for the role of the Syrians in Lebanon, his steadfast resolution was unshakable 
that such a role must exclude a military option. Faced with the Syrian intervention in 
the conflict, the prime minister did not hesitate to call on the Syrians to withdraw their 
troops from the quagmire of the Lebanese civil war. (7) On the contrary the prime 
minister insisted that if there was a need for military involvement in Lebanon, then such 
an involvement must be carried out under the auspices of the Arab League. In a 
manifesto after a meeting with the Islamic and National parties, prime minister Rashid 
Karami declared that: 
" .. Out of our concern for national unity between the Syrians and the 
Palestinians on one hand, and the National forces on the other, and 
the committment to face the danger which threatens our country, we 
request Syria to withdraw all its forces in order to prevent the 
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renewal of clashes which was condemned by all Arab world public 
opinion; and we kindly request the Secretary General of the Arab 
League, Mahmoud Riad, to speed up the execution of the Arab 
League resolution regarding Lebanon". 
(8) 
The prime minister's statement is of great importance since it refers to the 
withdrawal of the Syrian troops and a replacement of them by Arab league forces. In 
this way, the prime minister did not abandon his conviction that the military 
intervention by the Syrians was against the wishes of most parties to the conflict and 
aff=ed his acceptance of the Syrian political initiative as all parties had agreed upon. 
After four months following the Syrian military intervention, the prime minister 
reaffirmed what he believed as he submitted his resignation to the elected president 
(Sarkis) by saying that the Syrian initiative was " in the beginning political and thereby 
all the parties agreed upon itý but the successive development transformed it into a 
military one whereby the opinion was divided upon it". (9) 71is statement, in contrast 
to the first one which called for the Syrian withdrawal appeared very mild, and far from 
explicitly condemning the Syrian intervention. However, such a contradiction must not 
be interpreted in a sense as to give credit to the Syrian intervention. Karami's last 
statement must be viewed in the light of the development which took place following 
the Syrian intervention, as the Syrian forces stormed nearly all the fortresses of the 
LNM and hence the Syrian forces were the dominant power. It is unreasonable to 
perceive a statement from anyone charging the Syrian forces with illegality, or calling 
on its troops to leave the Lebanese territory. Despite this factorthe prime minister's 
statement was indicative of the relcutance of various parties to welcome it. 
Thus, one could only give credit to the first statement, for the simple fact that the 
prime minister was free from any foreign pressure; and consequently his second 
statement must be considered inconclusive. 
Accepting the prime minister's statement as a reflection of his administration or at 
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least his conviction, one could then draw the conclusion that the prime minister was not 
in favour of Syrian military intervention, and as a matter of fact was against it. Then, if 
the prime minister opposed the Syrian intervention, it becomes illogical to assume that 
he invited the Syrian tn)ops into Lebanon. 
Therefore, the Syrian intervention was not requested by the Lebanese prime 
minister and any conclusion to the contrary in the light of the foregoing facts seems 
unreasonable. 
B- The Existence Of A Treaty Or The Lebanese President's Request. 
As there is no hard evidence relating to the prime ministers involvement in the 
invitation of the Syrian troops into Lebanon, other possibilities may exist. One of the 
these possibilities is the existence of a legal arrangement, or in other words, the 
existence of a treaty which, if it ever existed, would legitimize Syrian military action. 
There is no evidence to prove the existence of any such treaty. However, in 
reviewing all the Syrian and Lebanese officials' statements one can detect some of the 
legal arrangements referred to by the two countries. Whether or not those statements or 
legal arrangements can be considered as a valid legal document is a major concern of 
this inquiry. However, the Syrians and in particular their president in his most famous 
speech did point to some of the legal arrangements relating to his troops' intervention in 
Lebanon. The Syrian president uncovered an agreement between himself and the 
Palestinian forces in Lebanon which, according to the President furnished the legal 
support for his military action. This agreement came out of an understanding between 
the Palestinian and the Syrian government after the latter's insistence that the 
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Palestinians must not depart from Syrian policy which is not different from the 
Palestinian policy. 
Thus, on the 16th of April 1976, the Syrian government headed by the Syrian 
president and the Palestinian Organization, represented by Mr Arafat, held a meeting 
and they thereafter agreed on a legal document which came to be known as the April 
Agreement. 00) The major features of this agreement is its reference to the Lebanese 
civil war. Tle two parties agreed on a set of rules relating to the management of the 
Lebanese conflict. The most relevant of these rules are the following : 
(l)- To halt the fighting and adopt a unified stand against any side which resumes 
combat operation. 
(2)- To reform the tripartite Syrian-Palestinian-Lebanese Higher Military Committee. 
(3)- To resist partition in all its forms and any action or measure that harms the unity of 
Lebanon's territory and people 
(4)- To reject American plans and solutions in Lebanon 
(5)- Rejection of internationalization or the entry of any international forces into 
Lebanon. 
(6)- To reject the Arabization of the crises in Lebanon. 
0 1) 
Thus, according to this agreement, the Syrians pledged to fight any one that 
resorted to the military option, rejection of the partition of Lebanon, and adherence to 
the Syrian policy in Lebanon. Following the rules of -this agreement and particularly 
Article (1), which permits Syrian intervention to stop any party which resorts to 
violence, president Assad affirmed that, " We had agreed to take measures against any 
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side which started a fighting operation. It was they who started the fighting (the 
Palestinians and LNM) .. we pushed some of our 
forces in the direction of Beirut in 
order to restore things to normal". 02) To what extent the president was relying on this 
document as a justification is not very clear as reference to it was only mentioned in 
Assad's speech. 
Whatever the Syrian government's stand on this issue, the April agreement has no 
real legal value whatsoever. The cited agreement was an agreement to which the 
Lebanese Government was a non- party. The agreement then has no legal importance 
vis a vis the Lebanese government. On the contrary, the agreement is adverse to the 
prevailing norms of international law . It is contracted on behalf of the 
Lebanese 
government over an issue which the constitutional government is solely entitled to deal 
with. 71be conclusion of this agreement between the P. L. 0 and the Syrian government, 
in no way could be brought as a justification for the Syrian intervention. After all, 
neither the Palestinians nor the Syrians have any right to contract on the issue which is 
ultimately within the domestic jurisdiction of the Lebanese government. Ilerefore, the 
16 April agreement must be dismissed as irrelevant and cannot be invoked as a 
justification. 
Another agreement was referred to, not by the Syrian government but by the 
Lebanese president who claimed that the agreement legitimized the intervention since 
that agreement was conducted and signed by the Lebanese government. 
03) This 
agreement was negotiated between the Syrian and the Lebanese presidents when the 
latter visited Syria following the first phase of an invited Syrian intervention on the 
fourth of January 1976. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the agreement was a 
compromise envisioned by the two presidents to resolve the conflict. However, the 
agreement was far too short to satisfy the demands of the LNM. In citing the 
agreement as justification for the Syrian intervention, the Lebanese president in his letter 
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to the Secretary General of the Arab League affirmed his conviction that the Arab- 
League had no legal right to intervene in the bilateral relations between Lebanon and 
Syria; and furthermore confirmed that the Syrian intervention was based on the 
constitutional document of the fourteenth of February which the Lebanese cabinet 
agreed upon. (14) 
To the Lebanese president, the agreement was the proper legal document which 
revealed that the Lebanese government's consent was not absent and hence the Syrians 
were invited. However, the cited agreement was a mere set of reforms that were 
embodied in a document, commonly known as the 14th of February constitutional 
document. This document has not touched on the Syrian military intervention in 
Lebanon. (15) There are no rules or references in the document which could be cited in 
support of the president's statement. Briefly, the document was a plan embodying 
reforms and had nothing to do with the introduction of foreign troops. 
The president's affirmation that the Syrian intervention to force the Palestinians to 
adhere to the Cairo agreement, already discussd in chapter two, is defenceless. The 
document's reference to the Cairo agreement was in such terms: 
" Nor do the Palestinians need reminding that if the Palestinian 
revolution was to coexist with Lebanese legitimacy in a small and 
compact territory like Lebanonwhich is not really the territory of the 
revolution, there had to be consideration, precaution if the two were 
not to come into collision. [They know] that the situation today 
requires close adherence to the agreement and greater endeavour in 
their implementation especially in the case of the Cairo 
agreement. 06) 
According to the wording of the document, it is impossible to interpret its rules to 
the effect that the Syrians were entitled to intervene to force implementation of the 
document. In response to the Lebanese president's claim, the prime minister, Karami, 
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questioned the content of the document in order to see whether or not there was a 
reference to Syrian implementation. He said: 
Whenever I, or others, returned to the constitutional document 
nothing could be found regarding the entry of the Syrian army, not 
to mention, the justification of its entry.. and I stressed that this 
constitutional document is not constitutional unless the Lebanese 
parliament agreed upon it, and, so far, the document is still a 
preliminary suggestion for the envisaged reform. 07) 
Therefore, the constitutional document cannot be invoked here in support of the 
Syrian intervention. Apart from its existence as a viable legal document according to 
Lebanese law, the document is still of no value because it is not concerned at all with 
the Syrian intervention. It is simply a formula or a plan for reforming the Lebanese 
system and moreover such a plan was rejected by various parties to the conflict. 
Out of the above, since neither the agreement of 16 April nor the constitutional 
document could be relied on as a justification for the Syrian intervention, the only 
remaining possibility, is that it was the president who invited the Syrians. (18) There is 
ample evidence that the Lebanese president acceded to the Syrian intervention. After 
all, the president and his partners of the Lebanese Front gave full support to the Syrian 
military intervention. 09) The leader of the Phalange party expressed his full support 
for the Syrian action and praised the initiative by saying: " The Syrian initiative is the 
best illuminating step in the record of history since it attracted the fearful people 
towards an Arab country which is considered the castle of true Arabismand foreclosed 
the colonization creeping through the door of Lebanon and the region". (20) 
Moreover, the Lebanese president has praised the Syrian intervention and defended 
it on every occasion. The Lebanese president's relationship with the Syrian president 
was a very special one which prompted the Syrian president to afflum to the Palestinian 
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leader that he was the best president among the Lebanese politicians, and according to 
Assad: " Ae is the only Lebanese president who would sign an agreement of unity if I 
asked him to do so". (2 1) 
Following this argument one could speculate that the president, out of desperation, 
invited Syria's intervention or at least welcomed it as a helpful gesture. Therefore, 
assuming the president issued the invitation, the most relevant question that might arise 
is the validity of that invitation. An invitation issued by the president must be issued 
according to the constitutional law of Lebanon. Whether or not the invitation was in 
line with the Lebanese constitution is a question of special importance but before 
proceeding to discuss it an attempt will be made to discuss the legality of the invitation 
under international law. 
IV- The validity of the invitation under the rules of international law. 
A- The Principle of Effectiveness. 
It is generally accepted as common knowledge that under international law a 
government by virtue of its representation of a state has the right to issue an invitation 
to invite another state into its territory. Such a postulate has long been adhered to and 
accepted by various actors on the international level. 
The acceptance of the invitation, however, contributed to a breach in international 
law, as an invitation in the context of a civil war does not reflect the above claim. In 
other words, the representation of a state in a civil war is of great doubt, and hence no 
one could assert with great confidence its representation of a state. The government 
which has been challenged by a massive rebellion, and in the course of suppressing it, 
the government could hardly be justified in inviting another government to assist in 
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putting down the rebellion. To assert that the government is still enjoying that right is 
in fact introducing a norm which puts the government in a superb position vis a vis the 
rebel forces. 
The norm that the government could be treated on equal footing with the insurgent 
when the latter is being recognized by foreign states or the parent government as 
belligerent, is out moded. It is illogical to perceive a state which is challenged by 
insurgents to recognise them and hence open the way toward its demise. Neither is it 
possible to see a government recognising the insurgents as belligerent, given the 
historical irrelevence of the concept. In such a context, the incumbent government's 
survival is guaranteed and its legal strength is left untouched. To Carner, the matter is 
very clear 
" there is no rule of international law which forbids the government 
of another state from rendering assistance to the established 
legitimate government of another state with the aim of enabling it to 
suppress an insurrection against its authority". (22) 
Such assistance, according to Carner, as long as it directed to the legitimate 
government " is not a case of unlawful intervention as is the giving of assistance to 
rebel forces who are arrayed against its authority-. (23) 
In such a context one wonders to what extent the norm is applicable and whether or 
not the norm could be extended to include a situation where the rebels hold a great 
portion of territory and exercise effective control. In fact, there are many cases in 
which the insurgents hold fast to the territory and challenge the writ of the government 
to the extent of making it null and void. Against this backdrop the presumption that the 
incumbent government is still the legitimate one seems to run against logic. Then, the 
criterion of effectiveness is an indication that the government is no longer in control and 
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the insurgents are gaining the upper hand. The practice of states on this issue is very 
clear and abundant. 
Following the abolition of the monarchy on June 1 1973 and the proclamation of 
Greece as a republic by the military Junta, the British foreign secretary said: 
" We deplore the fact that the monarchy has been brought to an end 
by this illegal government ... nevertheless, they are a government 
with whom we have had relations all these years and the situation 
has not changed in that respect. They are in control of the country 
and therefore we recognise them". (24) 
In this case, the matter was very clear as the new government was in total control. 
However, the case which needs clarification is where neither the insurgents nor the 
incumbent government hold complete control. International law dictates that the 
government which has lost control over the territory has no special advantage over the 
insurgents. 
In the Hopkins case this conclusion was affirmed. The commission that 
investigated the acts of certain revolutionary authorities relating to the legality of the 
postal order issued by the Huerta. (revolutionary authority) administration, reached the 
conclusion that the act was valid. The rationale of the ruling was as such: 
" It will be bome in mind that an administration of illegal origin will 
either operate directly on the central authority by seizing, as Huerta 
did, the rein of govemment, displacing the regularly constituted 
authorities from their seats of powerforcibly occupying such seats, 
and extending its influence from the centre throughout the nation; or 
it comes into being through attacking the existing order fi-om without 
and step by step working towards the centre. The act of an 
organization of the latter type become binding on the nation as of the 
date territory comes under its dominaton and control conditioned 
upon its ultimate success. [The] binding force of such acts of 
Huerta administratoin ..... will depend upon its real control and 
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paramountcy at the time of the act over a major portion of the 
territory and a majority of the people of Mexico". (25) 
The commission continued to stress the importance of the criterion of control by 
drawing the following conclusions: "Once it had lost this control, even though it had 
not actually been overthrown, it would not be more than one among two or more 
factions wrestling for power as between themselves". (26) 
In another famous case the effective control of the government was the sole 
criterion for establishing the legality of the action. The Tinoco case concluded that a 
government which is in firm control, although not recognized by other states, is still the 
de facto government which could request and speak for the state. (27)lle ruling of the 
Tinoco case was very specific. 
" The issue is not whether the new government assumes power or 
conducts its administration under constitutional limitations 
established by the people during the incumbency of the government 
it has overthrown. The question is, has it really established itself in 
such a way that all within its influence recognise its control, and 
there is no opposing force assuming to be a government in its 
place". (28) 
It is the general rule that a government in firm control of the territory is the proper 
government whose representation of a state enables it to issue an invitation. (29) It is 
the firmness of control of the territory and the ability of a state to exercise its daily 
function which count under the rule of international law. If it is so, then to concede that 
in international law there is a ground on which to regard a government which has no 
effective control over its territory as the proper government is quite absurd and contrary 
to the preceding argument. For accepting this view is to virtually tie the government 
inseparably to the state, in a sense that the absence of the former signifies the absence 
of the latter. In fact, there is no legal ground for such a presumption. In the life span of 
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a state, governments come and go and with such a process a state may have different 
governments. However, the only government in the case of a struggle for power 
amongst the various factions is that which exercises effective control. 
According to the White Man Digest of International Law the test of effectiveness 
depends upon the existence of the following factors: 
(1) Actual possession of supreme power by the government in the district or state over 
which its jurisdiction extends 
(2) The acceptance or acknowledgment of its authority by the mass of the people as 
proved by their general acquiescence in rendering habitual obedience. 
(3) The recognition of the government as de facto or de jure by foreign govemment(30) 
The firm control of the territory by the government was recognized by every 
authority on international law. This view is held by both classical and contemporary 
writers. As an example, Vattel's view is of great relevance :- 
"Since foreigners have no right to interfere in the domestic affairs of 
a state , they are not obliged to examine or to pass upon the justice 
or injustice of its conduct in the management of them; they may if 
they think fit, presume that the sovereign in possession is the lawful 
one. (3 1) 
Lauterpacht's view is in total conformity with the said view, as he asserts: 
"Although international law does not stigmatize revolutions as 
unlawful, it does not ignore altogether the distinction between the 
revolutionary forces and the established government. So long as the 
lawful government, however adversely affected by the fortune of the 
civil war, remains within national territory and asserts its authorityit 
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(32) is presumed to represent the state as a whole". 
Therefore, the preceding argument illustrates the fact that an invitation by a 
government beset by civil war will not be recognised so long as the government in 
question is not in firm control of its territory. The incumbent government has no legal 
authority to issue such an invitation due to its failure to put down the insurgency which 
challenges its authority. No such argument is legally valid today even though in the 
nineteenth century a king could represent the state irrespective of his control of the 
territory; andwhen deposed by the revolution, he could still invite another nation to his 
aid. The monarchy which was pervasive in the 19th century is no longer applicable and 
the effective control of a government is the major theme in accepting the act of the 
government in question. After surveying the practice of states, Bundu summarised his 
conclusion by saying: 
The preponderance of the practice of states nowadays consider the 
principle of effectiveness as controlling; any manifestation of 
popular consent being treated as affiation of that principle. The 
absence of popular consent is not therefore a conclusive factor 
militating against the issue of effectiveness',. (33) 
Quincy Wright reached this conclusion as he affmned in this regard that: 
"It is presumed that a government in firm possession of the territory 
of a state, even not generaly recognized, can speak for the state. 
There is a presumption on the other hand, that a government, even if 
generally recognized, cannot speak for a state if it is not in firm 
possession of the state's territory,,. (34) 
Summing up the argument, it becomes clear that a governmenfs act cannot be 
recognised unless the government holds firm control over the territory. Then an 
invitation by the incumbent government cannot be regarded proper as long as the 
196 
government has no firrn control. 
lberefore, as far as the Lebanese governments invitation is concerned, the question 
is whether the Lebanese government was in firm control at the time of invitation. To 
what extent the Lebanese government was in firm control is a factual question which 
ultimately detenriines the legal question. 
B-The Effectiveness Of The Lebanese Government. 
In his comment on the traditional rules of international law Tom Farer recognised 
the fact that the identification of the true incumbent is inseparably linked to a set of 
facts, which if ever agreed upon, would enable one to reach the right conclusion. (35) 
From that perspective, the agreed set of facts which is required in order to draw a 
conclusion about the true incumbent, is not difficult in the Lebanese case. As far as the 
Lebanese case is concerned, the agreed set of facts relating to the true incumbent was 
not a subject of disagreement. Therefore, in determining whether the Lebanese 
government was in true effective control to be regarded as the true incumbent, is greatly 
dependent on a review of the facts. There is no doubt that the Lebanese government 
was not in firm control at the time of the invitation, as its writ hardly ran beyond the 
presidential palace. (36) The ineffectiveness of the Lebanese government could be 
reviewed on two levels: political and military performance. 
On the political level the Lebanese government was in a state of paralysis. The 
differences between the prime minister and the president were too deep to be 
reconciled. (37) The president regarded the mere existence of Karami, the prime 
minister, as an insult, since his installation was due to Syrian pressure which was 
exerted upon the president following the crisis of the military government. (38) The 
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failure of Karami's government in bringing the parties together was believed to be one 
of the president's tricks. Later, Karami's frustration grew bigger as the president 
excluded him from the most crucial decisions(39), and to his irritation the president 
continued a policy of close collaboration with ex-president Chammoun who was 
regarded by the prime minister as a major party to the conflict. (40) The political 
differences reached a climax as the majority of the chamber of deputies called on the 
Lebanese president to offer his resignation as he was perceived to be one of the 
obstacles to the process of reconciliation. 01) As the crisis of the president and his 
prime minister went on unresolved, the latter offered his resignation which was 
perceived by one of the most eminent historians as being "symbolic of the 
ineffectiveness of the Lebanese cabinet". (42) 
Given these facts, the Lebanese political decision-makers were not united on any 
issue. These differences, if they prove anything, prove that the incumbent government 
was not one which represented the bulk'of the Lebanese people; only such a 
representation qualifies a government to ask for foreign help. A foreign state cannot 
respond to an invitation unless there has been a collective decision, where the processes 
of constitutional law have been fully respected, authorizing the invitation. However, 
with such a break down in decision making, one can affirm that the incumbent 
government was not united in the face of the rebel forces, but on the contrary was 
divided. 
As to the military situation which is the most important factor in drawing the 
conclusion about the ineffectiveness of the governrnent, the crisis of the incumbent was 
worse and much deeper. 'The impotence of the incumbent government was manifested 
in every aspect of its function. 
(43) Even before the desertion of the Lebanese army the 
government was experienced in living with the existence of various militias which 
exceeded the number in the Lebanese Anny. 
(44) The number of the recruits in militias 
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were around thirty thousand operating on Lebanese territory against seventeen thousand 
of the Lebanese army. The crisis of the incumbent government deepened when the 
Lebanese army, the last symbol of the existence of the incumbent government 
disintegrated and consequently joined various parties which were fighting each other. 
However, owing to the power of the army which mainly joined forces with the LNM, 
the pressure increased on the president, as a unit of the army shelled the presidential 
palace and the president fled to the Eastern sector and joined the Lebanese Front. 
(45) 
As the war was raged on, the LNM succeeded in occupying the whole country and 
the last bastion left was the tiny enclave of the Eastern sector. (46) Even that sector was 
not immune from occupation as the strength of the LNM grew bigger and bigger. 
As a whole, one could say that the ineffectivness of the Lebanese government was 
not a matter for controversy or discussion. The government, in fact, was not in 
existence. On the contrary, the LNM w as the only dominant party in the conflict. 
Borrowing the classification of the conflict according to customary international law, 
the National Movement was satisfying all the requirements of belligerency. 71be LNM 
was occupying three quarters of the territory and exercising full control over it. 
(47) 
The council of the LNM was representing all the parties and was headed by the leader 
Kamal Junmblat who was the commander of the forces. 
As to the recognition of the third state, The LNM has not received that recognition. 
However, one could argue that the conduct of mediation by the Syrian government 
between the LNM and the Government could be interpreted as a recognition of the 
belligerency of the LNM. Whether or not Syria recognised the LNM is not the crucial 
question, but what is very relevant here is the degree of control. As Tom Farer 
observed: 
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" where the governments are unusually inept and the rebels 
unusually skillful in their military operation, and more important in 
their capability to satisfy the symbolic and material yearning of the 
bulk of the population. ... in such cases, perpetuation of the 
incumbent by the sheer power of unanswered external assistance is 
inconsistent with authentic political independence". (48) 
The Syrian assistance to the Lebanese government at that time is hardly reconcilable 
with traditional international law. Offering help to the incumbent government at a time 
when the government in question exercises no effective control, is a delinquent act in 
international law, and a prevention of the domestic process from taking its preferred 
shape. During the Spanish civil war the Spanish government protested at the 
impartiality of foreign powers which deprived it from receiving military assistance. Its 
protest was based on international law which permits assistance to the incumbent but 
not to the insurgent. The Secretary of state of the United States replied unequivocally 
that: " This pretension has not been acceded to by this government, which has 
considered the contest in the light of a civil war in which the parties are equal,.. (49) 
The British government followed the same policy toward the Spanish government as 
the British recognition of the rebel forces as the de facto government was justified by 
the ineffectiveness of the de jur government. The British government affirmed to 
of -maintain that the lawful government holding out in one isolated fortress is entitled to 
continued recognition as de jur is to strain to the breaking point an otherwise 
unimpeachable rule ,. (50) 
Following this argument, undoubtedly, the Lebanese government was not in full 
control, and the opposing party (LNM) was in effective control of the territory. Hence, 
intervention by the Syrian government on the side of the Lebanese nominal government 
which was perceived by the Syrian as the sole government, ran foul of the rules of 
international law. The Syrian action, interestingly enough, bears a great similarity to 
the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. 'ne American 
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intervention was in response to an invitation which was issued by a government 
(ti-dlitary Junta) headed by Wessin though his power did not extend beyond the wall of 
the San Isidro air base(51) Commenting on that military action, Professor Friedmann 
phrased his argument in the following sarcastic way: 
"It has now been fully documented that the United States 
ambassador at the last moment, when it was clear that the U. S 
would intervene with overwhelming force, urgently phoned one of 
his friends in the Junta and said send us a request for 
intervention". (52) 
Similarly, in the Lebanese civil war, the Lebanese government was lacking any 
effective control and its existence was symbolically sustained. The president was 
unable to hold on to his palace and his writ hardly ran effectively in the Lebanese 
territory. Despite this, the Syrian president insisted that his troops were invited by the 
legitimate Lebanese government. 
Even accepting this to be the case it remain to. be resolved whether an invitation 
could be considered legitimate under Lebanese constitutional law: 
V- The validity of the invitation under the Lebanese Constitutional law. 
Under Lebanese Law, the president has a wide and great authority which has never 
been matched in any contemporary system. The president's power, however, is still 
subject to controversy and differences. One of the key disagreements is Article (52) 
which rrads: 
"The president conducts negotiations and signs international treaties 
which must be revealed by the president to the parliament when ever 
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the president sees that the interest of the country requires him to do 
so. Other treaties which contain conditions concerning the state's 
funds, commercial treaties, and treaties which cannot be terminated 
yearly cannot be put into effect unless parliament ratifies them". (53) 
This Article undoubtedly delegates to the president the power which qualifies him to 
invite or sign a treaty without the consent of parliament. However, a question vital to 
the inquiry is whether or not the prime minister is entitled to share the president's 
power or the latter needs the former's signature. Answering this question is not 
possible unless one can determine the type of system which has been adopted by the 
Lebanese constitution. For if the president's power is not limited by the consent of his 
prime minister, the invitation which was issued by him could be regarded as valid and 
hence the Syrian intervention is no longer illegal. 
Therefore, determining the constitutionality of the President's invitation under 
Lebanese law requires a thorough analysis of the Lebanese constitution. From the 
constitution in question it is not very clear whether it adopted the parliamentary or 
presidential model. The Lebanese constitution mentions nothing specific in relation to 
this matter, but at the same time it embodies some features of both systems. Despite 
this duality, the majority of legal experts, using the comparative method, reached the 
conclusion that the Lebanese constitution adopted the parliamentary model. 
Mustafa Fahmi in his study of the Lebanese constitution affirmed the thesis that the 
parliamentary model is the dominant feature of the Lebanese constitution. He simply 
compared the Lebanese with the Egyptian constitution of 1923. The Egyptian 
constitution of 1923 was clearly identified with the parliamentary model. Fortunately, 
most of the rules of the 1923 constitution were of great similarity to the Lebanese 
constitution which gives way to the assertion that the Lebanese constitution reflects the 
parliamentary model. (54) The Egyptian constitution affirmed three principles which 
202 
were also reflected in the Lebanese constitution : 
I- The irresponsibility of the King, and likewise the Lebanese president, according to 
the Lebanese constitution. (55) 
11- The council of ministers is responsible to the parliament and the same regarding 
Lebanese cabinet should be similarily responsible. (56). 
III- Ile existence of a kind of equilibrium between the legislative and executive organs 
and in the Lebanese constitution alike. (57) 
Following this comparison, the nature of the Lebanese constitution is no longer 
uncertain, since it is as parliamentary as the Egyptian constitution. Therefore, against 
this background one could now proceed to the analysis of the president's power in the 
light of parliamentary principles. 
To reiterate, Article (52) empowers the president to conclude an agreement or a 
treaty without referring it to the parliament and the president, whenever he sees fit, can 
reveal it to the parliament. However, the president cannot enjoy total freedom in 
concluding a treaty as he is obliged by the parliamentary rules to have the consent of the 
council of ministers, especially the prime minister. Ilereforereading Article (52) out of 
parliamentry context is a distortion of the spirit of the constitution. Article (52) must be 
read with other relevant Articles which clarify the extent of the president's power, 
especially relating to the invitation of foreign troops. In this regard, there are two 
articles which limit the power of the president, and at the same time, denote the 
parliamentarian orientation of the Lebanese system. 
Article (54) of the Lebanese constitution restricted the power of the president by 
requiring the signature of a specialised minister to any decision that the president may 
make. (58) Needless to say, in this regard, that Article (54) is a clear reflection of the 
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French constitution. However, there is a slight difference in the translation from the 
French text into Arabic. The French text stipulated that the minister's signature attached 
to every "act" of the president, while the Arabic translation referred to the "decision" of 
the president. (59) It is obvious that the French text is wider, and there is no doubt that, 
in the case of differences over a certain president's act as to whether it needs the 
minister's signature or not, a reference to the original text is inevitable. The second 
article which is of great relevance is article(17) which reveals that the president is not 
alone in performing his duties. Article (17) reads: 
".. the executive power is performed by the president who carried it 
out with the help of ministers according to the rules of the 
constitution. (60) 
Therefore, ministers help the president in performing the executive powerand that 
help must be in accordance with the rules of law which stipulate that the ministers' 
signature is indispensable to the president's decision. To suggest that the president 
could make a decision without the consent of his ministers is not fully supported. The 
leading French authority on constitutional law, Julien la Ferriere, in his book affirmed 
unequivocally that, " Any act of the president which does not bear the signature of the 
prime minister and authorized ministers must be regarded as void, and it has no legal 
effect and that norm is absolute and has no exception save his resignation speech. (61) 
This analysis is compatible with the parliamentry orientation of the Lebanese 
constitution which refers the executive power to the council of ministers. 
If the president could, by the constitution, take a decision without the consent of the 
ministers, then the Lebanese system could no longer be called parliamentary, rather 
than presidential. It is only in the presidential system, which is prevailing in the United 
States of America, where the president enjoys sole executive power without any 
limitation from his ministers. As an example of that unhindered power, one can recall 
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Lincoln's precedent. During the latter's meeting with his ministers or consultants, the 
president asked their opinion regarding certain matters and consequently the ministers 
all said "No". Then the president sarcastically said, "seven said "No" and I say IlYes". 
Therefore, "Yes" must be considered. (62) Such absolute power is only recognisable in 
the presidential system where the president alone is responsible for his governmental 
acts. 
In the Lebanese constitution, the president does not have this responsibility and the 
only responsibility he ever has is in two cases: treason and the violation of the 
constitution. Article (60) provides that the president is not responsible for his acts save 
in the case of violation of the constitution and treason. (63) On the contrary, the 
constitution stipulated that the ministers are responsible for their governmental duties 
before parliament. Article (66) reads that " The ministers are responsible collectively 
before the parliament for the government's policies and individually for their personal 
acts. (64) 
Therefore, to hold to the dogma that the president, by Article(52), can sign a treaty 
or invite troops without the consent of the council of ministers, and at the same time be 
immune fi-orn any action taken against him and the ministers collectively responsible, is 
an unacceptable interpretation. It would be more logical and fairer to assume that where 
there is no responsibility there is no power. Against this background one can sense the 
logical conclusion of Al-Hassan : 
Where the president cannot carry out his functions, according to 
the constitution, by himself but through his ministers and with their 
assistance, the constitution thus stipulates that the president is not 
responsible". (65) 
In order to shed more light on the matterone could recall the arbitration which took 
place between the King of Egypt and his prime minister. Ile importance of this 
205 
precedent emanates from the fact that the Constitution of 1923 is of great similarity to 
the Lebanese constitution. Owing to the differences between the king and his prime 
minister regarding the appointment of members to Senate House, the king and prime 
minister agreed to submit their case to arbitration in order to determine who was 
qualified by the constitution to give effect to the appointment. Their choice was the 
Belgium Attorney General, who after a full review of the Egyptian constitution reached 
the following conclusion: 
".. I have no right to appoint myself as a judge of the Egyptian 
constitutional system. However, the existence of a rule which 
prescribes that the king is not responsible for his governmental acts 
is basic to the system which provides that the king acts through his 
ministers. From the legal perspective, this principle is not subject to 
any legal exception. However, if an exception was made, that cannot 
be done without affecting the parliamentary system in its spirit and 
form. 17hus, for this reason I believe that the appointment must be 
considered by the council of ministers. (66) 
Against this legal argument, it becomes very clear that the Lebanese president is not 
qualified to issue an invitation on his own initiative as the consent of the council is 
indispensable. The president cannot invite foreign troops or sign a treaty, and at the 
same time is not responsible for such an act. It is the council of ministers which is the 
best institution to consider the issue. However, one wonders whether or not the 
president could invite foreign troops by relying solely on the specialized minister's 
signature. In the preceding argument it was established that the council of ministers is 
responsible collectively before parliament for the policy of the government. Such a 
responsibility must be taken into account when considering the question. The 
specialized ministers are individually responsible for his personal acts. However, an 
invitation to foreign troops hardly falls within individual responsibility. An invitation to 
foreign troops is of great importance, and that which requires the whole council to 
decide upon. It is the collective responsibilty of the'council of ministers to take charge 
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of such matters and not the president and not the authorized minister. It is quite strange 
to envisage in a parliamentary system a situation where the president embarks upon a 
policy of deciding issues of great importance without the knowledge of his ministers. 
As rightly observed by one of the leading Lebanese authorities on the constitution: 'The 
president cannot individually decide the foreign policy of the government and keep his 
policy secret and away from the knowledge of his government, as was the case in some 
old Western Kingdoms. (67) Another writer affirmed the same conclusion by saying 
"Acting upon the provision of the constitution, the government as a whole is in charge 
of determining the general policy of a state... and the president cannot, according to the 
constitution, act authoritatively without government approval regarding any issue of a 
state's affairs,. (68) Therefore, the government as a whole ought to discuss the issue 
and only after full consideration should the president, as the head of the council, issue 
an invitation provided that the signature of the specialized minister is attached. 
However, in the Lebanese context, a special custom emerged, through practice, 
which is regarded by the major sects in the Lebanese system as indispensable. This 
custom was peculiar to the Lebanese system due to its confessional features. As the 
power was divided between the two religious sects, Muslims and Christians, the 
practice evolved to enhance the power of the prime minister vis a vis the president. 
This equilibrium stipulated that the prime minister's signature must be attached to the 
president's decision. However, this custom is not of a special nature since the prime 
minister's signature is necessary as he is responsible for government policy. It seems 
very odd to hold to the prime minister responsible for the president's act without at least 
acceding to the president's act. 
Rabbat's analysis reflects the same conviction as he perceived that the custom does 
not run against the explicit provision of the constitution especially article(54) where the 
signature of the prime minister is necessary to give an effect to the president's act. It 
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would be inexplicable to hold that the president alone could conclude a treaty without 
referring it to the specialized minister and the prime minister. For such an act is at odd 
with the the parliamentry system and at the same time does not have a strong precedent 
in the custom or the provision of the Lebanese constitution. (69) 
Summing up, the argument the president under the Lebanese law is not 
constitutionally empowered to issue an invitation to effect the introduction of foreign 
troops into Lebanese territory on his own initiative. In order to regard his invitation as 
valid, the signature of the prime minister and specialized minister is vital. 
Thus, as far as the Syrian intervention is concerned, this requirment was not met. 
The president failed to produce evidence which showed that the prime minister and the 
authorized minister accepted the invitation. In fact, there was no document whatsoever 
to support the claim that the president acted legally. However, whatever the case is, the 
Syrian's claim that they were invited by the Lebanese government is very doubtful. 
Ile Lebanese government as whole did not issue the invitation, and if the president 
issued that invitation his action can hardly be regarded as legal and therefore binding on 
the Lebanese government; for the president has no right to do so. The insistence of the 
Syrian authorities on the thesis that they were invited by the Lebanese government has 
no solid ground. 
The Syrian government, as such, could be said, that it regarded the president as the 
only authority in Lebanon as was the case in the 19th century where the Alliance 
recognised no one but the Idng. The logic of the holy Alliance was very clear, the state 
was the king and to some extent the Syrian government, implicitly adhered to this by 
saying that the president is the state. 
The failure of the Syrian authorities to acknowledge the legality of the president's 
invitation is hardly explainable. For the Syrian officials after all are very 
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knowledgeable of the Lebanese system and their acceptance of the president's invitation 
could only be explained by the fact that the Syrian government had long before decided 
to intervene, and the president's consent was the only available pretext. 
Therefore, the president's invitation was illegal under the constitution of Lebanon 
and hence the Syrian military intervention was illegal. Following this conclusion, one 
comes to the last question which is mainly concerned with the right of the Lebanese to 
self-determination. The Syrian claim that its intervetnion was in response to the 
Lebanese masses needs more scrutiny and elaboration under international law. 
VI- Syrian intervention and the Lebanese right to self determination. 
A-General. 
The Syrian government, besides its claim that its intervention was in response to the 
invitation of the Lebanese government, defends its intervention with reference to self 
determination. The Syrian foreign minister claimed that the Syrian intervention was in 
response to an appeal by the Lebanese people. The Syrian reference to the principle of 
self determination as a right upon which a state can intervene in another state's domain 
in order to support the right of the people to self determination is very doubtful. It is 
not yet clear whether or not the principle could be regarded as a legal right in 
contemporary international law; and if it is, the principle could in no way be invoked to 
support intervention 
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In looking into the Syrian claim, a set of questions have to be answered: Was the 
Syrian government justified in intervening in support of the Lebanese right'to self 
determination, or does the Syrian government see no contradiction between the concept 
of invitation and self determination ? In order to find an answer to these questions, one 
has to determine first whether or not there is a legal right to self determination under the 
United Nations Charter, and if there is, does it permit a state to use force to implement 
the right of self determination.? 
B- The Orgin Of The Principle Of Self Determination 
In general the principle of self-determination as the right of people to choose their 
political and cultural system and government dates back to the French revolution and to 
the thoughts and writings of writers such as Rosseau, John Locke and Thomas Paine. 
However , the principle owes its material existence to the principle of nationality. 
Nationalism activated the process as people challenged the myth that their position was 
unchangeable and strived to improve their lot towards other nations. (70) This kind of 
awareness gave the principle the features of a political principle. 
The right of every nation to choose its political destiny, which is promulgated by 
nationalism, was grounded on the principle of democracy. The equality of men and the 
belief that the governed must give their consent to the governor also played a great role 
in the emergence of the principle. The idea of democracy mixed with the principle of 
nationalism paved the way for the emergence of the principle of self determination . 
Such a mixture prompted Johnson to say: " Democracy has been significant in respect to 
nationalist doctrine because it is the basis upon which each nation is formed and it 
accepts the nation as a unit of self government with an inherent right not only to choose 
its govemment but to detennine its status as a state". (71) 
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The principle found its first materalization in the American Declaration of 
Independence which reads : 
" We hold these truths to be self evident, that they are endowed by 
their creator with certain inalienable right, that among these are life, 
liberty, .. that to secure these rights governments are instituted 
among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed; that whenever any form of government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or 
abolish it and institute a new govemment". (72) 
Since then, the principle has gained in strength from developments such as: 
Lenin's declaration on the rights of the people of Russia in 1917(73); Wilson who 
recognised it and moreover equated stability and peace with full respect for the 
principle(74); and finally to the League of Nations. Unfortunately the principle was not 
included due to the stiff resistance by some states. Nevertheless the report of the 
commission of Jurists regarding the Aaland Island made a clear reference to the 
principle by recognising the importance it has in political thought. (75) However, with 
the emergence of the United Nations the principle was no longer only dictated by 
political thinkers ; moreover, the principle played a significant part in the development 
of contemporary international law. To what extent the principle has become binding in 
contemporary international law is still subject to controversy. 
C. The Principle Of Self Determination Under The United Nation 
Charter. 
Unlike the League of Nations, the Charter of the United Nations espoused the 
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principle of self determination and considered it to be one of the fundamental purposes 
of the United Nations. Article(l) enumerated the Purposes of the Charter and 
considered the development of friendly relations "based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self determination of the people"(76), one of the most important 
purposes. Other Articles and in particular Article (55) elevated the principle to a higher 
place and subsequently viewed it as a necessary " -condition of stability and well being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect 
(77) for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples". 
Despite the Charter's pledge to the principle of self determination, the realization of 
it seems to be hindered by many factors. Basic to these factors is the existence of the 
principle as a legal right. The failure to Tecognise the principle as such has undoubtedly 
delayed its application and its progressive development. Many protested against its 
recognition as a legal right(78) since it is impossible to determine who is the subject of 
it. The difficulty of defining the "Self' was the core of the criticism of the principle and 
consequently to its recognition. As most writers agree that the principle had been 
deployed in the colonial context which resulted in the massive proliferation of new 
states, they were still reluctant to recognise it in non colonial contexL 
The development of the principle in the body of the United Nations through a series 
of Resolutions, has played a great role in clarifying and explaining why states are 
fearful of admitting such a right. However, any close reading of the development will 
demonstrate that with every passing day hostility of the states seem to fade away. In 
1960, the General Assembly passed a resolution titled " Declaration On The Granting 
Of Independence To Colonial Peoples" which was the starting point towards 
decolonization. Despite colonial power resistance, the General Assembly succeeded in 
passing the resolution. The resolution's stand towards the principle was very clear as it 
declared: 
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"The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, and is 
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.. and all peoples have 
the right to self determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social, and cultural development. (79) 
Since that time, states have accepted the application of the principle in dismantling 
the era of colonization. This willingness prompted Higgins to comment on that 
resolution by saying: " Self determination is regarded, not as a right enforceable at 
some future time under indefinite circumstances, but as a legal right enforceable here 
and now". (80) However, the issue becomes more blurred and confused whenever 
states are confronted with the application of the principle outside the colonial context. 
In such situations the principle seems to attract little sympathy as the majority of 
states, especially the third world countries, are reluctant to enforce the principle in 
responsd to the demands of a section of their population. It seems, states adopted the 
view that when independence has been achieved, there is no place for the principle of 
self determination for any of its peoples. Ironically, independence, however, has 
brought about a host of problems to the newly formed states which exposed them to 
various criticisms. 
Secession was one of the most explosive issues upon which the principle of self 
determination was put to test. The principle failed to command strong support as many 
states feared the day on which they would have to confront secession. The reluctance 
of the third world states to uphold the principle and apply it whenever there was a fair 
demand on the part of the population, gives great credit to the thesis that beyond the salt 
water test the principle has no existence. The experience of the Katanga secession in 
the Congo(1960-1963) and the Biafrian in Nigeria(1967-1970) are clear examples. (81) 
Ilie Secretary General of the United Nations affirmed that the principle is not applicable 
in the case of the secession by saying: 
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" When a member state is admitted to the United Nations, there is 
the implied acceptance by the entire membership of the principle of 
territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of that particular 
state ... The United Nations has never accepted and does not accept 
and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a 
part of its member state, '. (82) 
Despite all of this, the entire world accepted the emergence of Bangladesh as an 
independent state. Howeverit could be argued that the peculiar nature of East Pakistan 
and its special relation with the parent state makes it an exception. (83) However, in 
ruling out secession, states are reminded that repressive measures and explicit 
violations of human rights may change the international climate as was the case of East 
Pakistan. Secession is not valid when an entire population of the state enjoys political 
and economic rights. For such rights are clear evidence that the population is not ruled 
against its will. Accordingly, the principle of self determination could be considered as 
the right of the majority within a generally accepted unit to determine their future. (84) 
This right could be asserted when the people are unjustly submitted to repressive 
measures. They are entitled by that right to self determination. With such an 
interpretation, one can grasp the acceptance of East Pakistan as a new state with such a 
speed. Moreover, this line of interpretation of self determination helps in drawing a 
clear cut boundary between the right to self determination and the right to independence 
where a certain race seeks separation from a state. (85) That is to say between the right 
to internal self determination and external self determination. 
During the discussion of the Principles of Friendly Relations among States the 
United States, submitted a proposal which precisely identified the principle with a 
representative government. The proposal regards the "existence of a sovereign and 
independent state possessing a representative government, effectively functioning as 
such to distinct people within its territory, is presumed to satisfy the principle of equal 
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right and self determination as regards to those people". (86) However, due to the stiff 
resistance from the third world countries who regard that a representative government is 
an invitation to disrupt national unity, the proposal was slightly modified. (87) The 
inclusion of paragraph (7) was the compromise upon which the Declaration of Friendly 
Relation among States found it's way into light. Despite its commitment to the 
principle of self determination , the Declaration proceeded to make an exception by 
recognising that " Nothing in the foregoing paragraph shall be construed as authorizing 
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.. --. (88) 
Later on, in the General Assembly Resolution on Aggression, the principle was 
reiterated and at the same time subjected to severe criticism. However, the inclusion of 
paragraph (7) does not rule out the right of people to secede. The right to set up a new 
state is hardly forbidden when such separation does not affect the economic and 
political stability of the parent state. As Bowett rightly observed regarding the question 
of Kashmir, its incorporation into India or Pakistan as the result of a plebiscite posed 
no problem whatsoever. He continued by saying that: 
" in such case one comes face to face not with arguments of 
economic and political good sense, but with arguments based upon 
political pride and a theory of statehood which attaches territory to 
state rather than to the inhabitants of the territory. One is left with the 
very basic question what is the purpose of the state ? It has at that 
stage ceased to be the promotion of the well being of the people of 
the territory according to their own freely expressed desire,,. (89) 
Opponents of the principle, challenged its existence on the ground that the principle 
suffers from many deficiencies. The assertion of the principle with reference to the 
General Assembly Resolution is not convincing since the latter is not binding, and 
moreover the principle is not capable of definition. (90) However, most of the criticism 
was directed at the non-binding nature of the resolution of the General Assembly. 
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General Assembly resolutions were the result of a compromise of different attitudes. In 
reaching that compromise, political orientation and expediency played a major role. 
Such a reality impressed some writers and pushed them to the extreme, claiming that 
the principle " Has .. always been the sport of national and international politics and has 
never been recognized as a genuine positive right of people of universal and impartial 
application, and it never will, nor can be so recognized in the future". (91) 
Others questioned the value of the resolutions which wereadopted by consensus, 
such as Friendly Relations and Definition of Aggression, in creating a legal norm and 
especially with respect to self determination. One such person was Shabtai who 
doubted the device of the consensus and defined its legal value by saying: 
" procedure must never be taken for more than it is in given 
circumstances, in this case a procedural device to bring an unpleasant 
and perhaps useless discussion to an end in the least ignominious 
way. For consensus means agreement on the words to be used and 
on their place in the sentence, and absence of agreement on their 
meaning and on the intent of the document as a whole". (92) 
While the claim that states in voting for or against take full regard of their political 
orientation and preferences, it is still valid to regard the resolutions of the General 
Assembly as a tool for clarifying the law. Rosalin Higgins in her book on The 
Development ofInternational Law Through the Political Organ of the United Nations 
asserts that resolutions of the General Assembly regarding the principle of self 
determination, were " taken together with seventeen years of evolving practice by the 
United Nations organ provides ample evidence that there now exists a legal right of self 
determination". (93) There is no alternative other than the organ of the United Nations 
to interpret the law and create the proper environment towards establishing a new norm 
that conforms to the changing reality of the international environment. The insistence 
on irrelevance of the General Assembly Resolutions without perceiving it as an 
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important component of international law(94) amounts to a deliberate distortion of the 
progressive development of international law. (95) Richard Falk offers a deep insight 
regarding the General Assembly Resolutions as he considers them as a tool to "disclose 
an altered normative which became established in the late 1950". (96) Whereas 
Prakash(97) considers the activity " in the General Assembly as one form of state 
practice and it cannot be dismissed as irrelevant evidence. It must at least, be 
considered". Others agreed for example, R. Sureda(98) and Asamoah, the latter taking 
a more positive attitude towards the Resolution of the General Assembly when he said 
that " In our view the Declaration in themselves are state practice. Furthermore, law is 
not created only after years of practice. Practice can be concentrated in a short space of 
time provided the opiniojuris is evident, a rule attains the status of law". (99) 
Again the principle's existence as a legal right is not entirely dependent on the 
General Assembly Resolution, but could be enhanced through its inscription in a 
variety of treaties. Borrowing what D'Amato calls custom creation through treaty, the 
principle could by now, be approaching customary status. According to the DAmato, 
custom is not only created through the old style Le clash of claims, but could evolve 
through a treaty as well. That is to say, when the norm is of a generalizable nature as 
can be found in many treaties, the norm may have evolved through a variety of treaties 
into a binding legal norm. With time and constant assertion, the norm could be 
transformed into customary international law. (I()O) In defending his thesis against old 
types of custom-creation, DAmato asserts: 
" Nations have not painted themselves into such a theoretical comer, 
but rather have manifested by virtue of their behaviour over the 
centuries, that generalizable provision in treaties become part of 
customary law without need for such subsequent practice. 001) 
As far as the principle of self determination is concerned, one could undoubtedly 
affirm it as a generalizable norm. After all, the principle has been included in a variety 
217 
of treaties, such as multilateral and bilateral(102) nevertheless treaties; of particular 
importance is the International Covenant on Human Rights, and the United Nation 
Charter, which bring into it the description of the generalizable norm. On the other 
hand, there are still those who disregard the principle as a legal right as it is incapable of 
being defined. The claim that the principle is surrounded by ambiguity and confusion 
which hinders its proper applicability is not very convincing. Fitzmaurice defined the 
legal principle as follows: 
"A legal principle Jf its truly one, must be capable of definition and 
circumscription, and of application in accordance with objective 
rather than merely subjective criteria.. ". (103) 
While that description of a legal principle is quite right, a distinction has to be made 
between domestic law, and international law. In domestic law the legal principle is 
very clear and precise and in cases of uncertainty a court is capable of lending its 
binding interpretation; but in international law such a procedure is absent. However, if 
one insists on the criterion of precision as a standard for the acceptance of a rule, then 
one has to offer many explanations for the many rules of international law. As an 
example, any international lawyer will agree that the norm of non intervention is one of 
the most important norms in international law and yet no one is capable of defining 
what intervention is. (104) However, denying the existence of the principle just 
because of the difficulty of definition is not sound. For as in the case of non 
intervention, the absence of an objective definition did not rule the principle out of 
existence as was the case of self determination. Miere is no escape from subjectivity in 
international law, as there is no central authority to affirm or explain the law save the 
discussion in the General Assembly which is regarded by many as inadequate and. 
unable to offer an alternative. 
Therefore, following the above discussion, the principle of self determination has 
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been asserted in the United Nation Charter and through a variety of Resolutions. (105) 
Moreover, the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinon on the Western 
Sahara affimned that the principle has already crossed the status of political principle to 
a legal one. (106) In addition, the principle finds its way into a variety of treaties which 
qualify it as a generalizable norm. T'he principle has been affirmed by the practice of 
states over many years. The principle therefore, no longer belongs to the political 
thought but its legal effect has been asserted in every aspect of international life; and by 
now it is a legal right under the charter of the United Nations. 
With the emergence and acceptance of the principle of self- determination as a legal 
right under the United Nations Charter, controversy persists regarding its 
implementation. Of many questions, one relates to the realization of the principle 
particularly in the context of civil war: Is it legal for a state to intervene in a civil war, 
using force, to realize the principle of self determination ? 
D-The realization of the principle of self-determination and the dilemma 
of civil war. 
The emergence of self determination as a legal right in contemporary intematioanl 
law is one of the greatest achievements in the history of the principle. It signifies the 
right of the people to choose freely their political, economic, and cultural system and 
the type of government they desire, without any foreign pressure. The mere acceptance 
of the principle has contributed to accelerating the dernise of the traditional rules of 
international law. 
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Since the principle recognises, the right of the people to revolt against their 
repressive government, international law should revise its stand towards the incumbent 
government. 007) * As the incumbent government enjoys the sanctuary of law, the 
rebellious people receive no regard whatsoever. It is hard to reconcile the right of 
revolution and the government's right to receive every possible assistance. The 
incumbent government by virtue of its representation of a state could invite another state 
to send troops to help in putting down the revolution which has been recognised by 
contemporary international law. Such a contradiction is of great hindrance to the 
principle of self- determination. 
The dilemma that a civil war brings regarding the principle of self determination and 
the rights of the government is not a new one. The relevant question is, how one can 
allow the principle to function properly without prejudicing the government's rights ? 
Any external support to the rebels will constitute a violation of the state's right, and so 
the assistance to the government is a violation of the right of people to self 
determination. This dilemma was presented by Hall who expressed a tendency towards 
a neutral norm by saying: 
"If intervention on the ground of mere friendship were allowed, it 
would be idle to speak seriously of the right of independence. 
Supposing the intervention was to be directed against the existing 
government, independence is violated by any attempt to prevent the 
organ of the state from managing the state's affairs in its own way. 
Supposing it is on the other hand, to be directed against the rebels, 
the fact that it has been necessary to call in foreign help is enough to 
show that the issue of the conflict would without it be uncertain, and 
consequently there is a doubt as to which side would ultimately 
establish itself as the legal representative of the state. If, again, 
intervention is based upon an opinion, as to the merit of the question 
at issue, the intervening states take up on itself to pass judgement in 
a matter which, having nothing to do with the relations of the states, 
must be regarded as being for legal purposes beyond the range of its 
vision". (108) 
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As a matter of fact most international writers such as Lauterpacht, (109) 
Lawrence(I 10), Hyde(l 11), Stowell(I 12), FriedmanG 13), Farer(I 14), and many 
others maintain that intervention upon the request of the government in internal conflict 
is illegal. The illegality of that particular intervention was based on the thesis that an 
inhabitant of a state must enjoy a right to self determination, and any foreign 
intervention on the side of the government will certainly hinder that right. Rohlik 
affmns the same conclusion by saying: 
" because of the internationlization of the concept of self 
determination the right of the invited state to assist ceased to 
exist". (1 15) 
In spite of that, a few writers still cling to the old norm which permits assistance to 
the incumbent government. John Moore in defending the old norm, forwarded four 
reasons which gives weight to his opinion: 
I- The incumbent government by virtue of its control of the army, makes the military 
opposition resulting in a prolonged struggle. 
2- The incumbent government may be incorporated in a bloc alliance which makes its 
overthrow unlikely and dangerous. 
3- The incumbent government may have a defensive arrangement with a third power. 
4- The incumbent government as a representative of a state may receive continuing 
military assistance prior to the struggle. 0 16) 
All these factors militate against the norm which permits assistance to the rebels and 
consequently negates the legal right of self determination. 0 17) On the other hand, there 
are others who defend the right of the rebel to receive such assistance, as their war is a 
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just one. 018) Moreover, the issue becomes more troublesome when both groups 
claim that they are upholding the norm of self determination. In the Vietnam war, the 
U. S. A, through its support to the incumbent government, claimed that they were 
helping the people to realize the right to self- determination, and likewise the Soviet 
Union and China in their support to the Viet-cong in Vietnam. The American 
intervention in Cuba to overthrow Castro (Bay of Pigs) and in GrenadaO 19), was 
justified in defence of the principle of self determination. Similarly, the Russian 
intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968 was grounded as well on the principle of self. 
determination. 
It is the political interest, which is alluring in a civil war and plays a great role in the 
foreign states's decision. It is by no means the Sanctuary of self determination nor the 
respect to the incumbent government as the representative of the state which influences 
external parties, but only the self interest in the struggle. Friedmann observed that: 
"Civil war usually arises from clashes of political philosophy and of 
government and political groups outside the state tom by the civil 
war are usually deeply engaged on one side or the other. This tends 
to mould legal interpretation of the right of intervention and dudes of 
abstention". (120) 
Accepting this view would not amount to the recognition of non existent rules 
relating to the civil war and admitting the foreign states right to choose the convenient 
way of responding to the civil war. The subject, however, is not as simple as that, 
since there are many relevant rules which could be relied upon to provide the minimum 
protection to the right of self determination and to the prevention of foreign 
intervention. 
The most relevant norm is Article 2 (4) which acknowledges that " the people of a 
territory of a state form one of the constituent elements of that state and their right of 
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self determination can find its expression only in 'their right to be left alone' and 
determine for themselves the form of government, the political, social, and economic 
system, or to dismember the state in question and establish two or more states". (121) 
The Article is also very clear and needs no elaboration as the use of force is iBegal and 
constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. (122) Relevant to the issue 
are the General Assembly resolutions as there are many Resolutions relating to the issue 
of intervention in civil war. The General Assembly Resolution on the Inadmissablity of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States offers a clear norm which could be 
regarded as a neutral norm by affirming that states should respect the right of self 
determination and independence of the people by not intervening " directly or indirectly, 
for any reason whatsoever in the internal or external affairs of any other states"; and 
stressed that the use of force to deprive the people of that right constitutes a violation of 
that right and the norm of non intervention. 023) 
In the Friendly Relation Resolution, the principle of self- determination seemed to 
have a better position since the resolution recognized the right of people who were 
deprived of their right to self determination to " seek and to receive support in 
accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter. (124) The phrasing of this 
paragraph is quite contradictory as the word "support", if in this case meant military 
support, would run against the Principles and Purposes of the Charter. This 
contradiction was a result of a compromise between the two trends; western and third 
world countries in alliance with socialist states. (125) Thus, in view of the differences, 
the only possible solution was "to lie in regarding the use of force to deny people their 
right of self determination is a delict giving rise to right on the part of the people 
concerned". 026) The issue was revived during the discussion of the Definition of 
Aggression, as the western powers referred to the word 'support' to mean moral and 
political support whereas the third world states interpreted it as meaning military 
support. (127) 
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As a matter of fact, the differences between the two trends could be reduced to a 
single issue, that the point of disagreement was over racist and colonial regimes. Tle 
majority of states regarded the continuation of a racist regime as a perpetuation of the 
colonial regime, and hence the necessity to use force. However, when the use of force 
is outside this issue, no states admit to using force to promote self determination. Ile 
use of force is then only workable in colonial and racist regimes. (128) Accordingly, 
there is a positive tone in such an argument, as the existence of a racist regime is not 
acceptable and not compatible with the United Nations Charter, nor with the level of 
civilization and more than that the U. N considers its continuation a threat to peace. (129) 
More encouraging is that there are no states which have used their army to cross the 
border to overthrow a racist or colonial regime. The Indian invasion of Goa can still be 
regarded as the only exception to the above rule. (130) The use of force, is by no 
means legal and there is a clear consensus on that. J. Rohlik aff=* that: 
"The normative content of the right of self determination of peoples 
has developed only in the last twenty and twenty five years. And 
there is not the slightest doubt that the international community did 
not develop consensus ... as to the limitation of sovereignty in favor 
of the right of third state to promote self determination of people, 
other than those in the colonies, contrary to the prohibition of Article 
2(4) of the Charter". 0 3 1) 
Thus, apart from the issue of colonialism and racism the use of force to overthrow a 
government is not at all acceptable to all states. Keeping in line with the belief that the 
use of force is non-permissible the American representative to the U. N (Seymour 
Finger) made the following statement: 
"It was not the United States view that people should be denied the 
right to resort to any means at their disposal, including violence, if 
armed suppression by a colonial power required it. Indeed, the 
United States itself was obliged to resort to violence in order to gain 
independence. The difficulty lay in giving a general endorsement by 
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the United Nations, an Organization dedicated to peace, to such 
violence and in employing language which suggest that member 
states have an obligation to provide material assistance to such violent 
actions against other member states. Such action could hardly be 
reconciled with the requirements of the charter of the United 
Nation". (132) 
What is encouraging is the fact there is no longer a colonial power using force to 
deprive people of their right to self- determination, save the existing regime in South 
Africa. Therefore, one can assert that states will render every possible support for 
people struggling for self determination, but that support must not be military support. 
It is the duty of the people to win their freedom, and challenge their government by 
relying on themselves. In this case when the people challenge their government, neither 
the government nor the rebel forces should be entitled to receive external help. (133) 
One can, somehow, sense the cruelty of that norm. However, it is still. more 
appropriate to world public order, to reject the use of force under the concept of self- 
determination as it arrests the dangers which emanates from a foreign intervention. , 
Intervention by a foreign power to promote the principle of self determination 
hardly brings any good to the people. Liberty has to be won by the people themselves 
for the liberty " which is bestowed upon them by other hands than their own, will have 
nothing real, nothing pennanent". (134) Whatever the merit of the case might be, the 
use of force must not be conceded. Oscar Schachterin his response to Reisman's 
progressive interpretation of Article 2 (4) which permits the use of force to promote self 
determination, affirmed that the use of force by states to that end is to " be a mistaken 
interpretation as a matter of law and policy. If followed it would weaken a key principle 
of the minimum world public order essential for peace and security',. (135) Professor 
Bowett reflected the same argument by playing down the suggestion of intervention by 
the use of force to promote the principle of self determination. In his opinion two 
reasons militate against the use of force; firstly, the norm of non intervention must be 
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an order of priority in the scheme of world order that to derogate from it in order to 
pursue an otherwise legitimate objective is wrong and dangerous. Secondly, if we are 
speaking of intervention not authorized by the appropriate organs of the world 
community within the United Nations, then the exception to the rule of non intervention 
would open possibilities of highly subjective evaluation of what is, and what is not, 
contiury to self determination". 036) 
Therefore, in a civil war, foreign intervention is impennissible for both sides, and 
the struggle is left to the domestic parties to decide what future they desire. Intervention 
on the side of the parties by the means of force is a violation of the United Nation 
Charter and the customary law which prohibits the use of force. Once the struggle 
crosses the threshold of mere rebellion no states can intervene in the domestic violence. 
It is clear that the inhabitants of a state have an inalienable right to determine their own 
political future. It is for them to chose, by whatever means they find appropriate, to 
change the government. However, this popular will has to struggle for itself and no 
other state is allowed to use force to implement it. To what extent the Syrian 
government adheres to this description is the purpose of inquiry in the next section. 
E-The Effect Of Syrian Intervention On The Lebanese Right To Self 
Determination. 
As mentioned earlier, the Syrian intervention, upon the request of the Lebanese 
government, was not valid under the rules of international law. For intervention by 
invitation according to the majority of writers becomes " an instrument to prevent social 
change which is a vital aspect of national self- detennination". 037) However, the 
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Syrian insistence that its intervention was not frustrating the right of the Lebanese 
people to self determination, deserves a close examination. The Syrian foreign minister 
on his visit to France following his country's intervention affirmed to his French 
counterpart that the Syrian intervention was in response to the great majority of 
Lebanese public opinion. 038) What the foreign minister meant by Lebanese public 
opinion is not clear. For the term "public opinion" as a matter of fact, has never ever 
been used before as a legal justification for foreign intervention. It is a loose term 
which usually belongs to the realm of politics and not law. It is a catch phrase 
deployed by politicians in order to paint a certain policy as not being opposed by 
domestic voters. However, such a term could be scientifically asserted through 
conducting a poll; and whatever the deficiency of the poll, it is still an instrument which 
could lead to the identification of public opinion. 
To what extent this term could be employed by the foreign power in order to justify 
its intervention in the domestic affairs of another country is very doubtful. In the 
Lebanese civil war, the mood of Lebanese public opinion was impossible to guage. 
How a foreign state could manage to reach an accurate grasp of public opinion in a state 
experiencing a devastating civil war, is quite incomprehensible. For the assessment of 
public opinion requires the existence of great stability and an independent body to carry 
it out. It is quite absurd to accept such an assertion as a justification for intervention. 
However, one may tend to minimize such an interpretation and give it another 
interpretation since the Syrians did not state exactly what they meant by such a term. It 
could be that the Syrian government was referTing to the principle of self-determination 
and, if this is so, the principle has to be re-examined in the light of the principle of 
invitation. For there is a great contradiction between the concept of invitation and self 
determination. Even if it is assumed that the Syrians used the term public opinion as a 
reference to the principle of self determination, their intervention is nevertheless still 
illegal. 
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The Syrian insistence on the Lebanese government's invitation and at the same time 
the principle of self determination, presupposed that the Lebanese civil war was not a 
revolution against the incumbent government. Because the peoples, according to the 
Syrians, were not against the government, but the government and the people were 
confronted by a minor group whose sole aim was to overthrow the Lebanese 
government. However, this suggestion is not convincing and no one could see how a 
government, supported by a strong army and the bulk of the people can be defeated by 
a minor group. The real fact is that the Lebanese government was challenged by a 
popular demand, and the need for a restructuring of the system was a major demand. 
As mentioned in the preceding chapters, the Lebanese civil war was originally against 
the confessional system; the people revolted against the government and consequently 
the war raged on. Thus it is impossible to accept the Syrian thesis that their 
intervention was upon an invitation and at the same time to promote the principle of self 
determination. It is impossible to see the Lebanese who revolted against their 
government in order to have a different system, could welcome a foreign troop whose 
sole aim was to suppress their revolution. Accordingly, the claim that the Lebanese 
people requested the Syrian intervention is hardly plausible. However, assuming that 
the request was made, there is no legal ground to justify that particular intervention. As 
defined earlier, there is no rule which perrrAts a foreign state fi-orn intervening under the 
banner of self determination in another state7s domestic affairs. 
Ile Syrian government over the passing years has demonstrated beyond any doubt 
that an intervention in the domestic affairs of any state is illegal. They went further, as 
the Syrian delegation during the discussion on the Friendly Relation and co-operation 
Among States affirmed that the principle of non intervention in matters which falls 
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state was the very basis of peaceful co- existence 
and called on states not to intervene in " any form of subversive activity and any direct 
or indirect intervention, on any pretext whatever, in the internal and external affair of 
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another state". 039) The delegation went on to affirm its country's stand on the 
principle of self-determination as one of the basic principles by saying " the principle of 
sovereign equality was closely bound up with the principle of non-intervention and 
with the right of peoples to self-detem-lination". (140) 
Moreover, the Syrian reaction to the principle of self- determination was very clear 
and they attacked vigorously the United States invasion of Grenada. Although the 
Americans invoked the concept of invitation as a justification and an indication that is 
not against the principle of self-determination, the Syrian representative Al Fattal 
described the American intervention as "a flagrant violation of the inalienable right of 
the people of Grenada to self determination and the structuring of its society free from 
any outside intervention". 041) I'he delegate went on to say: 
" The United States is trying to impose its value on the whole world. 
It is therefore depriving the people of that world of the right to 
rebuild their countries in accordance with their local circumstances 
based on their cultural values and national priorities. (142) 
Therefore, the Syrians according to their representative denounced intervention in 
general, under any pretext whatsoever, and claimed that such an intervention is 
violating the principle of self determination which is embodied in the principle of 
sovereign equality of states. The Syrian rejection of the invitation by the Attorney 
General of Grenada and moreover their claim that intervention was illegal due to the 
sacrosanct of self determination is quite interesting. The Syrians, however, did not see 
their intervention in Lebanon as such and on the contrary they asserted, as the 
Americans did, that their intervention was upon an invitation and a realization of the 
principle of self determination. 
The Syrian attitude towards the principle of self determination was reaffirmed in 
1983. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and subsequently the introduction of 
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the Multi-National Forces upon the request of the legitimate government, the Syrians 
demonstrated again their unshaken belief in the principle of self determination. Their 
perception of the principle, nevertheless deserves closer scrutiny. Having refused to 
accept the Lebanese government's request for the Syrian troops' withdrawal, the Syrian 
government ignored it and instead asked the Multi-National Forces to leave Lebanese 
soil, as the latter exceeded their declared objectives. G 43) In response to the Syrian 
arguments, the United States representative affirmed that: 
" We wish no one to misunderstand our intention in Lebanon ... The 
forces of the United States of America are present in Lebanon at the 
express invitation of the government of Lebanon; their purpose in 
Lebanon, along with the forces of three other countries, is simply 
stated. It is to work with that government and to assist it in every 
way possible in the rebuilding of its domestic institution and 
extension of its sovereignty throughout its territory". (144) 
The Lebanese representative confirmed the American explanation that the Lebanese 
government was committed to the quick withdrawal of all unauthorized non- Lebanese 
forces [viz, the Syrian and Israeli ] from Lebanon and referred to the multi-national 
forces by saying: " We confirm that their presence in Lebanon is at the request and the 
approval of the Lebanese government". 045) 
The Syrian delegate at the forum of the Security Council dismissed that argument 
on the ground that the Lebanese government's decision regarding the multi-national 
forces was not truly reflecting the will of the Lebanese people. In explaining this, he 
affirmed that " The freedom of the Lebanese decision stems only from the freedom of 
Lebanon". (146) He continued to say that freedom cannot be enjoyed unless there is " 
full Israeli withdrawal and the lifting of the American hand from Lebanon". 
(147) 
Although this argument took place in 1983 and after the Syrian intervention in Lebanon 
in 1976, it is however, of great importance since it could be employed to clarify the 
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Syrian position regarding invitation and the principle of self-determination. 
As the preceeding arguments have demonstrated, the Syrians cannot accept an 
invitation from the legitimate government, since that invitation does not reflect the will 
of the Lebanese people. The will of the Lebanese people was largely distorted or 
prevented by virtue of the presence of foreign troops on Lebanese territory. Therefore, 
one could assert that the Syrians perceived the mere presence of forceful intervention on 
the request of the incumbent government as illegal since that intervention is suppressing 
the right of the peoples in question to self determination. 
This conviction was positively affirmed in The General Assembly discussion and 
the Syrian government's criticism of the American invasion of Grenada and their 
presence in Lebanon. The Syrian proclamation, as mentioned above, clearly reflects 
the legal stand of the Syrian government on the issue. The pronouncement as such 
could be employed to analyse the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. As Asamoah 
declares in his analysis of the General Assembly resolutions: 
" These declarations express the agreement of a number of states on 
the principle which should govern their activities ... That the 
circumstances surrounding their adoption indicated a clear intention 
to accept them as law and as such they represent the law for those 
who voted for them". 048) 
Therefore, the Syrian pronouncement on the principle of Friendly Relations and 
other matters could be cited as evidence regarding the meaning of the law on that 
particular issue. Against this background, it becomes clear that the Syrian intervention 
runs against the principle of self determination and the ban on the use of force in the 
Charter of the United Nations and the principle of non-intervention in the domestic 
affairs of any state. 
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The Syrian intervention in 1976 against the Leftist forces in Lebanon needs a 
special explanation by the Syrian government. Oscar Schachter puts an obligation on 
the intervening state to offer an explanation regarding its military intervention by 
saying: 
"There is good reason therefore to place a heavy burden on any 
foreign government which intervenes with armed forces even at the 
invitation of the constitutional authority to demonstrate convincingly 
that its use of force has not infringed the right of people to determine 
their political system and the composition of their 
goverriment". 049) 
As far as the Syrian intervention is concemed, the Syrian authorities did not offer 
that explanation, save the foreign minister's statement regarding public opinion. 
Despite that, the Syrian intervention, raises the question : why was the American 
intervention in Grenada or in Lebanon illegal and a violation of the Charter, and was 
not so regarding their military intervention in Lebanon ? 
Assuming that the use of force was legal to promote the principle of self 
determination, (a policy on which the Syrians hardly agree), one wonders whether or 
not the Syrians were sincere in their military action regarding the right of the Lebanese 
people to self determination. In answering this question a host of factors need to be 
explored. Was the Syrian military action welcomed by the Lebanese population and 
was there no armed resistance on their part ? Or were there special circumstances that 
could be considered in invalidating the Syrian intervention ? Regarding the first 
question, the welcome by itself could stand as evidence of the popularity of the action 
and the absence of it could prove the opposite; the Syrian forces were hardly accepted 
as being friendly forces. 
There is no doubt that the Syrian forces were treated as occupying forces, and 
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seems as a tool of conspiracy against the patriotic Leftist forces. 050) Over the four 
months that followed the Syrian invasion, stiff resistence was encountered by the 
Syrian forces(151), and voices of protest from a great section of the Lebanese 
population were raised against the Syrian military action. 052) Among those voices 
was the statement of The Lebanese National Movement which was broadcast to Syrian 
soldiers. The statement asked every Syrian soldier to think of what he was doing and 
why he was ordered to fight the patriotic Lebanese masses: 
" Don't you ask yourself why [ The Lebanese ] masses greet you by 
digging trenches ? .... Does it make sense that you should enter today 
to suppress the Lebanese Arab masses and ... the Palestinian Resistence and to support the isolationist [ the Lebanese 
Front]. (153) 
Given this evidence, the Syrian military intervention could hardly be conceived as 
an intervention to promote the principle of self determination. The resistence of the 
Lebanese people over three to four months in the face of twenty thousand Syrian 
soldiers, demonstrated beyond doubt that there was a genuine popular resistance to the 
Syrian intervention. Compared with the American intervention of Grenada where the 
Americans completed their military operation in a very short time, and left the country 
with as much speed as possible, the Syrian intervention does not seem to satisfy these 
two conditions. Despite that, the Syrians perceived the American intervention as a 
violation of the right of Grenadians to self determination. 
This argument leads to the second question regarding the circumstances of the 
Syrian intervention. It is generally recognised by every observer of the Lebanese civil 
war that the Syrians have had too much control over the direction of events. The 
circumstances that led them to send the PLA into Lebanon on the Fourth of January 
1976, against the wishes of the Lebanese government, coupled with their intervention 
on the First of June 1976 against the Leftist forces whose protection was the sole aim 
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of their first intervention is a clear testimony to that end. 
The motivating force behind the Syrian intervention could be explained in the 
struggle for dominance in the Middle East following the separate Egyptian deal with 
Israel. Syria felt betrayed and the sense of isolation was very strong and decisive in its 
decision-makers. To compensate this imbalance, an alternative had to be found, as 
Syria could not afford the risk of war with Israel on its own. The Lebanese civil war 
represented a golden opportunity as the control of Lebanon could be used to serve two 
purposes. First, it enabled Syria, in controlling Lebanon, to realize the historic dream 
of Greater Syria, especially as her relations, with Jordan at that time were very 
intimate. 054) The establishment of Greater Syria would compensate for the loss of 
Egypt and enhance Syria's prestige in the region as the main broker in any future 
settlement in the Middle East. Second, being the major power in Lebanon, the threat of 
an Israeli attack on its soft southern part would also be removed. 055) 
Confronted with the success of the Lebanese National Movement, whose basic aim 
was the establishment of a socialist independent Lebanon, the Syrians were alarmed at 
the prospect of having a radical state on their frontier and with it the dream of Greater 
Syria would slip away. It was not only the Syrian government that was alarmed, but 
the Americans also perceived the success of the LNM and the PLO as a devastating 
outcome to the their plan in the region. 056) Adding to this, the Israeli fears of 
witnessing the emergence of a radical state allied with the Palestinians whose basic goal 
was the destruction of Israel, was behind the Israeli acceptance of the Syrian 
intervention. All these factors together [ Israel, Syria, USAJ were at play in the Syrian 
decision to intervene. 
After all, the intervention would eliminate the possibility of establishing a radical 
state, enhancing Syria's prestige in controlling Lebanon, removing the threat of an 
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Israeli surprise attack, and finally gives way to the emergence of Greater Syria. Where 
the interest of the Lebanese people lies in this analysis is hardly detectable. The 
Lebanese right to self determination was not even considered by the Syrian decision 
makers, given the strategic factor of controlling Lebanon. The Syrian policy in 
Lebanon with its inherent characteristic of shifting alliance, or as described by 
Weinberger as "tactical flexibility". (157), was deployed only to protect Syrian interest. 
Their support of the LNM at the outset of the struggle under the guise of affording 
protection for the revolution, and later their intervention to liquidate that revolution was 
clear proof of their insincerity towards the Lebanese right of self determination. 
To sum up, the Syrian intervention under the principle of self determination is not 
supported by law nor by fact. Ile existence of the principle of self determination as a 
legal right does not justify the use force to implement it. Nevertheless, the Syrian 
intervention [ assuming the legality of the use of force ] remains an instrument to 
promote the Syrian national interest under the guise of self determination 
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VII- Conclusion 
Ile Syrian intervention in response to the Lebanese invitation is beyond any doubt 
illegal. There is no invitation or treaty which gives credit to the Syrian government's 
claim. However, there is a shred of an argument with which the Syrian could have 
been invited by the Lebanese president. As such, such an invitation is neither valid in 
international law or Lebanese constitutional law. 
As to the former, the rules of international law are very clear. An invitation to be 
legally valid must emanates from a government which exercises effective control. 
These requirements are well founded in international law. The Lebanese government, 
as far as this criterion is concerned, has failed. The rebel forces at that time were in 
effective control and not the government. Accepting an invitation, on the assumption 
there was one, would clearly run against the rules of international law. 
As to the latter, the president had no right, under Lebanese constitutional law, to 
issue an invitation. Having established the parliamentarian orientation of the Lebanese 
system, the president cannot issue an invitation without the signature of the Prime 
Minister and the specialised Minister. Since there are no such signatures, the 
president's invitation becomes invalid. 
Regarding the validity of intervention to promote the Lebanese right to self- 
determination, the analysis has proved the illegality of such a claim. There is no doubt 
that the principle of self determination is by now a principle of international law. The 
principle was mentioned in the Charter and reaffirmed by the General Assembly 
Resolutions. The claims that the Resolutions are not binding is not very convincing. 
As far as the principle of self determination is concerned, the General Assembly 
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Resolution could be referred to as explaining the law and cannot be dismissed as 
irrelevant. The practice of states over thd issue coupled with the insertion of self 
determination through a variety of treaties gives way to it's emergence as a customary 
principle of international law is further proof of the existence of the right of self 
determination. 
The existence of the principle as a legal right, however, does not at all justify the 
use of force. After all, the policy of the Charter is to eliminate force and prevent its 
occurrence under whatever pretext. The acceptance of all states of the illegality of the 
use of force is unanimous, save in the context of colonial and racist regimes. More 
interestingly, was the use of force to promote self determination in the context of civil 
war which was unanimously regarded by all states as being against the principle of the 
U. N. Charter. This is against the norm of non intervention which acknowledges that 
no state has any right whatsoever to meddle in the domestic affairs of another state. 
Accordingly, intervention, upon invitation was ruled out as a legal act in the context of 
civil war since it contradicts the right of the people to self determination. 
The Syrian government has acknowledged the superiority of the norm of self- 
determination. The Syrian delegate asserted continuously his country's stand which 
was that the use of force or intervention upon whatever pretext in a civil war will run 
against the wishes of the native people. The Syrian condemnation of the American 
action in Grenada and Lebanon testify to this conclusion. However, the Syrian military 
intervention in June 1976 is a clear departure from this asserted policy. The Syrian 
intervention was against the wishes of the Lebanese people and their right to self 
determination. The Syrian intervention is a violent manifestation of the use of force 
which represents at its lowest level a challenge to the Charter of the United Nations and 
a state's acceptance of illegality of the use of force. The Charter's pledge in Article 2 
(4) that the use of force is forbidden whatever the circumstances save in self defence, is 
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an important priority in a drive towards preserving peace and stability, an interpretation 
the Syrian government wholeheartedly embraced in its public pronouncement. Basic to 
this, the principle of self determination which is enshrined in the charter in both Articles 
(55) and (1), not to mention the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and various international agreements, prescribes the use of force to deprive people of 
their right to self determination as illegal. 
As the Syrian government failed to demonstrate that its intervention was to promote 
the legal right of the Lebanese people to self determination, and since there is no right to 
use force to that end, its intervention will fall within the category of aggression. Its 
intervention was then a clear attack on Lebanese sovereignty and independence and the 
right of the Lebanese to choose whatever system they desire. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE LEGITIMIZATION OF SYRIAN INTESRVENTION BY THE 
ARABLEAGUE. 
I-Introduction. 
On the 9th of June 1976 an extra session of the Arab League Council, at Ministerial 
level, took place to consider the Syrian intervention in the Lebanese civil war. The 
outcome of the meeting was the establishment of a peace keeping force to end the civil 
war in Lebanon. With the establishment of a peace-keeping force, the Syrian forces 
were called on to withdraw from Lebanon in order to be replaced by an Arab-peace 
keeping force. However, due to the refusal of the Syrian government to withdraw its 
forces another meeting of the Arab League was held in Riyadh at the level of Heads of 
State. The outcome of the meeting was the establishment of the Arab Deterrent Forces 
(A. D. F) which included the Syrian forces. With the formation of A. D. F, it was argued 
that the Syrian forces, were no longer an illegal force. To what extent this assumption 
is valid is the main purpose of this chapter. Moreover, it will highlight the 
circumstances which made possible the inclusion of the Syrian forces in the Arab peace 
keeping force. First it is necessary to consider the Arab-League as a regional 
organization and its relation with the United Nations Charter, and then proceed to 
discuss the legality of Arab-League action and its effect on the legitimization of the 
Syrian presence in Lebanon. 
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11- The Foundation and Constitutional Basis of the Arab League 
A- The Origin Of The Arab League. 
On the 22nd of March 1945 of March and upon the invitation of the Egyptian Prime 
Minister, a meeting took place in Egypt, where Arab leaders finally put their seal of 
approval on what later came to be known as the Arab League. (I) 
The emergence of the Organisation of the Arab-League was a natural outcome of the 
Arab yearning for unity which had been a persistent phenomenon since the nineteenth 
century. The drive or desire for Arab unity was occasionally employed by foreign 
powers to gain Arab support in critical times. The first attempt was made by the 
Ottoman authority through its governor Shafiq Pasha with King Abed AI-Aziz. (2) 
However, the Ottoman offer was not welcomed, as the Arab world was divided on the 
issue, and generally treated it with scepticism. (3) In this regard, the Arabs allied 
themselves with the Allied Forces in the First World War under the impression that 
their most cherished hope of unity and independence would be the ultimate outcome. (4) 
However, their hope of unity never materialized. Both France and Britain refused to 
recognise the new Arab King Al Sharif Hussain and, on the 24th of July 1920, the 
French forces invaded Damascus and overthrew the government of Al Sharif s son. (5) 
Following that, Arab countries were subjected to the new international arrangement 
whereby Syria and Lebanon fell under the French mandate while Iraq and Palestine 
came under the British mandate. (6) Thus, the promise of Arab unity was a dream 
which never come true. 
. 
During the Second World War, the British government again raised the subject of 
unity. The British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden announced on May 29,1941 that the 
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Arab world has shown a great desire for unity and to realize that they should rely on the 
British government. He proceeded to say "No such appeal from our friends should go 
unanswered"and thus " 11is Majesty's government for their part will give their full 
support to any scheme that commands general approval". (7) 
Responding to the British offer, the Iraqi prime minister in the spring of 1943 
1 
forwarded a plan envisaging the establishment of Greater Syria and an Arab League. (8) 
Likewise, Prince Abdallah of TransJordan envisaged the establishment of a federation 
composed of Greater Syria and Iraq. (9) The last reaction to the British offer was from 
Egypt. On March 30,1943 the Egyptian Premier, in a speech, was committed to 
exploring the opinion of Arab governments on the issue of unity. (10) In July 1944 the 
Egyptian Premier invited Arab States to a joint conference to exchange opinion on the 
issue of unity. 
On September 25 1944, a meeting was held in Alexandria, Egypt and in the course 
of the meeting three proposals were submitted: 
(I)- The establishment of a unitary state with central authority and compulsory 
settlement of disputes. 
(2)- A federated state consisting of central assembly and executive committee with full 
power over federal sYstem. (1 1) 
(3)- A loose federation sharing nothing with the above proposals, aimed at increasing 
co-operation and co-ordination of Arab state policy. (12) 
After full consideration, and upon the insistence of Lebanon that a unitary state 
would ultimately destroy state sovereignty, the conference abandoned the first 
proposal. 03) In contrast, Syria argued for the unitary state and pledged its readiness 
to surrender its sovereignty. 04) However, the conference managed to reached a 
compromise by which an Arab-League would be established and independent Arab 
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states would be free to join it. (15) This compromise came later to be known as the 
Alexandria protocol(16). Thus the establishment of the Arab-League, despite the 
differences between various Arab states' view of unity and its achievement, was 
primarily attributable to the " natural expression of trends which were already present 
and which could not be denied eventual fruition". (17) 
Later, a sub-conunittee created by the Protocol prepared a draft pact for the Arab 
League. After the sixteenth session, an agreement was reached on that draft. (18) On 
March 20,1945 the committee transformed itself into a general Arab conference(19) 
and on 22rd of March 1945 the pact was finally approved and signed by the states' 
representatives. (20) 
B- The Pact Of The Arab League. 
The Pact of the Arab League is an international treaty signed by the heads of 
independent Arab states. The purposes of the League are set forth in Article 2 of the 
Pact. These purposes are: strengthening relations between member states; co- 
ordinating their polices in order to prompt further co-operation and safeguarding their 
independence and sovereignty; and a general concern for the affairs and interests of 
Arab countries. (21) However, co-operation was addressed specifically to matters 
concerning economic and financial affairs, commercial relations, customs , industry, 
social relation and health etc.. 
On the other hand the Pact failed to regulate matters relating to defence against 
armed attack, co-ordination of military resources or co-ordination of foreign poHcy. (22) 
Moreover, the absence of commitment to co-ordinate foreign policy was a clear 
departure from the Alexandria Protocol which prescribe d that Arab states should "co- 
ordinate their political plan so as to ensure their co-operation',. (23) The stress of the 
Pact on the respect of sovereignty and independence and non interference in domestic 
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affairs was the major theme in the Pact. However, such a position could be seen as a 
clear retreat from the ideal that gave rise to the Alexandria protocol. (24) Member states 
pledge their commitment to refrain from any intervention or action directed at changing 
or weakening other government systems. Article 8 reads: 
" Each member state shall respect the system of government 
established in the other member states and regard them as the 
exclusive concern of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from 
any action calculated to change the established system of 
govemment". (25) 
In Article 5 the Pact renounced the use of force to settle disputes and for any dispute 
not involving sovereignty or independence, in cases referred to the Council by the 
parties, the decision of the Council would be binding. (26) 
Regarding the membership, the Pact opened the door to every independent Arab 
state but at the same time did not ignore the plight of non independent Arab states. (27) 
The admittance of Algeria as an observer and Palestine as a member was a clear 
manifestation of the flexibility of the pact. (28) Upon their admission, member states 
were to pledge their committment to abide by the rules and procedures and support their 
execution . Withdrawal was allowed on giving notice which ought to be served one 
year in advance to the Council. (29) Expulsion could be considered in the light of a 
Member's state's failure to fulfill it's obligations. (30) 
The Pact dealt with the issue of aggression stipulating that in the case of aggression 
by one state against another member state, the victim of such act would ask for the 
convocation of the Council which would take the necessary action to check that illegal 
incursion. (3 1) 
The Pact also envisaged the establishment of an institutional structure for the Arab 
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League and provided the rules for its regulation. Although there are many organs 
envasiged by the Pact(32), the most important organs are: the Council, Permanent 
Secretariat and Committee. The Council is composed of representative states of the 
Arab-League. It holds two ordinary sessions each year and each representative has one 
vote. (33) However, the Council can meet in extra-ordinary sessions upon the request 
of two members(34). The procedure of voting is unanimity as a general rule and thus 
decisions taken unanimously ought to be binding, but decisions taken by the majority 
would be only binding on states accepting them. (35). However, in the case of 
aggression, the vote of the aggressor must be excluded. (36) Moreover, the council 
would be, according to the Pact, the appropriate organ to discharge or to see to the 
realization of the purposes of the Pact. (37) 
As to the Permanent Committee, according to the pact its function was confined to 
preparing and planning the extent of co-operation in accordance with the purposes listed 
in Article 2 of the Pact. (38) Finally, the Permanent Secretariat, which is composed of 
the Secretary General and Assistant secretaries and appropriate other officials(39), is 
charged with the preparation of the League's budget and convening the ordinary council 
sessions. (40) 
C-The Interrelation Between The League And The United Nations 
Charter. 
Although the Pact of the Arab League preceded the establishment of the United 
Nations(41), nevertheless the Pact's provisions ensured room for a future relationship 
between the two organizations. This flexibility was clearly reflected in Article 19 which 
envisaged the possibility of a modification of the pact in order to be compatible with the 
United Nations. (42) 
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The Charter of the United Nations provided for such a relation under Chapter VIH, 
and in particular Article 52 (1) which reads: 
"Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate 
for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and 
their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations". (43) 
The Charter stipulated that the regional organization performing its duties in 
accordance with article 52 (1) ought to make " every effort to achieve a pacific 
settlement of local disputes". (44) In course of such pacific settlement by the regional 
organization, the Security Council will, in its turn, "encourage the development of a 
pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such 
regional agencies". (45) On the other hand, the Security Council restricted the freedom 
of regional organization in'dealing with the local disputes as it stipulated that an 
enforrement action by such agencies or regional organization must at first obtain the 
authorization of the Security Council. (46) Article 52, paragraph 4, affirmed that the 
existence of regional organization shall " in no way impair the application of Article 34 
and 35" of the United Nations charter. (47) In addition, the Charter imposed another 
restriction on the freedom of regional organization by stipulating that the regional 
organization must keep the Security Council " informed of activities undertaken or in 
contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintainance 
of international peace and security',. (48) However, the Arab-League as a regional 
organization and a kind of collective body could operate a system of collective security. 
Indeed the Arab-League at a later stage signed a treaty of collective defence (Treaty of 
Joint Defence). Such a treaty qualifies the Arab-League to take collective action in 
response to an aggression. The United Nations Charter recognized such measures 
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under Article 51 which was inserted upon the insistence of Latin American states in 
order to allow regional organization to take action without reference to the Security 
Council. (49) 
III- The Arab League Peace Keeping Force in Lebanon. 
A- Prelude to the establishment of The Arab Security Force 
As the Syrian forces continued their illegal intervention in the Lebanese civil war, 
the ferocity of fighting took a dramatic shift. The belligerents in their strive for 
supremacy used every type of conventional warfare'ranging from tanks and artillery to 
the use of large troop tactics in their offensive war. Despite all of that, the Syrian forces 
met stiff resistance and its advance was thus very slow. (50) Responding to the Syrian 
offensive drive, the LNM and Palestinian resistence, waged a war against the Syrian 
proxy [Al-Saqua and the Bathist party] in the capital which ended in their 
surrender. (5 1) 
In the course of these developments, Arab public opinion was outraged by the 
Syrian military drive against the Leftist and Palestinian forces, and that pressure was so 
great that the Arab leaders felt it necessary to hold a meeting in order to form a new 
initiative. The urgency of the meeting was reconfirmed following the Iraqi 
government's criticism of Syrian activity in Lebanon coupled with mass troop 
movement on the Iraqi-Syrian border. (52) Thus, in response to the Libyan, Iraqi and 
Egypation request for an extra ordinary session of the Arab-League, a meeting was 
convened on the 6th of June 1976 to discuss the Lebanese crisis. (53) 
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On the 9th of June 1976, an extra-ordinary session of the Arab-League Council, at 
the level of Foreign Nfinisters, took place in Cairo , to consider the implications of the 
Lebanese civil war and the Syrian intervention. The outcome of the meeting was a 
Resolution which is commonly known as the Cairo Resolution. 
B-The Cairo Resolution And The Formation Of The Arab Symbolic 
Force 
The Cairo Resolution of the 9th of June 1976 called on all parties to " cease fighting 
immediately and to consolidate such a cease fire". (54) Interestingly enough, to secure a 
cease fire, the Resolution envisaged the establishment of a commission representing the 
League to be dispatched to Lebanon as soon as possible in order to "co-operate with the 
parties concerned in following up the situation and ensuring security and stability in 
Lebanon". (55) 
In addition, the resolution provided for the establishment of the Symbolic Arab 
Security Force under the supervision of the Secretary General of the Arab-League, 
Mahmoud Riyad. The Force (A. S. F) would be entrusted with the task of maintaining 
"security and and stability in Lebanon". The most important paragraph was that 
pertaining to the Syrian replacement as the resolution stipulated that the A. S. F. " should 
start to perform its task immediately, replacing the Syrian forces". (56) 
In line with the model of a peace keeping force, the resolution stipulated that the 
A. S. F "should be brought to an end if the elected president of the Republic of Lebanon 
so requested. ', (57) In general, the rest of the Resolution consisted of the call to all 
parties to bring about a comprehensive national conciliation under the auspices of the 
1 
Lebanese president-elect and affirmation of the Arab-League commitment to the 
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Palestinian revolution so as to provide protection and increase its effectiveness and 
strength. (58) On whole, the Resolution failed to determine accurately the kind of 
consent which the force needed to operate in Lebanon, since there was a constitutional 
crisis as regards to who was the proper or legal president of Lebanon. This came about 
since President Franjieh refused to resign and hand over the presidency to the newly 
elected president before the end of his term. However, the council on the night of June 
9 1976, and in a further session, decided to make a slight modification to the mandate 
with reference to the consent which was rephrased in such terms that the A. S. F. was to 
act " within the frame work of Lebanese sovereignty". (59) Moreover, the Resolution 
was quite ambiguous on the issue of Syrian troops as it failed to determine the 
procedures by which the Syrian forces could find their way out of Lebanon. This 
ambiguity of the mandate needs more elaboration and comment. 
C-The Ambiguity of The Mandate Of The A. S. F. 
As mentioned previously, the resolution of the League on the 9th of June 1976, was 
quite ambiguous on the issue of consent and Syrian replacement. As the consent will be 
discussed later, the effort in this section will be devoted to the ambiguity of the clause 
relating to the Syrian troops in Lebanon. 
The failure of the Resolution to explicitly condemn the Syrian intervention cannot 
be taken as a sanction of the Syrian military action. On the contrary, the mandate made 
it clear that the withdrawal of Syrian forces was one of the main purposes. Thus, by 
inference, an assumption could be made that reference to the Syrian replacement was an 
indication of the illegality of the Syrian intervention. Moreover, the mandate fell short 
of setting out in detail the procedures necessary for such replacement. There was no 
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time table for measures which were to be taken in order to effect the Syrian 
replacement. However, this lacuna permitted an argument that the resolution of the 9th 
June did not contemplate full Syrian withdrawal, otherwise the resolution would have 
explicitly mentioned that and provided a time-table for that purpose. 
Later events affirmed this thesis as discussion concentrated on the the size of Syrian 
participation and not on their full withdrawal. Faced with the Palestinian and LNM 
rejection of full Syrian pardcipation(60)and Franjieh with LF insistence on the Syrian 
participation(61), an Arab League spokesman affirmed the Syrian participation, but 
made no reference to the size of the Syrian contingent. (62) 
In the course of these discussions, the Syrian government made the point very clear 
that they would not withdraw from Lebanon nor reduce the number of troops. The 
Syrian foreign minister elaborated on this point: 
"When our troops entered Lebanon, it was in order to impose 
security and stability and to create a climate favorable to political 
dialogue between the Lebanese. When all that has been achieved, 
there will not be a single Syrian soldier left. We will take all the time 
that is necessary". (63) 
In the light of the Syrian statement and the Arab-League spokesman's clarification, 
the issue of the Syrian replacement became clear. The word replacement did not mean 
withdrawal of the Syrian troops as there was no time-table or arrangement to that end. 
Therefore, since the Arab-league resolution was ambiguous about the Syrian 
replacement and in light of the aforementioned statements, one wonder whether or not 
the League has ever condemned the Syrian intervention. In general, the ambiguity of 
the mandate, has provided the necessary loopholes which permitted the Syrians to 
participate in the Arab peace keeping force, and saved the League from delicate 
questions concerning the condemenation and withdrawal of the Syrian forces . 
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D- Silence Of the Arab-League Pact On The Issue Of Peacekeeping 
Force 
As far as the Arab-League Power to establish a peace keeping force was concerned, 
the Pact so far provided no legal ground for that purpose. The failure of the Pact in this 
field was overcome by what could be called a progressive interpretation of the Pact. 
This method of interpretation was employed in the interpretation of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
The United Nations Peace Keeping Force was based on two grounds; either that the 
establishment of the peace keeping force is based on a treaty provision or on the 
assumption that the Organization is acting intra vires. (64) However , such an 
interpretation was not completely accepted by the major actors as opinion referred to the 
practice of the United Nations where others discounted any practice that could not be 
supported by the provisions of the Charter. (65) As there is no specific provision in the 
charter pertaining to the subject of peace keeping forces(66), the conviction was that the 
the Organization was acting intra vires. In the Certain Expenses Case the ICJ held the 
opinion that: 
"When the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion 
that it was appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the stated 
purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action 
is not ultra vires the Organization". 06) 
Therefore, on the analogy of interpretation of the United Nations Charter, one can 
analyse the Pact of the Arab-League. Since the purpose of the Arab League 
Organization is to preserve peace and stability in the region, then action taken by it for 
such a purpose is not ultra vires. In fact, there are many provision in the Pact of the 
Arab-League which permits such an interpretation. In particular, Article 2 of the Pact 
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specifies the purposes of the Organization(68); 
(I)- "To strengthen relations between member states. 
(2)- Co-ordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between them and 
to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the 
affairs and interest of the Arab countries". 
Thus, the Arab-League's action could be considered as an action inherent in the 
purpose of the organization, and moreover consistent with Article 2 pertaining to 
safeguarding independence and sovereignty of Lebanon which was in great danger 
following the Syrian intervention. In addition, some suggested that the action of the 
Arab-League in Lebanon could be legitimized on other grounds such as the Treaty of 
Joint Defence which was signed by Arab states. (69) Hassouna one of the leading 
authorities on the Arab-League, relied on such a Treaty as a basis for the Arab-League 
initiative in Lebanon. (70) Ile Treaty provided two options for the Arab League: 
(I)- " As a regional collective security system concerned with the prevention or 
resolution of conflict within its members" 
(2)- " And as a regional collective self-defence system aimed at providing joint 
security against an external threat". (71) 
It is within the first option that the new form of establishing a peace keeping force 
was manifested in the establishment of a peace keeping machinery in Kuwait, and so it 
would be the case in Lebanon. (72) 
Another lawyer writing on the topic shared the view that the Arab League peace 
keeping operation in Lebanon could be based on the Treaty as well. (73) Pogany 
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referred to the preamble of the Treaty of Joint Defence which includes inter alia, the 
desire of the contracting states to maintain peace and security and moreover Article 3 
which reads: "The contracting states shall hold consultation whenever there are 
reasonable grounds for the belief that the territorial integrity, independence, or security 
of any one of the parties is threatened" as a justification for the peace keeping 
operation. (74) However, as far as this Treaty serves as a basis for the establishment of 
a peace keeping force in Lebanon is concerned, the validity of it is very doubtful. The 
said Treaty is concerned with the subject of collective security and its operation arises 
only in cases of aggression and violation of another state's independence and 
sovereignty. This violation does not make any difference whether or not it emanates 
from a member state of the League or an external one. The reference to Article 3 as a 
justification is quite misleading since it does not correspond to the intention of the 
drafters of the treaty. In fact Article 2 defines the parameters of Article 3 which affirms 
that" The contracting states consider any (act of) armed aggression made against any 
one of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all" and therefore in 
accordance with " self defence .... they undertake to ... use armed forces to rebel the 
aggression and restore stability and peace". (75) 
Therefore, the words stability and peace are confined only to cases of aggression in 
which the Arab states respond collectively to halt the aggression and restore peace and 
security. Another reason which confirms the view that the action of the Arab League 
was not based on the said Treaty is Pogany's argument regarding the Arab peace 
keeping in Kuwait. I-Iis conclusion seems to contradict his verdict in the case of the 
peace keeping force in Lebanon. 
Departing from Hassouna's position, he asserts that the Force in Kuwait was not a 
peace keeping force and was a manifestation of collective self-defence. He proceeded to 
confirm that the Arab peace keeping force in Kuwait was based on the resolution of 
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20th July 1961. The resolution specified that the force was to give "effective assistance 
for the preservati(? n of Kuwait's independence". He rejected Hassona's arguments that 
the force was not directed against any party, since as he believes, the reason for that was 
attributable to the fact that Iraq pulled back and took no more hostile action. For if the 
Iraqi troops attacked the Arab League force, the League would repel it and by virtue of 
that the League force constituted a measure of collective self defence and not a peace 
keeping force. (76) Following this, reasoning, one wonders how the Arab League peace 
keeping force in Lebanon could be based on the Treaty ofJoint Defence. For if it is so 
then the League action would have been in accordance with collective self defence and 
not a peace keeping force. After all, the League action was undertaken following the 
Syrian intervention in Lebanon. Such an intervention was a clear violation of 
Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. Thus, one can reverse Pogany's analogy, to 
demonstrate that the constitutional bases of the Arab League peace keeping force could 
not relate to the said treaty. To Pogany, the League peace keeping force was not 
directed against any state, but that was presumably because of Syrian willingness not to 
use force any more; and had the Syrians used force the League troops would 
presumably repel that attack. And if that holds true, then the force would no longer be a 
peace keeping force rather a collective self-defence measure. Therefore, the Arab- 
League peace keeping force in Lebanon was based on the Pact of the Arab League only 
and not on the Treaty of Joint Defence. The Pact, however did not envisage the peace 
keeping role but an assumption could be made that the League's action was inherent in 
its purposes and as such was not ultra vires. 
IV- The Compatibility Of The A. S. F With The Conventional Type Of 
Peace keeping 
The establishment of the A. S. F by the Arab-League in order to carry out a peace 
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keeping operation in a civil war, was a novelty as far as the League is concerned. It 
was the first time that the Arab League experienced such a situation in which a member 
state was tom by civil strife and external intervention. Therefore, it is imperative to 
examine the requirements that are necessary for peace keeping forces and to see to what 
extent the League adhered to such requirements. In this regard, the experience of the 
United Nations is enriching, and in light of it, the Arab League peace keeping force 
could be judged. As far as the conventional type of peace keeping force is concerned, 
there are three important factors: the consent of the host state, composition of the force 
and control of the operation. Therefore, in this section an attempt will be made to see 
how the Arab-League responded to these conditions or requirements. 
A-The Consent Of The Host State 
It is a pre-requisite that the consent of the host state has to be obtained in order for 
the peace keeping force to operate in its territory. Without such a consent, the force 
would be considered an enforcement action under Chapter(VII) of the Charter. The 
consent of the host state originally emanated from the practice of the United Nations 
peace keeping force in Egypt 1956. The General Assembly Resolution 998 (ES-I), 
which was passed following thý British, French and Israeli invasion of the Egyptian 
territory, requested the Secretary General to submit within 48 hours "a plan for the 
setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency internation al 
United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities". (7 7) 
Consequently, the Israeli government refused to give its consent while Egypt accepted 
the presence of that force on its territory. (78) 
Moreover, the Secretary General in his second and final report (6th November 
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1956) regarding a plan for an emergency international United Nations force affirmed 
that: 
"... the force, if established, would be limited in its operation to the 
extent that consent of the parties concerned is required under 
generally recognized international law. While the General Assembly 
is enabled to establish the force with the consent of those parties 
which contributes units to the force, it could not request the force to 
be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the 
consent of the government of that country". (79) 
However, since the United Nations force in Egypt was not utilized in the context of 
civil war, an argument might be put forward that in a civil war, in the absence of a 
recognisable government, it would be irrelevant for the United Nations to seek consent 
before establishing a peace-keeping force. This is not quite true since the experience of 
the United Nations in the Congo furnishes a clear precedent. During the ONUC 
operation in the Congo, although in response to the Congolese govemment's request 
following the Belgian invasion, the Secretary General at a later stage sought the consent 
of all the parties to the civil war since the government was no longer representing the 
Republic of Congo. This is clearly illustrated by the Secretary General's endeavor to 
obtain the consent of the Katangese government headed by Mr Tschombe. (80) 
As to the form of the consent which was supposed to be given, there are two 
methods; either through a message to the Secretary General or through an agreement 
between the host state and the United Nations (81) However, the methods of giving 
the consent are not restrictive to the aformentioned types. Therefore, the consent is 
very important to the operation of the peace keeping force since that Force is not 
engaged in an enforcement action under Chapter(VII) of the Charter of the United 
Nations. (82) 
As far as the A. S. F. is concerned, one could assert that the force was not an 
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enforcement action. Thus, one wonders whether or not the A. S. F obtained the 
necessary consent from the proper authority as a pre-requisite to its deployment in 
Lebanese territory. The Resolution of 9th June 1976 stressed the fact that the A. S. F 
mandate would be terminated upon the request of the president elect Illias Sarkis. This 
specification has the advantage of removing any ambiguity that might arise in the case 
of termination as was the case regarding UNER(83) However, stressing the right of 
the president regarding the termination of the mandate of the A. S. F could not reveal on 
its own whether or not the consent was properly addressed. For the president-elect has 
the right to terminate the mandate then by right his consent is necessary to the 
deployment of the force. 
Given the constitutional crisis in Lebanon, the president elect was not yet 
inaugurated as the constitutional president as president Franjieh's term had not yet 
expired. However, the council of ministers of the Arab League realized the loophole 
and in a later session they affirmed that the deployment of the force would take place 
"within the frame work of Lebanese sovereignty". (84) Despite that, the Lebanese 
president protested against the resolution of June 9th and considered it null and void. 
According to him, the resolution was passed in the absence of Lebanon and against 
Article 7 of the League which required that a state concerned with the decision of the 
League, had to give its consent for it to be binding. In a letter addressed to the League 
Franjieh stressed that: 
" It is contrary to the League's charter and to the very reasons which 
had prompted the creation of the League for an Arab League meeting 
to take place to discuss the Lebanese matter-and to attempt to make 
decisions binding on Lebanon without inviting Lebanon to attend or 
be represented at the meeting by a responsible person". (85) 
However, it is worth mentioning that the Lebanese ambassador to Egypt was 
present at that meeting. (86) Nevertheless, president Franjieh and the Lebanese Front 
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continued their attack on the League's decision and insisted that the A. S. F. would be 
met with every possible resistance in order to defend the sovereignty of Lebanon. In 
order to solve the impasse, the Secretary General of the Arab-League, Mahmoud 
Riyad, arrived in Lebanon to secure the consent of president Franjieh. Thus on the the 
15th of June 1976 and after a meeting with president Franjieh and the leaders of the 
Lebanese Front, the latter gave their consent to the deployment of A. S. 087) 
However, it was latter revealed that the consent was given on the ground that the 
deployment of the peace keeping force would "take place... in agreement with the 
Lebanese authorities regarding all details and especially those relating to the size and 
nationality of the contingents. According to the memoir of the president of the Front, 
Chammoun, the Secretary General agreed to the following conditions: 
(l)- Lebanon will not oppose the Arab-League's initiative so long as the initiative's sole 
aim is to preserve peace and security. 
(2)- The mission of the Arab contingents are to supervise the implementation of the 
Cairo agreement and its appendix Le the Melkart agreement. 
(3)- The Arab contingents will not replace the Syrian forces but, on the contrary, ought 
to co-ordinate with, and any decision would not be considered unless the Lebanese 
government was consented. 
(4)- The Lebanese government holds the right to veto any decision regarding the 
composition of A. S. F, and rejects the participation of Libya, Iraq, Algeria and the 
PLO in the peace keeping force. (88) 
These conditions were indirectly hinted at by president Franjieh in his statement 
regarding acceptance of the A. S. F, as he stipulated that acceptance was given " within 
the lin-dt set by assurance and clarification offered by the Secretary General in the name 
of the League, and provided that initiative is coordinated with the fraternal Syrian 
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initiative currently underway and to which Lebanon had acceded',. (89) In response to 
Franjieh's statement, the Lebanese prime minister, Karami, criticized the president for 
exceeding his authority in determining exclusively Lebanon's view. (90) However, the 
Secretary General's attempt at securing the president's consent as a pre-requisite to the 
deployment of the force is quite controversial. In doing so, the Secretary General 
ignored the limitation imposed by the practice of the United Nations peace keeping 
force, that is to say that the force must not intervene in internal affairs. The Secretary 
General, in recognising Franjieh as the legitimate president amounted to an interference 
in the domestic affairs of Lebanon. After all, the Lebanese president was not the proper 
legal authority as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, and if he was, then, his 
consent was not enough on its own. Not only that, the president explicitly took sides 
in the internal conflict and his alliance with the LF was public. Against this 
background, one wonders whether or not the Secretary General was treating the 
president as one of the parties whose consent is vital for the success of the A. S. F or as 
the proper legal authority of Lebanon. For securing the consent of parties to civil war 
is consistent with the practice of the U. N as was the case in the Congo and hence the 
Secretary General's attempt to do so could be considered valid and proper. However, 
there are contradictory statements on this point, and whether or not the weight of 
evidence suggests that the Secretary General's contact with Franjieh was an attempt to 
secure the consent of all parties to the conflict, could be regarded as controversial. (91) 
Therefore, the consent of the host state was more or less complied with despite the 
controversial status of President Franjieh. The Secretary General's attempt to secure the 
consent of all parties to the conflict was consistent with the practice of the UN peace 
keeping force. However, if the Secretary General is acting on the assumption that the 
consent of president Franjieh was the consent of Lebanon, then his attempt would be 
considered biased and an interference in Lebanese domestic affairs. 
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B-Impartiality And The Non Coercive Character Of Force. 
Other features of the peace keeping force are the impartiality and the non-use of 
force. These two features are well understood since the peace keeping force is not 
directed against any one nor is it entitled to use force to execute its mandate. It is 
completely a peace keeping force designed to supervise a cease fire which enables the 
parties to reach an agreement on the various political issues. This attitude was 
demonstrated by the United Nations peace keeping Force during its operation. 
Following the resolution of 1956 which established the UNEF, the Secretary General 
of the United Nations complied with the Egyptian request to exclude a contingent from 
New-Zealand and Pakistan as they were perceived by Egypt as politically allied with 
Great Britain and France and thus were considered unfit for the mission of peace 
keeping. (92) 
On the same ground, the Secretary General excluded the participation of permanent 
members of the Security Council and other countries that were directly involved or have 
an interest in the conflict. (93) Consistent with the factor of impartiality, the non-use of 
force by a peace keeping force, save in self-defence, (94) is mandatory. The only case 
in which the use of force is permissible, is when an action is considered an enforcement 
action under chapter(VII) of the UN Charter. 
By adhering to such requirements the peace keeping force could not be regarded as 
an intervening force. The field of its operation must be restricted to a buffer zone where 
their task is to supervise a cease fire and prevent any attempt to cross that zone. Such a 
task will enable the parties to devote their time to a political settlement and reach an 
agreement on pending problem. Therefore, in order to perform its task properly the 
peace keeping force must be neutral and not coercive. For if neutrality is not ensured, 
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the participating state will run the risk of getting involved in the internal conflict. (95) 
The A. S. F was more or less in line with the aforementioned requirements. However, 
an objection was raised concerning the Syrian and Libyan participation. 
The Syrian inclusion in the A. S. F was a clear deviation from the principle of 
impartiality. For Syria intervened in the conflict and sided with one party against the 
other in order to influence the outcome of the conflict. (96) Their 
participation, especially in large numbers, put the concept of impartiality in great doubt. 
Moreover, its mere inclusion would run against the resolution of 9th June 1976 which 
stipulated the replacement of Syrian troops as a way to end the Lebanese civil war. 
However, the resolution affirmed that the composition and the size of the A. S. F must 
be settled in accordance with the Lebanese authorities. (97) In view of the absence of the 
Lebanese government, the composition of the force could either be based on the 
discretion of the Secretary General or in consultation with the parties. The insistence of 
the Lebanese president Franjieh, on the role of the Syrian troops must not be 
considered since the president was a party to the conflict and was not constitutionally 
empowered to do so. 
On the other hand, the Libyan participation was rejected by the LF and president 
Franjieh as the latter insisted that: 
" Libya is in no way suited to participate in the Arab-peace keeping 
force which is expected to have a neutral position in this 
conflict". (98) 
However, the participation of Syrian troops was of much more importance than the 
Libyan troops since the former was required by the League's resolution to be replaced 
following their participation in the fight. Despite all of that, one could say that the 
274 
Syrian participation was not to form the bulk of the force, and moreover the command 
of the force was to be under the authority of the Secretary General, which allows the 
assumption that the force was more or less impartial. This view, although inconclusive, 
must take into consideration the political difficulties in excluding the Syrian 
participation at that time. 
Regarding the coercive nature of the force, the A. S. F was consistent with the 
conventional type of the peace-keeping force. The Secretary General made this very 
clear when he said that "... the entry of the A. S. F is dependent on the co-operation of all 
parties and their respect for the cease fire" and he affirmed that the A. S. F " will leave 
Lebanon as soon as its mission was accomplished as it is not a deterrent force... and its 
mission is to preserve and supervise the cease fire"09) 
Therefore, the A. S. F could be viewed as a peace keeping force despite the Syrian 
participation, as the political necessity made their exclusion impossible. The mere 
control of the A. S. F by the Secretary General directly contributes to the concept of 
impartiality. As a whole, the presence of the consent and non-coercive character of the 
Force coupled with its control by the Secretary General satisfies the conditions of a 
peace-keeping force. 
C-The Conduct of The A. S. F in Lebanon: 10 June- 18 October. 
The peace keeping force which was established by the League on the 9th of June 
sought to start its operation very quickly, but difficulties regarding its structures and the 
issue of consent played a major role in its delay. I'lie Lebanese Front's refusal of 
Libyan participation, coupled with their insistence on the participation of Syrian trx)ops 
in large numbers, put a major obstacle in the process of its formation and consequently 
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its operadon. (I()O) 
On the 21st of June 1976, the first contingent of the. A. S. F arrived in Lebanon. The 
Force was composed of three battalions; two Syrian and one Libyan. (101) On 22nd of 
June, these forces took positions in Khalda, around the international airport and around 
Saida in the South of Lebanon. (102) However, the Sudanese and Saudi contingents 
did not arrive at the expected time as the Saudi government stipulated that a cease fire 
had to take place before sending their troops. (103) As the A. S. F. did not arrive as 
planned, the fighting intensified and was culminated by the fall of the Palestinian camp 
Jisr Al-Pasha in the Christian zone, which marked a set back to the Arab-League 
resolution. (104) This situation urged AL Kohli, the representative of the Secretary 
General of the Arab League in Lebanon, in his report to recommend the despatchment 
of other peace keeping contingents quickly. (105) 
On the 30th of June 1976, another meeting of Arab foreign ministers convened in 
an emergency session to consider the situation in Lebanon. The outcome of the meeting 
was a repetition of the 9di June resolution but with an additional clause urging the Arab 
countries to send their troops as soon as possible. 006) On the first of July 1976, the 
Saudi and Sudanese contingents arrived and an Egypation Major-General Muhammad 
Hassan Ghoniem was appointed commander of the A. S. F. 007) During July, the 
A. S. F did not succeed in its task as the parties to the conflict persisted in their 
arguments regarding the participation of Syrian and Libyan contingents (108) This 
failure was attributed to the intransigence of the Lebanese Front as the Tunisian 
representative in the Arab committee, (established in accordance with the 9th June 
resolution to help the parties in Lebanon) aff=ed that the LF was responsible and was 
seeking a military victory. 0 09) Again, the impasse warranted another session for the 
foreign minister in Cairo to consider the Lebanese conflict. The meeting did not come 
up with any solution and an appeal was made urging the parties to reach a cease 
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fire. 0 10) On 21 st of July, the A. S. F managed to take positions on the green line 
which separates the capital (Beirut), but an attempt to extend its deployment collapsed 
following its exposure to fire and consequent injury of its members. 0 11) Again, the 
finger was pointed at the Lebanese Front as the source of the fire came from its camp, 
coupled with its leader's insistence that the A. S. F must not to be deployed in the 
victim's territory and, if it was, had to support the victim against the aggressor. 0 12) 
On the first of August, an agreement was reached that only a small contingent of 
A. S. F would enter the East sector (Christian sector) to establish a supervision 
post. (I 13) However, the Libyan participation was excluded upon the request of the 
Lebanese Front. G 14) By the 12th of August, the Palestinian camp Tel Al-Zatar fell to 
the Christian forces and consequently thousands of civilians were slaughtered-0 15) 
Following the fall of Tel Al-Zatar, a military campaign was undertaken by the LF and 
Syrian forces to dislodge the LNM and the Palestinian resistence from the Mount of 
Lebanon and position around Beirut. 0 16) However, the commander of the A. S. F, 
General Ghoniern in Lebanon, managed to produce a fourth plan to establish a cease 
fire. It envisaged the gradual withdrawal of the LNM, the Palestinians and LF from the 
Mount of Lebanon to certain areas, and the deployment of the A. S. F. in their places 
and the execution of the Cairo agreement which was included upon Syrian 
insistence. 0 17) However, this plan did not succeed as the LF insisted on the total 
withdrawal of the LNM and Palestinians from the Mount of Lebanon and the Syrian 
government insisted on their exclusion from withdrawal from the Mount of 
Lebanon. (l 18) 
During that September, all attempts to give the A. S. F a bigger role failed due to the 
opposition of the parties as every one insisted on their own conditions. On 23rd 
September, president Sarkis was inaugurated as the president of Lebanon in Shtura 
under Syrian protection. In his message, he appealed to all parties to start a dialogue, 
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and at the same time acknowledged that the Syrian presence in Lebanon was in 
accordance with Lebanese consent. 0 19) 
On the 28th of September, the situation reached a peak with a massive invasion 
undertaken by the Syrian Forces and the LF against the LNM and the Palestinians in the 
Mount of Lebanon. Ile Syrian Forces finally dislodged the Leftist forces from Dhour 
Shwaire and they were regrouped at Bahmdoun and ALey below Sofer where the 
Syrian troops were stationed. 020) Following that escalation, a meeting of foreign 
ministers was scheduled for the 15th of October, to be followed by a heads of states 
summit on the 18th of that month. (121) In what seemed to be a race against time, the 
Syrian forces, two days before the scheduled meeting of the Arab League, attacked the 
Leftist forces in their bastion in Bhamdoun where the fighting resulted in massive 
casualties. 022) With the fall of Bhamdoun the Syrian forces marched steadily into the 
headquarters of the LNM amidst protest and appealed to the Arab leaders to take action 
and stop the Syrian military offensive. In fact, the Saudi government managed to bring 
Syria and Egypt to Riyad with Lebanon represented by Sarkis. The Riyad meeting 
marked the end of the A. S. F as a new peace keeping force was announced which came 
fo be known as the A. D. F. 
On whole, the A. S. F was indeed a peace keeping force which was reflected in its 
performance. The A. S. F. deployment was entirely dependent on the consent and co- 
operation of the parties to the conflict. Its use of force was only in self defence. This 
was clearly demonstrated during its deployment. The Secretary General Mahmoud 
Riyad affirmed his peaceful mission as he said: 
"This Force -the A. S. F- cannot perform its task unless there is a 
political decision regarding the cessation of fighting ... this A. S. F is 
a symbolic force and it is working on the same basis as the UN 
Emergency peace keeping force which only operates in a situation 
where a cease fire. is observed hundred per hundred,,. (123) 
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The symbolic role was clearly reflected in its size and weapons, and its mandate. 
However, its failures fully contributed to the reluctance of the parties to co-operate. 
Moreover, the Syrian presence and their support for the LF made the mission of the 
A. S. F useless. The Syrian factor has undoubtedly contributed to the ineffectiveness of 
the peace keeping force of the Arab-League. Therefore, a conclusion can be drawn that 
the A. S. F, 'as a peace keeping force was quite successful. Despite all the pressure, it 
succeeded in preserving its impartiality and the non-use of force. Their failure to 
prevent the outbreak was largely attributable to the syrian troops which not only 
disregarded the presence of the A. S. F but the order of newly elected President Sarkis 
who did not authorize the syrian offensive. 024) The syrian troop's disregard to the 
peace keeping force, led to a new initiative which culminated in establishing the A. D. F. 
in which the Syrian amps were included. 
V- The Establishment Of The Arab Deterrent Force. 
A- Riyadh And Cairo Meeting 
The success of Saudi Arabia in securing the consent of the major Arab countries, 
and in particular those which were embroiled in the Lebanese civil war, to hold a 
meeting has undoubtedly paved the way to a new Arab initiative. Indeed a meeting was 
held in Riyadh on the 17th and 18th of October 1976, which was attended by the heads 
of state of Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, PLO, and Syria. (125) In part, the 
summit convocation reflected the de facto reality of the parties to the civil war following 
the Syrian military operation which resulted partially in the destruction of the military 
wing of the Leftist Alliance, and at the same time showed the pressure that Saudi Arabia 
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exerted on Syria and Egypt-(126) The willingness of the two major Arab countries to 
attend the meeting was crucial to the success of the summit. As was expected, the six 
party summit after a tense deliberation and discussion reached an agreement which 
came to be known as the Riyadh resolution. 
The crucial point of that resolution was its effect on the course of the Lebanese civil 
war. '17he resolution transformed the existing A. S. F into an Arab Deterrent Force with a 
substantial increase in its number, weapons and mandate. Constitutionally, an 
argument arose concerning the validity of the Riyadh resolution in relation to the 
changing character of the previous A. S. F. It was argued that the resolution validity, 
having been taken outside the frame work of the Arab-League, was questionable. 027) 
Despite the fact that the resolution was taken as such, there are many writers who argue 
that it must be considered as an Arab-League resolution. 028) This opinion relies on 
the prevailing practice of Arab states since 1964, when Nassar the president of Egypt 
invited other Arab Leaders to discuss some urgent problems pertaining to the Arab 
cause. 029) From that time the Arab Heads of State summit has been treated as a 
session of the Arab League Council. (130) Therefore, the resolution of Riyadh is an 
Arab-league resolution, and consequently the formation of the A. D. F is constitutionally 
formed. 
The resolution determined that the A. D. F must comprise of thirty thousand soldiers 
drawn from various Arab countries, with the mission of putting an end to the civil 
war. (131) The resolution outlined the main purpose that the Arab Deterrent Force 
ought to execute: 
(I)- To ensure observance of the cease fire and the ending of the fighting, to separate 
the warring forces and deter any violaters. 
(2)- To implement the Cairo agreement and its appendices; 
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(3)- To safeguard internal security 
(4)-. To supervise the withdrawal of armed personnel to the places where they were 
before April 13,1975 and to remove all evidence of military presence in 
accordance with the time table outlined in the appendix. 
(5)- To supervise [ the gathering of I all heavy weapons- artillery, mortar, missile- 
launcher and armoured. vehicles -which come under the responsibility of the 
parties concerned. 
(6)- To help the Lebanese authorities, when necessary, to take over the public 
establishment and utilities in preparation for the resumption of their work and to 
protect military and civilian public utilities. 
(7)- That life in Lebanon is to be restored to normal, in the state it was in before the 
outbreak of the incidents, that is to say, before April 13,1975, as a first stage in 
accordance with the time-table outlined in the attached appendix. 
(8)- That the Cairo agreement and its appendices be implemented and adhered to in 
letter and in spirit with the guarantee of the Arab-League participating in the 
meeting, and that a committee to be set up consisting of representatives from 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Kuwait, to work in coordination with the 
president of the Republic of Lebanon with regard to the implementation of the 
Cairo agreement and its appendices, its term of office to be 90 days with effect 
from the date of the announcement of the cease-fire. 
(9)- That the PLO affirms its respect for Lebanon's sovereignty and security as well as 
its non-interference in the country's domestic affairs, out of its total committment 
to the Palestinian national issue. The Lebanese legitimate authority guarantee for 
the PLO, the safety of its presence and work on Lebanese territory within the 
framework of the Cairo agreement and its appendices. (132) 
In addition the resolution was accompanied by an appendix which set out in detail 
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the manner in which the resolution ought to be executed. This appendix was considered 
by the resolution itself as an integral part of iL(133) 
Of the many provisions in the annex, the most important are: the cessation of 
fighting in all Lebanese territories as from 6. a. m. on the 21st of October 1976 (A-Day) 
and the establishment of check points by the A. D. F after the creation of a buffer zone in 
areas of tension in order to consolidate the cease fire and the termination of 
fighting. 034) The rest of the annex provided a time table for the withdrawal of the 
troops and the collection of heavy weapons. It stipulated that the A. D. F forces should 
be formed with the agreement of the Lebanese president, and ordered the execution of 
the Cairo agreement and the exit of Palestinian forces that entered the country after the 
beginning of the civil war(135). Furthermore, the implementation of the agreement had 
to be completed within 45 days starting from the first day of the formation of 
A. D. F. 036) 
Therefore, the resolution of Riyadh, as shown above, was of great significance 
both to the character of the A. D. F and to the absence of any condemnation of the Syrian 
intervention. The Riyadh finding reversed the League's resolution of the 9th June 1976 
which clearly referred to the replacement of the Syrian troops. 
As such, one wonders whether or not the Six party summit wanted to legitimize the 
presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon. As a matter of fact, the Arab-League in its 
subsequent meeting in Cairo not only failed to condemn the Syrian intervention but 
secured their role under the banner of the Arab-League. Thus with the Riyadh 
Resolution the legal character of the Syrian forces has changed dramatically. 
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B-The changing legal character of the Syrian Forces under the new 
mandate 
Since the establishment of the Arab security forces to deal with the Lebanese civil 
war, the Syrian government made it clear that the presence of their forces in Lebanon 
was to carry out a specified purpose; stability and creation of a favorable political 
atmosphere for dialogue. (137) The Syrian government not only failed to observe that 
guideline, but directly through its military might, dealt a severe blow to the Leftist 
Forces. Consequently, the Arab-League seized the opportunity that was created by the 
Syrian intervention and proceeded to recognize the Syrian role in Lebanon as a decisive 
factor in maintaining stability and order. 
This attitude was clearly reflected in the new mandate of the Arab-League which 
failed to address the presence of the Syrian Forces in Lebanon and on the contrary 
secured their presence in the newly established force. The recognition of the Syrian 
forces as part of the A. D. F is a clear departure from the earlier mandate which required 
the replacement of the Syrian troops. This novelty of the mandate antagonized some 
Arab countries which protested at the accommodation of the Syrian Forces in the Arab- 
League peace keeping force. As a manifestation of their resentment of the mandate, they 
refused to endorse the Riyadh Resolution of 18th October 1976 (138) In particular, 
Iraq and Libya insisted on a full Syrian withdrawal, and if not possible, at least the 
limitation of the Syrian contingent to 10,000 soldiers. 039) However, their demand 
was obstructed by the elected Lebanese president who insisted that the Lebanese 
government was committed to welcoming the presence of Syrian Forces. He referred to 
the presence of Syrian tmops in Lebanon in his speech at the Riyadh summit by saying: 
" Lebanon has appealed to the Syrian army, entrusting it with the 
mission of securing order and maintaining stability, and such an 
appeal is based on the existing special relations between the two 
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countries: Lebanon and Syria. It is natural that the Syrian Forces [ 
which means the forces that already exist in Lebanon] should have a 
leading role in the Arab Deterrent Force. And these force must be 
under the control and direction of the Lebanese government which 
has an exclusive right regarding the number, operation and 
duration". 040) 
The kind of leading role that the Syrian forces should play in the newly forined 
peace-keeping force was the centre of discussion at the Riyadh summit. The Palestinian 
leader Yassar Arafat was very anxious to limit the Syrian role since he believed that the 
Syrian government was behind the defeat which he endured. He insisted that the Syrian 
participation, if not to be ruled out altogether, must be limited in size to the number of 
other Arab contingents and the control of the forces must be under the authority of the 
Arab-league. (141) Interestingly, the Syrian president responded to Arafat's claim by 
drawing the attention of the Arab leaders to the danger of Arafat's proposal: 
" What the Palestinian leader Yassar Arafat is asking for, is the 
disappearance of the Lebanese government. He wants to nullify the 
Lebanese government's right, in the application of the Cairo 
agreement, and transferring it to the Arab-League. This is a violation 
of a sovereignty of an Arab state which has never taken place 
before. It is illogical to build an authority over the authority of the 
Lebanese government. And it is unfamiliar to empower the Arab- 
League with the right of veto and supervision regarding every order 
that the Lebanese president might issue". 042) 
The Lebanese president embraced the Syrian interpretation of the Lebanese right to 
hold control over the Arab forces as he drew the attention of heads of Arab states to the 
inherent danger of the proposal in putting the force under the authority of the Arab- 
league. He specifically affinned that: 
"I cannot accept the stationing of troops on Lebanese soil unless it is 
under my command, .... and I don't need any authorization from 
anyone whenever I direct the Force"(143) 
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As the leaders felt unable to find a formula between the Palestinian and the 
Lebanese demands backed by the Syrian president, the Egyptian delegate proposed a 
compromise which was accepted by the said parties. The compromise conceeded to the 
Lebanese demand and allayed the fear of the Palestinian leader by establishing a 
commission composed of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and Syria to supervise and 
assist the Lebanese government and the PLO in application of the Cairo 
agreement. (144) 
Following the aforementioned compromise, the parties at the Riyadh conference 
overcame the stumbling block and agreed on the establishment of the A. D. F with 
Syrian participation. It is of significance to mention that the Lebanese parties were not 
invited nor consulted by the Riyadh summit. The Riyadh summit was fully pre- 
occupied with the salvation of the Palestinian Resistance, the internal causes of 
Lebanese conflict and the demand of the Lebanese parties , presumably excluded from 
the discussion. However, both parties to the conflict, the LNM and LF although 
voicing their criticism, neverthel ess accepted the Resolution. (145) 
Later, at the Arab-League summit in Cairo on October 25th/26th 1976, the 
Resolution of the Riyadh summit was formally endorsed by the League. (146) 
However, the issue of Syrian participation was raised again as pressure was increased 
to limit the Syrian participation. Again, the Palestinian leader demanded Egyptian 
participation in the force and if possible the PLO participation as well, as a mean of 
reducing the fear of the LNM. 
(147) However, the Palestinian participation was utterly 
rejected by the Lebanese government, and Egypt was also reluctant to commit troops to 
the A. D. F. As to the size of Syrian participation, the leaders failed to reach a 
compromise and thus, they assigned the task to the Arab Foreign Nfinisters on the night 
of 25th October. However, neither the foreign ministers nor the private talks amongst 
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Arab leaders succeeded in producing an understanding on that issue. (148) As a 
solution to the impasse the Secretary General M. Riyad suggested that the size of the 
force would be left to the Lebanese president who would have ultimate power in this 
regard. (149) 
'Merefore, the presence of the Syrian forces was left to the Lebanese president who 
owed his presidential post to the Syrian effort. Not surprisingly, the A. D. F turned out 
to be composed of twenty thousand Syrian soldiers out of the total force which account 
for thirty thousands soldiers. (150) By integrating the intervening Syrian forces into the 
A. D. F, the illegal presence of the Syrian troops was transformed into a legitimate one. 
Not only that, the Cairo meeting had the benefit of propping up the Syrian regime as the 
resolution of Cairo eased the financial burden that the Syrian forces bore in their 
intervention of Lebanon. Ile resolution specified the establishment of a special fund to 
cover the expenses of the force which was in practice the Syrian forces, and the fund 
would be paid by Arab states. Moreover, the supervision of the fund was to be 
assigned to the Lebanese president who after consultation with the Secretary General of 
the Arab_League and Arab states would issue the necessary regulation concerning 
expenditure; and the fund would remain for six months renewable by the Arab-league 
council upon the request of the Lebanese president. 0 5 1) 
Therefore, with the new mandate of the Arab Uague, the Syrian forces were no 
longer an occupying force but an Arab peace keeping force designed to restore order 
and stability. It is quite an unusual practice, although there is a precedent in the 
Dominican Republic where the legality of U. S. A intervention was subject to great 
controversy. The benefit which the Syrian government has gained from the changing 
legal character is very important and a quick comparison between the A. S X and A. D. F 
will show the difference. 
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C- Comparison between the A. S. F and the A. D. F 
As noted above, the new mandate was marked by a clear departure from the 9th 
June 1976 resolution. The effect of the new mandate was significant since it 
transformed the Syrian forces into a peace keeping force. Of particular importance was 
the power that the mandate gave to the A. D. F. which was permitted to use force to 
prevent the occurrence of civil war and to restore order and security. These powers 
were absent in the mandate of the A. S. F. This contrast between the two forces 
precipitated the question as to whether or not the ADY was a genuine peace-keeping 
force. 
As a matter of fact there is no strict rule that determines exclusively the type or 
model that a peace keeping force should adhere to. However, the practice of the U. N in 
this field sheds some light on the issue. 'Me Secretary General of the United Nation in 
his final report on the plan for setting up an Emergency Force identified three types of 
peace keeping: "An emergency international United Nations Force can be developed on 
the basis of three different concepts: 
It can, in the first place, be set up on the basis of principles reflected in the 
constitution of the United Nations itself. This would mean that its chief responsible 
officer should be appointed by the United Nations, and that he, in his function, should 
be responsible ultimately to the General Assembly and/or*the Security Council. His 
authority should be so defined as to make him fully independent of the policies of any 
nation. His relations to the Secretary General of the United Nations should correspond 
to those of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; 
A second possibility is that the United Nations charge a country, or a group of 
countries, with the responsibility to provide independently for an emergency 
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international force serving for purposes determined by the United Nations. In this case 
it would obviously be impossible to achieve the same independence in relation to 
national policies as would be established through the first approach; 
Finally, as a third possibility, an emergency international force may be set up in 
agreement among a group of nations, later to be brought into an appropriate relationship 
to the United Nations. 'Ibis approach is open to the same reservation as the second one, 
and possibly others". 052) However, this specification does not exclude other types of 
United Nations peace keeping as, "variation of forms, of course, are possible within a 
wide range, but the three concepts mentioned seem to circumscribe the problem". 053) 
The report proceeded to mention that the first type was used for the UNEF in 1956 and 
the second one was utilized in Korea and there was no utilization of the last type. (154) 
In the case of the A. S. F., the Force was based on the first model of the Secretary 
General's report. Therefore, the force was established on the basis of the Arab-League 
and its command was in the hands of the Secretary General of the Arab-League. (155) It 
needs to be mentioned that the A. S. F was not coercive in character, and the Syrian role 
was at its lowest level, not to mention the insistence on the replacement of the Syrian 
forces. Therefore, the A-S. F was a peaceful and impartial force directly controlled by 
the League. 
In contrast the A. D. F was completely lacking in these characteristics, as the Force 
was neither under the command of the League nor was it impartial. The Syrian forces 
composed the bulk of the force and hence their wide mandate with the power to use 
force to prevent civil war, brings into doubt the peaceful character and impartiality of 
the A. D. F. However, what the A. D. F does share with its predecessor is the consent of 
the Lebanese state. Newly elected President Sarkis consented to the establishment and 
presence of the force. As such it is doubtful that the A. D. F in its present form could be 
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properly viewed as a peace-keeping force. It is questionable, indeed, that an illegal 
intervention could be transformed into a legal presence. It is quite hard to separate the 
requirements that the peace keeping force ought to respect, and the reality that 
manifested in the composition of the A. S. F. To clarify the matter it is worth 
mentioning a remark made by the Secretary General Hammarskjold's remark pertaining 
to the ONUC operation in the Congo: 
"The Force is .... not under the orders of the 
Government nor can it, 
as I pointed out in my statement to the Council, be permitted to 
become a party to any internal conflict. A departure from this 
principle would seriously endanger the impartiality of the United 
Nations and of the operation". 056) 
If it is so, then how could one reconcile the presence of the Syrian army in the 
A. D. F. with such a dominant role with the Secretary General's remark. Moreover, the 
A. D. F. was under the order of the Lebanese president whose presidency was 
vigorously supported by the Syrian government and against the wishes of the LNM. 
As such, it is very doubtful that the Force could be called a peace-keeping force since it 
was a Syrian force under a new name. How this force which was fighting the Leftist 
forces for around six months could be expected to forget its interest and hatred and act 
as an impartial force is quite puzzling. Despite all of that the force was widely 
recognized as a peace-keeping force and welcomed by every state. Such a recognition 
undoubtedly had the effect of setting a precedent which is very dangerous to 
accommodate in the corpus of a peace- keeping force. For such a precedent would 
ultimately change the basis of peace keeping and at the same time would encourage a 
powerful state to break the law in the name of law. If the A. D. F is not compatible with 
the conventional type of peace keeping force, then one wonders whether or not the 
A. D. F. is compatible with the United Nations Charter and if not then why did the 
A. D. F find its way into existence ? 
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VI-Compatibility Of The Arab Deterrent Force With The United Nations 
Charter 
A- Introduction 
The formation of the A. D. F, with the wide and coercive character of its Mandate, 
necessitates an overall examination of its legality , and in the light of that, to see to what 
extent the mandate of the force was consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. 
Although the Charter qualified a regional organization like the Arab-League to take the 
necessary action to maintain peace and security in any regional conflict, nevertheless the 
Charter by virtue of Article 52 affirms that: 
"Nothing in the present charter precludes the existence of a regional 
arrangement or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for 
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and - 
their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations". 057) 
In addition, the Charter has imposed some limitation on the freedom of the Regional 
organization in matters relating to enforcement measures. Article 53 (1) reads: 
"No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements 
or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security 
Council.. ". (158) 
Therefore, the charter determined clearly that regional organization are duty-bound 
to observe the conditions set out by the Charter ; the action must not be inconsistent 
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and no enforcement 
action shall be taken without the prior authorization of the Security Council. 
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As far as the Arab-League action is concerned, the prevailing belief is that the action 
was not contrary to the above conditions. It was argued that the action was consistent 
with purposes and principles of the Charter and there was no enforcement action on its 
part. Therefore, the purpose of this following section is to analyise the extent to which 
this allegation or assumption is true. 
B- The A. D. F. and the question of Enforcement Measure. 
The legal character of the Arab Deterrent Force (A. D. F) is beyond any doubt 
coercive. It was empowered to use force to prevent the civil war and deter any potential 
violator. The coercive character of the force is explicitly recognizable from the title 
which it bears. The term Deterrent, which in Arabic is, 'Al Radae', means furnishing 
unlimited power in order to deter and consequently force compliance with the action 
recommended. Despite its obvious character, one leading authority on the Arab-League 
maintained: 
"It must be emphasized that in spite of the transformation of the 
force-in size, level of equipment, scope of mandate and pattern of 
supervision- it's basic nature is to assist the legal authorities in 
Lebanon in restoring peace and security in the country". (159) 
This statement is not conclusive and failed to grasp the distinction between the 
conventional type of peace keeping and the type that involved an enforcement action. 
By ignoring that distinction, however, one tends to narrow the gap between two 
distinct categories, peaceful measures and enforcement action. It seems that it is not 
only the authority which holds such a view, but another writer adhered to that 
description. 060) In support of his view, Poganyjustified his conclusion by relying on 
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the reasoning of the International Court of Justice in Certain Expenses cases, as the 
court reached its verdict on the ground that the action of the ONUC was not directed 
against any state. The court made a distinction between the use of force as a sanction 
and the use of force to maintain law and order. (161) And since the force was not a 
sanction but to preserve law and order, the ONUC action was not an enforcement 
measure. By the same analogy, Pogany asserted that the A. D. F was deployed to assist 
the Lebanese government in restoring security and peace, as was the case in the Congo, 
and it is not true to say that the A. D. F. " was mandated to use force as a sanction in the 
sense of Article 42 of the Charter" but in the " view of the finding of the court.... it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the Arab Deterrent Force was also a peace keeping 
operation". 0 62) 
Following this argument, and since it is entirely based on the ON'LJC analogy, a re- 
examination of the United Nation action in the Congo is imperative. The rationale for 
this re-examination lies in the belief that the action of the ONUC was an enforcement 
measure under Chapter VII of the U. N Charter. However, in proving this, the 
A. D. F's action would no longer be regarded as a peace-keeping measure, but as an 
enforcement action. 
As far the ONUC action was concerned a spectrum of different opinions ensued in 
the wake of its controversial action in the Congo. However, it was suggested that 
collective measures that is to say an enforcement action has its own description. It has 
dme ingredients or factors: 
(I)- Application of tangible pressure; 
(2)- Perforrnance by the United Nations; 
(3)- Application to a situation constituting a threat to international peace, breach of 
peace or act of aggression. 
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As such, it would be a collective measure which is defined in Article 1 (1) and Chapter 
VH of the Charter. (163) 
Viewing the ONUC operation from such a perspective the issue would become 
more distinct and clear, since the nature of the operation could be determined by its 
objectives and characteristics. 71he ONUC deployment in the Congo was in pursuit of 
the Security Council Resolution of 14 July 1960 following the request of the Congolese 
govemment. 064) The Security Council entrusted the Secretary General with the task 
of providing the military help that the government needed until such a time when the 
government could use its own resources in preserving security and order. The 
Secretary General in explaining the legal basis of the Force, referred to two factors: the 
consent of the Congolese government and the threat to international peace. 065) 
However, subsequent events suggested that the consent was not of much significance 
as the issue was equated to the threat to international peace. The Secretary General in 
his reply to the Congolese government which demanded the United Nations troops to 
refi-ain from entering the Matadi territory maintained that: 
" We are, of course, strongly aware of the fact that the initial action 
of the United Nations was undertaken in response to a request of the 
Government of the Republic of the Congo. But I am certain that 
you, on your side, are also aware of the fact that this action was 
taken because it was considered necessary in view of an existing 
threat to international peace and security. Thus, in its resolution of 
22 July 1960, and subsequent resolutions, the Security Council 
expressly linked the maintenance of law and order in the Congo to 
the maintenance of International peace and security, and made it 
clear that the primary basis of the Security Council decision was the 
maintenance of International peace and security. ... The relation 
between the United Nations and the Government of the Congo is not 
merely a contractual relationship in which the Republic can impose 
its conditions as host State and thereby determine the circumstances 
under which the United Nations operates. It is rather a relationship 
governed by a mandatory decision of the Security Council. The 
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consequence of this is that no Government, including the host 
Government, can by unilateral action determine how measures taken 
by the Security Council in this context should be carried out. Such a 
determination can be made only by the Security Council itself. "(166) 
Therefore, the Secretary General Acknowledged that in matters threatening 
international peace, such as in the Congo, the consent of the government regarding the 
Force is insignificant. That acknowledgment may strengthen the fact that the Force was 
implicitly considered as a collective measure under Chapter (VII) of the United Nations 
Charter. (167) The insistence, however, that the Force was not as stated above is likely 
to be attributable to the theory which" regards collective measures as limited to positive 
'enforcemenf actions directed against states or other political entities; an operation with 
the characteristics of ONUC would be excluded". (168) The subsequent events and the 
resolutions of the Security Council have demonstrated clearly that the ONUC was 
authorized to use force in order to execute its mandate. The Security Council Resolution 
of February 21,1961, which was passed after the killing of Prime Minister Lumumba, 
authorized the ONUC to use force by declaring that: "the United Nations take 
immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the 
Congo, including arrangement for cease-fire, the halting of all military operations, the 
prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort". Moreover, 
the Resolution expressed concern " at the grave repercussions of these crimes and the 
danger of wide-spread civil war and bloodshed in the Congo and the threat to 
international peace and security, ". In such a context, it becomes clear that the Security 
Council is referring to article (39), though refraining from spelling it out explicitly and 
at the same time enlarging the spectrum of the use of force to go beyond the concept of 
self- defence. However, despite that evidence there are some authorities who constantly 
affirmed that " While in Resolution S/4741 The Council now spoke of a' threat to 
international peace and security' (employing the language of Chapter VII there is still no 
evidence that the ONUC had embarked upon enforcement action,,. (169) Higgins 
proceeded to defend the view that the U. N action was not an enforcement measure by 
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referring to Article 2 (7) which could no longer be operative if an enforcement measure 
was taken. She confidently confirmed that: 
"there is ample evidence that the U. N still regards itself as being 
bound by the domestic jurisdiction requirement: it could not 
enforcibly end the secession of Katanga". (170) 
It is quite puzzling to see that the action of the U. N is perceived as such since the 
mere action on the part of the United Nations is indicative of the fact that the situation is 
no longer within the domestic jurisdiction of the state; as the premise of the U. N 
measure was the concern for world peace. 071) The explanation by the Secretary 
General that the United Nation troops' action in the Congo was based upon the forces' 
right of free movement and maintaining public order(172) is quite controversial. 
Commenting on the action of the ONUC under the right to free movement, Mona 
asserted that : 
"The United Nations does not have freedom of movement if one of 
the parties can stop United Nations troops at will, but if the troops 
move in the face of such opposition, firing back if fired upon, they 
are in effect imposing a United Nations policy against whatever 
force is resisting them. The operation is consensual but 
coercive". (173) 
Therefore, the action cannot be justified as self defence, since the U. N troops took 
the initiative and moved in despite the reluctance of the opposition. Even Bowett, 
considered the action to be beyond the boundary of self defence but again he reconciled 
the action with the right of the force to freedom of movernent. 074) However, if one 
accepts the argument that freedom of movement permitted such action, what would 
remain of the principle of domestic jurisdiction since the force under the guise of 
freedom of movement puts an end to the secession ? 
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Despite his consistent assurances that the ONUC was not employed to regulate the 
internal political affairs, the Secretary General in his annual report on 16 June 1963, 
made it clear that the operation in Congo was to preserve the "territorial integrity of the 
country, and to prevent civil war ... while sparing no effort to achieve a peaceful 
solution... it did what it could .. to prevent the attempted secession 
from becoming an 
accomplished fact ... The United Nations operation thwarted the 
Katanga secessionist's 
effort". 075) Therefore, it is an inappropriate finding to perceive the action as a 
peaceful resolution since the purpose was to eliminate by force the secessionist 
movement and at the same time, it could be argued that the mere elimination of that 
movement would give rise to an enforcement action which only by it, could the United 
Nations escape the restriction imposed by article 2(7). 
As to the finding of the ICJ, that the action was not under Chapter (VII) of the 
United Nations Charter, it is the opinion of the present writer that the court finding was 
inadequate. To apply the Halderman technique of drawing a comparison between the 
constitutional basis of the UNEF and ONUC, the issue would become clear and far 
from confused. The ICJ in the Expenses case did not hestitate to identify the status of 
the UNEF by coming to the conclusion that it was a manifestation of a" peaceful 
settlement" and hence the court took the task of identifying the specific provision of the 
Charter pertaining to the peaceful settlement viz Article 11 (2) and 14 (176) In the case 
of the ONUC the court failed to identify the status of the force but maintained that the 
ONUC operation was not an enforcement action. The court's restrictive interpretation 
of the enforcement measure was clearly declared: 
It can be said that the operation of the ONUC did not include a use 
of armed force against a state which the Security Council, under 
Article 39, determined to have committed an act of aggression or to 
have breached the peace. The armed forces which were utilized in 
the Congo were not authorized to take military action against any 
State. The operation did not involve preventive or enforcement 
measure's against any state under Chapter (VH) and therefore did 
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not constitute 'action' as that term is used in Article II". (l 77) 
The failure of the court to specify the provision under which the action was taken, 
as it did in the case of UNEF, is attributable to the fact that " Having excluded the 
'collective measures' concept, the concurring Judges were unable to find a category of 
United Nations activity within which it could satisfactorily be placed". (178) Given this 
fact, one can assert that under Chapter VII the ONUC was established and was 
thereafter authorized to use force to prevent the civil war, arrest and expulsion of 
mercenaries from the Congo, and moreover engaged in combat without obtaining the 
consent fi-om the government in both areas: Matadi and Katanga. (179) The insistence of 
the Officials of the U. N, and not to mention the ICJ finding that the action was a 
peaceful settlement despite the aforementioned characteristic of the force, would only 
have the effect of eliminating or breaking down the barrier between the two categories: 
peaceful settlement and enforcement action. (180) Judge Koretsky in his dissenting 
opinion asserted that the ONUC action was an enforcement measure and he affirmed 
that the United Nations force " had grown into an army numbering many thousands " 
and their task in the Congo was not " to persuade or parade, but to carry out a military 
operation". 0 8 1) 
Thus, if the case was as such, then why did the Secretary General prefer to take 
such a course of action since it had the power to take an enforcement action? Many 
suggested, infact, that a practical consideration was the motivating power behind the 
Council's decision. It was suggested that if the Secretary General had acted under 
Chapter (VII), he would certainly have applied Article 42 and with it states which were 
contributing troops to the force would be aware of the implication of the decision. 082) 
Such states would be more reluctant to furnish troops and material for defined and 
restricted objectives. 0 83) Giving the partisan relationship between the internal factions 
and external states in the Congo where the latter provided assistance to their clients, an 
action under an enforcement measures would also be hard to reach in such a setting 
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where the political interest played a major role in the state's decision. 0 84) 
Whatever the merit of justification might be, the ONUC action as demonstrated, 
was an enforcement action. However, the insistence that the action was not directed 
against any state is untenable, since the action applied the three factors: tangible 
pressure, enforcement by the U. N, and application to a situation which constitutes a 
threat to international peace. The claim that the action was not directed against any state 
as is required in the case of enforcement action(185) is not conclusive. It is not 
necessarily that the action ought to be directed against a state to be qualified as an 
enforcement action. Kelsen affirmed that enforcement action need not necessarily be 
directed against the state but it could be against a" group of the population not having 
the character of a state". 086) Judge Koretsky, questioned the legitimacy of that 
interpretation by saying: 
" What is the basis for such an interpretation ? If we turn to the first 
Article of Chapter (VIII) Le to Article 39, we are unable to find there 
any direct reference to the fact that the measures which, as directed 
by the Security Council shall be taken ... to maintain or restore 
international peace and security should be directed against any of the 
states -, (187) 
Moreover, it was said that although Ka=ga is not a sovereign state, as was stated 
in the Resolution of 24th November 1986, nevertheless the Resolution cannot deprive it 
of the " capacity to constitute a'threat to the peace'or to commit a breach under Article 
39". (188) Even the Secretary General has dealt with the provisional government of 
Katanga in a way which implicitly implies a recognition of its de facto status. 0 89) 
Therefore if the action of the Security Council was undertaken to prevent a breach or 
threat to peace, and the consent of the state was in some aspect of the operation not 
adhered to on the ground that the action was initiated under the terms of breach of 
peace; and force was used on a massive scale which ended with the collapse of 
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secession, then one would ridicule himself by insisting that the action was a peaceful 
measure and not an enforcement action. 
Having established that the action of the ONUC was an enforcement measure, then 
the argument that the A. D. F. was a peace keeping force would collapse. The A. D. F 
was authorized to assist the government and prevent the occurence of civil war, to deter 
any violator, and to preserve security and order. However, the term to prevent civil 
war, and deter any violator requires the A. D. F to employ tangible pressure in case one 
of the parties refused to evacuate his position or surrender his weapon. The equipment 
of the force suggests that they were combat troops armed to the teeth, which enabled it 
to initiate an offensive attack. It is quite unreasonable to perceive a force armed with an 
offensive weapon, in a situation requiring them to be the messenger of peace, as a 
peace keeping force. Ile conventional type of peace keeping adheres to the notion that 
the weapon must be defensive in character, since the mission is peaceful and carrying 
defensive weapon is a measure of precaution to defend oneself if fired upon and not to 
initiate an attack. The weaponry of the A. D. F coupled with its wide mandate which 
gives the Force the right to collect weapons and move freely in any area they wish, 
gives the indication that the authors of the Force would have contemplated enforcement 
measures had the Force encountered resistance in implementing its mandate. This 
interpretation is not of an academic nature as the A. D. F in its operation used force on a 
massive scale. For an operation on such a large scale ought to be determined on " the 
basis of its actual practical consequences rather than upon the question of its form or the 
procedure by which it was initiated". (190) 
Therefore, as far as the A. D. F is concerned, the action which was taken by the 
Arab-League was an enforcement measure. Any view, contrary to that, would be 
unrealistic since the Force according to its mandate and action furnished irrevocable 
evidence of its coercive character. If it is such, then a second question has to be 
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answered: Was the Security Council informed by the Arab-League regarding, the 
enforcement action of the A. D. F? And if the answer was negative, then another 
question has to be answered as well: was the action in conformity with the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations Charter ?. 
C- Failure to comply with Article 53 (1) and 54 of the United Nations 
Charter 
Article 53 (1) of the United Nations Charter affirms that there is no enforcement 
action on the part of a regional organization in a matter relating to regional disputes 
unless it obtains the prior authorization of the Security Council. (191) In view of that, 
the Arab League action regarding the establishment of the A. D. F. as a peace keeping 
force failed to comply with the United Nations requiremen ts. The failure of the Arab- 
League to obtain the prior authorization could be explained by the conviction of the 
Arab League that the action undertaken by it was not an enforcement action. Such a 
conviction is not sound since the A. D. F had all the pre-requisites of an enforcement 
action. 
It was suggested by Pogany that the silence of the Council on the action of the 
Arab-League is indicative of the fact that the action was not an enforcement 
measure. (192) However, it might be contended that the failure of the Council to 
criticize the Arab-League for its non-compliance with Article 53 (1) cannot be 
interpreted as evidence of approval for that action. It could be that the Council's 
reluctance to criticize the Arab-League action in Lebanon was based on political, rather 
than legal considerations. After all, the Lebanese civil war was unique in its nature and 
posed a serious risk to international peace. 'Mis was demonstrated by the willingness of 
Syria to assert its interest and at the same time by Israel's commitment to prevent the 
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PLO and the LNM from establishing a radical state on its border. - Moreover, the crisis 
was sensitive for the super powers as well. The Soviet Union opposed the liquidation 
of the PLO and at the same time its prestige and interest were in the balance after the 
success of United States diplomacy in convincing Syria to weaken the Left coalition 
and maintain the status quo in Lebanon. In view of these factors, an Arab-League 
action would have reduced the danger by legitimizing the Syrian intervention and at the 
same time would have arrested the danger that might result from civil war. This holds 
true since the mere discussion of the case in the Security Council would have 
transformed the issue into a power bloc struggle and were the right of veto used, the 
danger would become real. Apart from that political reason, the claim that the failure to 
criticize the Arab-League by the Security Council is not quite valid on its own. This 
claim was advanced by the Legal adviser to the U. S. A. during the American 
intervention in the Dominican Republic and its subsequent incorporation in the regional 
peace keeping force under the banner of the O. A. S . He claimed that prior authorization 
of the Security Council was no longer necessary as the failure of the Security Council 
to " disapprove regional action amounts to authorization within the meaning of Article 
53,,. (193) The danger of that proposal is quite obvious. It opens the door to free action 
by the regional organization, since any superpower could make the Security Council 
fail to disapprove the action which was undertaken by the regional organization . 
Therefore, the Arab-league action was inconsistent with the requirements of Article 53. 
However, in view of the present circumstances, it could be argued that the Security 
Council's reluctance to criticize the Arab-League was motivated by that political reason 
rather than by any legal consideration. 
Similarily, the Arab League's position was no less clear regarding Article 54 of the 
Charter which stipulates that: 
"Ibe Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of 
activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional 
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arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of 
international peace and security". (194) 
Although there was muted criticism of the Arab-League's failure to report 
adequately to the Security Council(195), nevertheless the prevailing view is that 
practice indicates that the Security Council never protested against the failure to report; 
and hence compliance with that Article becomes optional. (196) However, this could be 
acceptable in matters relating to peaceful measures taken by a regional organization, and 
not by an enforcement action. The mere existence of Article 54 suggests that receiving 
infortnation from a regional organization is vital since the Council's authorization is 
required in the first place. It is unrealistic to assume that since the Council gave the 
required authorization, there was no need to follow up the action of the organization. 
Such an interpretation is not consistent with Article 53(l) which was inserted to affirm 
the superior authority of the Security Council in matters pertaining to the maintenance 
of peace and security. 
Therefore, the Arab-League action in Lebanon was an enforcement action and hence 
it failed to follow the requirements set out in Article 53(l) and 54. However, the silence 
of the Security Council pertaining to the need to obtain prior authorization as stipulated 
in Article 53 (1), can only be attributable to the political setting of the Lebanese civil 
war. 
D- Compatibility Of The Arab League Action With The Purposes And 
Principles Of The United Nations Charter. 
Articles 1 (1) and (2) of the United Nations Charter provide that: 
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Me purposes of the United Nations are: 
I- To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, 
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace; 
2- To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples, and to 
take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace". 097) 
According to Article 24 (2), the Security Council in discharging its duties, ought to 
do so in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. (198) Thus, the 
Security Council is not immune from those obligations, and its action has to be in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. It must follow, then, that 
the Arab League is embraced by the same limitation and thus its action must be in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Therefore, Arab-league action could be looked at as an attempt to meet the purpose set 
forth in Article 1 (1). 
To this end, it was suggested that the Arab-League action was to meet a threat to 
international peace. The Lebanese civil war, posed a real risk to the maintenance of 
peace in the region, following the Syrian intervention and Palestinian infiltration. 
However, this cannot be accepted, as Article 1 (1) stipulates that the removal of 
aggression is one of the ways in which the threat to international peace can be removed. 
In this regard, the Arab-League also demonstrated its willingness to see the replacement 
of the Syrian forces according to the 9th of June 1976 resolution, as was the case in 
Congo regarding the Belgium troops, but its endeavor was short of implementation. 
The refusal of the Syrians to withdraw prompted the League to abandon what is 
stipulated in Article 1; that is to say the removal of aggression as a pre-requisite to the 
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maintenance of international peace. In addition paragraph (2) of Article I speaks of the 
need for respect for the principle of self determination. 
Thus, Arab-League activities must not eliminate the right of the Lebanese people to 
self determination, and it is incumbent upon the League to refrain from the use of force, 
pressure or taking sides in the internal conflict. However, the reluctance of the League 
to recognise the interest of the Leftist forces was fully reflected in the Riyadh 
discussion which excludes the Lebanese belligerents. The recognition of the Lebanese 
president who was perceived by the Leftist Forces as a Syrian candidate and at the same 
time representing the Lebanese Front, suggests, that the League was interested in the 
maintenance of the status quo. That argument was cemented by the fact that the volatile 
subject at the conference of Riyadh was the Palestinian subject and the Lebanese 
problem was assigned to second place. The stress on the implementation of the Cairo 
agreement could be viewed as a vindication of the Lebanese Front's claim and a 
rejection of the case of the Leftist Forces. The League's decision to empower the 
president with the power to use the A. D. F was in direct agreement with the Rightest 
camp's position vis a vis the Left. It is worth mentioning, that the Secretary General in 
the case of the Congo refused to put the ONUC under the control of the government, 
for such a step would clearly have amounted to taking sides and at the same time 
preventing the people from deciding their own destiny. (199) The Arab-League, 
however took an unprecedented step and assigned to the president what the Secretary 
General would have considered a partial action and an interference in internal affairs. 
As a whole, the Arab-League action could be considered as an action designed to 
prevent a threat to international peace, but at the same time it fell short of removing the 
Syrian aggression as was stipulated in Article 1 (1). 'nie Arab-League action provided 
an atmosphere in which the Palestinian subject took priority over the reforms which 
was demanded by the LNM. Moreover, by putting the control of the A. D. F. under the 
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Lebanese president, (although proving to be theoretical), the League provided the latter 
with the power to impose any settlement against the opposition whose weapons, 
according to the League resolution, ought to be handed over to the A. D. F. Following 
this, one might contend that the League action prejudiced the right of the Lebanese 
people to restructure their political system as they wished. Despite the failure of the 
Arab-League to conform with the Charter of the United Nations, it escaped criticism 
and on the contrary its action was welcomed by every state. The inclusion of Syrian 
forces has warranted no criticism whatsoever save some Arab radical states. The 
absence of such criticism is not surprising, given the unique circumstances of the 
Lebanese civil war. What these circumstances are which permitted the Syrian forces to 
be admitted in the Peace Keeping Force, is the theme of the following section. 
VII- The effect of Arab politics on the formation of the A. D. F in 
Lebanon. 
The high number of Syrian troops participating in the A. D. F. confirmed that the 
force was, in practice, Syrian, while the presence of other contingents, was oiily 
theoretical. T'he structure of the A. D. F, however, in such a form roused suspicion 
concerning the validity of the regional Organization and its effectiveness in the 
prevention of aggression or in the maintenance of peace . The Syrian intervention in 
Lebanon and the subsequent formation of the A. D. F naturally reflected the fragility of 
the organization of the Arab League in meeting the danger of civil war. However, the 
Syrian case, arguably, could be seen as -a special case since the accentuated 
circumstances of the intervention qualified it as such. Ilese circumstances undoubtedly 
played a major role in cementing the Syrian position, and at the same time, contributed 
to what could be called pax Syrian'a in Lebanon. Bearing this in mind, the question 
concerning Syrian participation cannot be fully answered unless one grasps the political 
305 
reality that prevailed at the time of the Syrian intervention. Ilis can be done only by 
focussing on the regional and international setting at the time of intervention and the 
subsequent events that led to the formation of the A. D. F. 
On the regional level, the Arab world, at the time of, or shortly before the Syrian 
intervention, was divided on the issue of peace-talks between the Israelis and the 
Arabs. The Second Sinai disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel under the 
auspices of the United States, was the catalyst that contributed to the major division in 
the Arab world. Ile conservative regimes on one the hand, and the radical ones on the 
other, were striving to dominate the scene and to dictate their policies. Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan, in particular, supported the Egyptian policy which was positively blessed and 
supported by the United States, while radicals such as Iraq and Libya were opposing 
such an approachement. (200) Naturally, the'opposing sides thus found an outlet in the 
Lebanese civil war and their -struggle for supremacy persisted on the Lebanese battle 
field. 
In such a context, Syria found itself in a better bargaining position as both camps of 
Arabs wooed and solicited its support. The strength of the Syrian position was fully 
demonstrated when Syria refused to attend either meeting of the Arab League in 
October 1975 and May 1976 to discuss the Lebanese crisis. This was because the 
Syrian government had been financially lured by Libya in return for Syrian renunciation 
of the Egyptian- Saudi- American coalition. (201)'Tbus when Syria intervened against 
the Leftist forces in June 1976, Syria was aware of its powerful position, and hence its 
co-operation with the conservative Arab countries, helped it escape the wrath of Arab- 
world public opinion. The conservative governments were in favour of the status quo 
and the neutralization of the Palestinian and Lebanese radical groups. However, such a 
course could not be undertaken without risking stability at home, disrespect and the 
charge of conspiracy by Arab public opinion. By explicitly urging Syria, one could' 
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argue, to attend the Arab-League meeting in order to stop the bloodshed, and tacitly 
approving Syrian action, the conservative governments scored two goals with one 
strike: improving its image as the saviour of Palestinian and the Muslim Lebanese, and 
reaping stability and admiration at home. The reluctance of Saudi Arabia to send their 
troops during the summer of 1976, and their refusal to take drastic action to stop the 
Syrian intervention, if it meant any thing, was indicative of either their helplessness or 
approval. However, the financial support and the reconciliation between Egypt and 
Syria by the Saudi government, could only reflect their approval of Syrian action in 
Lebanon. However, unlimited freedom was not accorded to Syria in Lebanon. The total 
elimination of the moderate Palestinians, headed by the PLO leader Arafat, was not 
acceptable to the Saudi government, neither was the total domination of Lebanon. This 
was clearly reflected in the Riyadh summit where the Saudi government exerted 
enormous pressure on Syria to attend the summit and stop its military campaign against 
the Palestinian and Leftist Lebanese. During the summit, an Arab political compromise 
was worked out by which Syria would stop its attack on the Egyptian disengagement 
agreement and in return Egypt would acknowledge the Syrian influence in Lebanon but 
under the banner of Arab-League. (202) Syria and Egypt were the major players in the 
Arab world, and their agreement on the Lebanese issue was imperative, as the rest of 
Arab states, especially those who opposed the peace talks with Israel such as Iraq and 
Libya, were unable, because their geographical location denied them the opportunity to 
engage militarily in Lebanon, to influence the outcome. Consequently, the Syrian 
participation was agreed upon and met no serious opposition. 
On the international level, the Syrian government was, similar to its position on the 
regional level, in a comfortable Position. Both superpowers were seeldng and 
soliciting its support. The United States' initiative and its success was a severe blow to 
Soviet policy in the Middle East. The reason for the success of the American policy was 
coincidental as both the U. S. A and Syria were in favour of restricting the activities of 
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the Palestinians and the rise of LNM in Lebanon for different reasons. (203) The 
American approval helped Syria to push their arTny into Lebanon with the guarantee of 
no Israeli objection as both America and Israel considered the liquidation of the PLO as 
a bonus. (204) However, the Soviet Union was in an awkward position as the 
Egyptian authorities, once one of the major allies of the Soviet Union in the Nuddle 
East, distanced themselves from the Soviet Union and embraced the United States 
policies. It was the ultimate hope of the Soviet Union, following the Egyptian 
defection, to prevent further defection to the American camp. Faced with the choice 
between its two allies in Lebanon, namely the Leftist and Palestinians on one hand, and 
the Syrians on the other, the Soviet Union was reluctantly on the side of Syria. (205) 
After all, Syria was the only key element in the soviet Union policy in the Nfiddle East 
and with Syria, the Soviet Union could guarantee that there would be no settlement in 
the Israeli-Arab conflict without its participation. 
It is these international and regional setting which mainly contributed to the success 
of the Syrian intervention and consequently to its dominant role in the peace keeping 
force in Lebanon. During the performance of the A. S. F over the summer of 1976, both 
superpowers, were eager to praise the Syrian role in Lebanon. However the Soviet 
Union was very cautious and at one point criticised the Syrian's military action against 
the LNM and its Palestinian allies. Therefore, because of its delicate position, the 
Soviet Union was very pleased to see the establishment of the A. D. F with the 
acknowledgment of the Arafat leadership and, the dominant role of Syrian troops. 7Ibe 
Soviet news paper Pravda, signalled that trend when it said: 
"Lebanon is gradually returning to normal life ... already it is clear 
that the pan-Arab peace keeping force has accomplished its first 
objective- to stop the bloodshed in Lebanon.. ". (206) 
Similarly, the American decision-makers were very pleased as well with the Syrian 
role, as Kissenger in his testimony before Congress affirmed that: " It is quite possible 
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that as the situation in Lebanon is being resolved .. we can go back to the peace 
process. I believe that the events in Lebanon may have crystallized forces that may 
make a return to the NEddle East peace negotiations more hopeful". (207) Thus, there 
was no serious objection from any regional or international actors save the Iraqi 
government. However, the Iraqi objection was not of much importance due to its 
geographical location which hardly made it possible to disturb the process. With this in 
mind, the Syrian dominant role would become clearly explainable in term of politics 
and not law. Politically, Syria would be better qualified to supervise the implementation 
of the Riyadh and Cairo resolutions and to provide a deterrent reminder to the Leftist 
that they could no longer could rely on the outside world since their presence was 
legitimized both internationally and regionally. Equally, the Syrian participation in the 
A. D. F. saved the Soviet Union from a delicate and embarrassing situation, as they 
were now a part of the Arab-peace keeping force. Likewise, the American decision- 
makers appreciated the mission of Syrian forces in taming the PLO and Leftist forces 
and they had no objection so long as Syria kept within that limit and did not threaten 
Israel. 
Regarding the Arab states, the Syrian incorporation into the A. D. F was an 
acknowledgment of the compromise which guaranteed Syrian silence on the Egyptian 
agreement, and at the same time, brought Syrian action in Lebanon under the authority 
of the Arab_League. Moreover, as Syria suppressed the Leftist forces and tamed the 
PLO in Lebanon who might, at some stage, have posed a real danger to Arab 
conservative states by their revolutionary propaganda, there would be no reason on the 
part of Arab conservative states to object to the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon. 
For, the incorporation of Syrian troops in large number in the A. D. F, at least enabled 
the conservative states to exercise a kind of pressure through the institution of the 
League either through the finance of the force or legal cover. Together, all these 
reasons, paved the way for the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon. It is quite 
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important to note, that there was no discussion whatsoever about the legality of the 
Syrian intervention nor about Lebanese interests. Ile major issue was the protection of 
Palestinians and the process of peace talks between the Arabs and Israelis. In such a 
context, it becomes clear that the rule of law was of no importance and its real value 
was only in using it as a means to support any political decision by political leaders. 
Therefore, the Arab-League as a regional organization and an organ intended to protect 
the sovereignty and independence of Arab states, turned out to be a means of 
legitimizing the illegitimate so long as it concurred with the political leaders priorities. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
GENERAL CONCLUSION. 
The drastic changes that the international system has undergone since the Second 
World War contributed, in one way or another, to an unprecedented level of 
interventionist activities. Most of those interventions were undertaken by superpowers 
and powerful states against weak states. Ilose interventions were invariably justified 
on different grounds which conveyed the belief that such intervention was not against 
the norm of non-intervention. 
Intervention, with the passing of time, has become no longer confined to powerful 
states, but small states have also embraced it in order to impose their will on weak 
neighbours. In carrying out that intervention, small states resorted to the same type of 
rhetoric that was originally invoked by superpowers and powerful states. Ibis, in fact, 
was well demonstrated in the Lebanese civil war, in which a variety of foreign 
interventions were undertaken. 
The Lebanese civil war mainly emanated from the legacy of the French Mandate 
which left the Lebanese divided. The concentration of power in the hands of Christian 
Mornites caused bitterness and dissatisfaction among the rest of the sixteen 
communities in Lebanon. Another factor playing a role in accelerating the trend toward 
violence was the existence in Lebanon of Palestinian commandos and their guerrilla 
attacks against Israel. Arab states and Israel did not hesitate to use Lebanon as an 
alternative battle ground. Despite the existence of Palestinian commandos on Lebanese 
territory, the conflict was regarded as a civil war, since the Palestinian presence was 
legitimized by the Lebanese government under the Cairo Agreement. However, the 
Palestinian participation on a large scale in that civil war went far beyond the letter of 
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the Cairo Agreement. 
The Syrian intervention in that conflict, however, was the first foreign intervention 
in the Lebanese civil war and surpassed the traditional indirect assistance to one party or 
another. The Syrian government's justification overlapped with that of the superpower 
states', the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The first Syrian indirect 
intervention in response to the rebels' invitation was a clear departure from the classical 
rules of international law. It signified the readiness of a state to misuse the norm in 
order to bring legitimacy to its intervention. There were no rules that permitted a state 
to render direct support to rebel forces which embarked on overthrowing the legitimate 
government unless the rebels achieved the status of belligerency. The Lebanese rebels 
were far short of achieving that status. However, since states have full discretion in 
granting that status to any group or party to civil war, the application of rules becomes 
optional. 
Moreover the classical rules of international law , although regarded as outmoded 
and unresponsive to the changes that took place in the international system, are still 
operative so long as there are no rules to replace them. There is nothing inherently 
wrong with the rules in themselves, except for the absence of an impartial body to 
whom the determination of the status of parties would be assigned. The prevalence of 
subjectivity would in the long run undermine the legal function of the norm, as an 
objective standard for evaluating behaviour. That subjectivity was manifested again in 
the Syrian intervention in June 1976 under the triad of legal justifications. 
The intervention on humanitarian grounds was considered by the Syrian 
government as one of the bases upon which their intervention was undertaken. 
However, such intervention is highly controversial in international law. Despite its 
persistent invocation by various states and especially by the United States, many 
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writers deny the existence of such a rule. Humanitarian intervention, in contemporary 
international law, is not valid in the way it was thought to be in the nineteenth century, 
but it is still very hard to disregard it as irrelevant. The international recognition that the 
human rights issue has received in the present century highlights the view that states are 
no longer free to violate human rights. It is conceivable that humanitarian intervention 
could be undertaken in very limited and special circumstances in a situation where the 
violation of human rights (especially the right to life) is perpetrated on a massive scale 
which shocks the conscience of mankind. However, such intervention, if can ever been 
accepted, must be implemented in accordance with certain criteria: the exhaustion of 
peaceful means, proportionality, necessity, duration, disinterestedness. Those criteria 
were originally designed to prevent states from using that intervention as a cloak for 
self-interest. As far as the Syrian intervention is concerned, it was in violation of those 
criteria. 
Similarly, intervention by invitation represents a controversial issue in international 
law. It is recognised that a government could invite another nation to help whenever it 
faces difficulties. However, with the new development of international law, invitation 
is no longer perceived as an absolute right of a government. The emergence of the 
principle of self determination has influenced the concept of invitation greatly. Apart 
from that, an invitation, from the perspective of international law , to be regarded 
legally valid ought to be emanate from a government whose effective control of its 
territory is unquestionable. To accept an invitation from a government which had lost 
every power to control the population who opposed it with every means, clearly runs 
against the wishes of the peoples and their right to self-determination. The invitation of 
the Lebanese government was hypothetical , as there was no invitation according to 
factual records; even if such an invitation had been issued, it would have been against 
the rules of international law, since the Lebanese government exercised no effective 
control over its own territory. The Syrian insistence that they were invited by the 
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legitimate government has no legal validity according to the principle of effectiveness in 
international law. Similarly, the invitation was invalid under Lebanese constitutional 
law. Moreover, an invitation from a government, whose legitimacy was challenged by 
its own peoples, if ever accepted by a foreign government, would ultimately run against 
the principle of self-determination. 
The Syrian government did not miss the opportunity to point out that its 
intervention was in response to Lebanese wishes and desire. However, there are no 
legal grounds that permit a state to intervene in a civil conflict in order to promote the 
principle of self-determination. An acceptance of such a rule would prejudice the 
sovereignty of a state and run counter to recognized principles of inte mational law. 
Legitimizing such intervention would ultimately open the door to potential abuse and 
hence every foreign state would meddle in another state's affairs under the pretext of 
self-determination. The principle, although recognized as a legal principle of 
international law, has no effect in validating a foreign intervention in its name. In a civil 
war, parties to the conflict ought to settle their differences by themselves and any 
foreign intervention would ultimately prevent the operation of the principle of self- 
determination. Such interpretations were wholeheartedly embraced by the Syrian 
government throughout its pronouncement in the United Nation or through officials 
statements. As such, the Syrian intervention was running against its own interpretation 
of the law and, consequently, its intervention under the principle of self-determination 
becomes invalid. 
The only ground of legality with which the Syrian enjoyed some legitimacy was 
under the umbrella of the Arab-League. The Arab-League intervention in the conflict, 
although in the latter stage, had a great effect on the legality of the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon. By virtue of its legal personality as a regional organization which comprises 
Arab states, the League action in Lebanon was regarded as one of its main purposes 
and duties. The legality of the League action would, ultimately, contribute to the 
330 
legitimacy of the Syrian presence. In the first peace-keeping force, which was 
established in accordance with a conventional type of international peace keeping force 
to replace the Syrian forces, the League initiative suffered a set back in the face of 
Syrian's refusal to submit to the will of the Organization. The Syrian government 
consistent disregard of the League, and the obstruction of the Arab peace keeping 
operation over the summer of 1976, led to a new initiative by which the Syrian 
government was recognized as a major power in the newly established peace keeping 
force, namely the Arab Deterrent Force. The Arab Deterrent Force was regarded as a 
peace keeping force and not an enforcement action. However, the A. D. F action and its 
mandate pointed to a different conclusion. The Force bore all the characteristics of 
enforcement measures which as such, needed the prior authorization of the Security 
Council in accordance with Article 53 (1). Moreover, the Arab-League failed to comply 
with Article 54 which stipulates that all activities of the peace keeping force must be 
reported to the Security Council. In addition, the action that was undertaken by the 
League in fact halted the process of self-determination. 
In view of that, the Arab-League action manifestly served the Syrian interest in the 
long run. It contributed to the legitimacy which they desperately needed to justify their 
existence on Lebanese soil. Under the cover of A. S. F the Syrian forces destroyed the 
military apparatus of the Lebanese National Movement and enhanced the position of the 
rightist camp. Moreover, under the A. D. F the Syrians became the only power that had 
total supremacy in Lebanon. 
In general, the Syrian intervention, through its various stages, presented the major 
challenges to international law. The Syrian government, following the steps of 
superpowers states, furnished the usual and traditional justifications for their 
intervention. More interestingly, and in line with Monroe and Brezhnev Doctrine, they 
offered the doctrine of Arabism. Under such doctrines, Syria could intervene in 
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Lebanon which, is an Arab country, since the interest of all Arabs are the same. This 
argument hardly differs from American and Soviet justifications. Such an argument re- 
asserts the potential danger that can be exposed in civil war. It also affirms the 
disrespect that the norm of non-intervention has received. So long as the national 
interest is seen as vital, states tend to violate the norm of non-intervention under many 
pretexts. This readiness to intervene, by states, is a major defect of international law. 
International law has no power to influence states by means of coercion as is the case in 
domestic law. The only power it possesses is the moral one. Therefore, any attempt to 
modify the law to make it more responsive to the situation of a civil war, would 
ultimately suffer from the absence of a central authority and its coercive character. 
International law, in the absence of a central authority, could only be made effective 
through the willingness of national leaders to submit their case to the rule of law 
Instead of pursuing a short term goal of national interest, an observance of the law 
would in the long run serve their interest and the interest of the international community 
alike. 
Therefore, any proposal which might be introduced has to stress the importance of 
the role that a national leader has to play. In fact, many proposals have already been put 
forward by eminent writers to improve the quality of law into the situation of a civil 
war, and to minimize the danger that might emanate from it. However, most of these 
proposals, in the absence of a central authority, rely for their implementation 
exclusively on the national leaders. As such, the existing rules could have served well 
without any need for new proposals, if the national leaders had conceded that the rule 
of law has supremacy over the national interest. It is ultimately the decision-makers' 
responsibility in every country to facilitate the application of law, by refraining from 
breaking it. 
It is unrealistic to put forward a variety of proposals which are intended originally 
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to make the law effective, without urging the leadership of powerful states such as the 
United States and Soviet Union to abandon their damaging attitudes and approaches 
toward the norm of non-intervention. It is their behaviour that has encouraged small 
nations to break the law and offer the same justifications. More relevant is the need to 
look objectively and impartially at the issue of internal conflict. It is that conflict which 
is threatening peace and giving rise to the breaking of the law. Foreign states, especially 
powerful states, hold primary responsibility to encourage democratic procedures and 
economic reforms which are an essential ingredient of internal stability. By rendering 
no support to autocratic regimes, and exerting pressure on those regimes to change their 
undemocratic practices, civil conflict would become more rare. The elimination of that 
conflict would undoubtedly enhance the upholding of the law. 
In our present international system where the shadow of nuclear war still haunts 
every one, an internal conflict might turn out, through various foreign interventions to 
be the locus for a nuclear war. Therefore, it is not just a matter of improving the quality 
of law, rather of malcing the law preserve our existence and provide a bright future. 
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Resolution of the Arab League Council regarding the war in Lebanon. 
Cairo June 9.1970, 
In the course of its session, the Arab League Council considered the deteriorating situation 
in Lebanon and the bloody incidents that are taking place there and, and in the light of its 
responsibility to the Arab nation, resolves the fol. lowing: 
1- To thank the secretary general of the Arab League for his initiative in calling this 
extraordinary session to discuss this fateful issue. 
2- To call on all parties to cease fighting immediately and to consolidate such a cease-fire. 
3- To form a symbolic Arab security force under the supervision of the general secretary of 
the Arab League to maintain security and stability in Lebanon, which force should start to 
perform its task immediately, replacing the Syrian forces. The task of this Arab security 
force should be brought to an end if the president-elect of the republic of Lebanon so 
requests 
4- That a commission representing the League Council and consisting of the foreign 
minister of Bahrein, chairman of the session, the secretary of the Arab League and the 
heads of the Algerian and Libyan delegations, should be dispatched immediately to 
cooperate with the parties concerned in following up the situation and ensuring security and 
stabUity in Lebanon. 
5- The council calls on all the Lebanese parties to bring about comprehensive national 
conciliation under the auspices of the Lebanese president-elect, to ensure the maintenatice 
of the unity of the Lebanese people and the unity of their territory and the country's 
sovereignty, security and stability. 
6- To affimn Arab commitment to support the Palestine revolution and to protect it fi-orn all 
dangers, and to insure that it is provided with everything that can increase its strength and 
effectiveness. 
7- ne Council will remain in session to follow up the situation. 
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Statement Issued By Six-Party Arab Summit Conference Held in Riyadh. 
On the initiative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the state of Kuwait, a six party 
conference, attended by president Mohammed Anwar El Sadat of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt, president Hafez El Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic, president Elias Sarkis of the 
Lebanese Republic, Mr Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, 
His highness Sheikh Sabah AL Salem Al Sabah, Ruler of the state of Kuwait, and his 
Majesty King Khaled bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was held in 
Riyadh from 16 to 18 October 1976 to discuss the crisis in Lebanon, to consider ways of 
solving that crisis, and to agree on the steps necessary to halt the bloodshed in the country; 
it was agreed to resort to dialogue rather than fighting, to preserve the security, safety, 
independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, and further to safeguard Palestinian resistance 
as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
The conference recognized the national and historical commitment to enhancing the 
collective Arab role in such a way as to ensure the settlement of the situation in Lebanon 
and prevent any further outbreak of hostilities. 
The conference also recognized the need to transcend the attitude and negativism of the 
past, to move towards the future in a spirit of conciliation, peace and construction, to 
provide the guarantees necessary to ensure stability and normalcy in Lebanon, to preserve 
Lebanese political, economic and other institutions, to maintain Lebanese sovereignty, and 
to ensure the continuation of the Palestinian determination. 
The conference examined the situation in Lebanon and considered the measures and steps 
necessary to restore normalcy in that country within the context of the preservation of the 
country's sovereignty and independence, the solidarity of the Lebanese and Palestinian 
peoples, and the collective Arab guarantee of the foregoing. The Conference decided to 
declare a cease-fire and an end to the fighting, and pledged the full commitment of all 
parties to this agreement. 
The conference further decided to reinforce existing Arab security forces, so that thy might 
act as a deterrent force within Lebanon under the command of the president of Lebanon 
himself. 
The conference unanimously rejected the partition of Lebanon in any form, whether legally 
or in practice, expressly or implicitly; it also unanimously confirmed the obligation to 
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maintain the national unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon, as well as to prevent any 
form of interference in that country's internal affairs. 
T'he conference requested all Lebanese parties to engage in a political dialogue with the aim 
of achieving national reconciliation and establishing unity among the Lebanese people. 
Agreement was also reached on the implementation of the Cairo Agreement and its 
annexes, and the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization announced his full 
commitment to that Agreement. In that connection, the Conference decided to establish a 
committee consisting of representatives of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic 
of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the state Kuwait to ensure co-ordination with the 
president of Lebanon in respect of the implementation of the Cairo Agreement. The 
committeee's mandate will cover a period of 90 days, beginning on the date of the 
annuncement of the cease-fire. 
The conference affirmed its commitment to the decisions of the Seventh Arab Summit 
Conference held in Rabat declaring the palestine Liberation Organization the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestine people , pledging the full support of all member states of the 
Arab League to the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as their non-interference in 
the internal affairs of any Arab country. 
In that connection, the Conference affirmed that participating States would guarantee the 
security, unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. The Conference also discussed 
the question of reconstruction in Lebanon and the cost of removing the traces of the armed 
conflict and making good damage affecting both the Lebanese and the Palestinian peoples. 
Resolutions adopted by this Conference will be submitted to the full Arab Summit. 
Annex 
Resolution of the Six party Arab Summit Conference Held In Riyadh. 
The limited Arab Summit Conference, held in Riyadh from 16 to 18 October 1976, on the 
initiative of His Majesty King Khaled bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah, Ruler of the State of kuwait, 
Having reviewed the resolution adopted by the council of the League of Arab States at its 
extraordinary sessions on 8-10 June 1976, and 1 July 1976, and its session on 4 
September 1976, 
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Recognizing the national commitment to preserve the unity, security and sovereignty of 
Lebanon, to ensure the continuation of Palestinian resistance, as represented by the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, recognized by Rabat resolutions to be the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestine people and to increase the capacity of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization to resist threats to the existence of the Palestinian people , their right to self 
determination and their right to return to their national soil, 
Having faith in the unity of objective and destiny binding the two fraternal Lebanese and 
Palestine peoples and the impossibility of any contradiction of the interests between these 
two peoples, 
Determined to transcend the attitudes and negativism of the past, to face the future in a spirit 
of reconciliation, dialogue and co-operation, to accelerate the establishment of conditions 
and guarantees necessary to ensure stability and normalcy in Lebanon, to consolidate the 
political, economic and other institutions of Lebanon, and to enable the Palestine Liberation 
Organization to attain its national goals, 
Recognizing the positive and constructive spirit demonstrated by the leaders attending this 
Conference, a§ well as their sincere desire irrevocably and decisively to end the crisis in 
Lebanon and to overcome any disputes that might arise in the future, 
Decides the fbHowing: 
I- That all parties should definitively cease fire and terminate fighting in all Lebanese 
territories as from 6.00 arrL on 21 October 1976, and that they shall all be fully comn-dtted 
thereto 
2- 17hat existing Arab security forces should be expanded to 30.000 men so that they might 
become a deterrent force operating inside Lebanon under the personal command of the 
president of the Lebanese Republic with, inter alia, the following principal task: 
(a)- Ensuring observance of the cease fire and termination of hostilities, disengaging 
belligerent troops and deterring any violation of the agreement; 
(b) Implementing the Cairo Agreement and its annexes; 
(c) Maintaining internal security; 
(d) Supervising the withdrawal of armed troops to positions they held prior to 13 April 
1975 and removing all military installations in accordance with the schedule set out in the 
enclosed annex; 
(e) Supervising the collection of heavy weaponry such as artillery, mortars, rocket 
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launchers, armoured vehicles, etc. , by the parties concerned; 
(f) Assisting the Lebanese authorities when necessary with respect to taking over public 
utilities and institutions prior to their re-opening as well as guarding public military and 
civilian establishments; 
3- Ilat, as a first stage, the normal situation in Lebanon, as it existed prior to the incidents 
(i. e prior to 13 April 1975) will be restored in accordance with the schedule set out in the 
annex; 
4- Iliat the implementation of the Cairo Agreement and its annexes and the observation of 
the letter and spirit of their contents shall be guaranteed by the Arab states participating in 
the Conference; a committee is to be established, comprising representatives of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the 
State of Kuwait to ensure co-ordination with the president of Lebanon in respect of the 
implementation of the Cairo Agreement and its Annexes; the mandate of the said committee 
will cover a period of 90 days, beginning on the date of the announcement of the cease-fire; 
5- That the palestine Liberation Organization shall affirm its respect of the sovereignty and 
security of Lebanon, as well as its non-interference in Lebanese internal affairs, 
recognizing in this respect its full commitment to the national objectives of the Palestinian 
cause. For their part, the legitimate authorities in Lebanon shall, in accordance with the 
Cairo Agreement and its annexes, guarantee security to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization with respect to its presence and activities in Lebanese territory-, 
6- That the Arab States participating in the Conference pledge their respect for the 
sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Lebanon, as well as the unity of its people; 
7- that the Arab States participating in the Conference reaffirm their commitment to the 
decisions taken at the summit Conferences held in Algiers and Rabat to support and uphold 
Palestinian resistance, as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, and to 
respect the right of the Palestine people to use all means at their disposal in their struggle to 
recover their national rights; 
8- That with respect to information: 
(a) All publicity campaigns and psychological warfare by all parties should be stopped; 
(b) Information activities should be directed towards consolidating the termination of 
hostilities, establishing peace and promoting a spirit of co-operation and brotherhood on all 
sides; 
(c) Action should be taken to unify official inforrnation activities; 
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(9) That the attached Schedule concerning the implementation of these resolutions is to be 
considered an integral part of the resolution. 
Signed: 
Ruler of the State of Kuwait 
President of the Syrian Arab Republic 
Chaim= of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
President of the Lebanese Republic 
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt 
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Annex 
Schedule Regarding the Implementation Of The Resolution Of The Six- 
Party Summit Conference Held, In Riyadh From 16-18 October 1976 
1- Declaration of final cease-fix-e and termination of fighting in all Lebanese territories by all 
parties as from 6.00 a. m. on 21 October 1976 (D-Day). 
2- Establishment of check point by the deterrent security force after the creation of buffer 
zone in areas of tension in order to consolidate the cease-fire and the termination of 
fighting. 
3- Withdrawal of all armed troops, collection of heavy weaponry and removal of military 
installations in accordance with the following schedule: 
f-" Mount Lebanon: within five days (D-Day+5) kal 
(b) Southern Lebanon: within five days (D-Day+5) 
(c) Beirut and outskirts: within seven days (D-Day+7) 
(d) Northern Lebanon: within ten days (D-Day+10) 
4- Reopening of international highways: 
(a) The following international highways shall be reopened within five days (D-Days +5): 
Beirut/Al Masnaa 
BeiruVrripoli/the Borders 
BeiruVryre 
Bcirut/Sidori/Maýoyoun/Al Masnaa 
(b) Check points and patrols shall be established along unsafe routes, and shall consist of 
units from the deterrent security force as agreed by the parties concerned and the 
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commander of the said force. 
5- The legitimate Lebanese authorities shall take over public, military and civilian utilities 
and establishments: 
(a) after the removal of armed troops and non-employees, the Arab security force shall be 
assigned to guarding such utilities and establishment andfacilitating their operation by 
employees who shall begin work within 10 days (D-Day+10); 
(b) the utilities and establishment shall be handed over to an official central Lebanese 
commission which shall, in turn, be responsible for forming a sub-committee in each utility 
or establishment to make an inventory of its contents and to take over. 
6- Ile forces required to strengthen the Arab security force shall be formed in agreement 
with the president of the Lebanese Republic, and these forces shall arrive in Lebanon 
within two weeks (D-Day+15). 
7- As a second stage, the Cairo Agreement and its annexes shall be implemented, 
particularly those provisions concerning the existence of weapons and ammunition in 
refugee camps and the exit of those armed Palestinian forces that entered the country after 
the beginning of the incidents. The implementation of the agreement is to be completed 
within 45 days, beginning on the date of the formation of the Arab deterrent security force. 
Communique Concerning The First Extraordinary Session Of The Arab 
Summit Conference. 
Cairo, 25-26 October 1976 
The Kings and Heads of State of the League of Arab States met in Cairo in order to 
examine the crisis in Lebanon, to consider ways of solving it, to protect the security, 
sovereignty and unity of Lebanon, to safeguard Palestinian resistance as represented by the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, and to enhance Arab solidarity. 
They recognize the national and historical commitment to enhancing the collective Arab role 
in such a way as to ensure the settlement of the situation in Lebanon and to prevent any 
further outbreak of hostilities, to provide the guarantees necessary to ensure stability and 
normalcy, to preserve the political, economic and other institutions of Lebanon, to preserve 
the country's sovereignty and to ensure the continuation of Palestinian determination. 
They are convinced that the liberation of the Arab territories occupied by Israel and the 
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recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people, notably the right to return to their 
national soil and establish their own independent state, require the further strengthening of 
Arab solidarity, and the mobilization of Arab efforts and potential in the service of this great 
cause. 
They are aware of the need to help Lebanon overcome its crisis and reconstruct its 
economy, institutions and utilities in order to restore normal life and the country's effective 
role in the Arab economic domain. 
They have examined the present situation in Lebanon in the context of preserving Lebanese 
sovereignty and independence and ensuring the solidarity of the Lebanese and Palestinian 
peoples. 
They welcome the outcome of the Six-Party Arab summit Conference in Riyadh, and 
express their appreciation for its achievements with respect to promoting the settlement of 
the Lebanese crisis, and continuation of the Palestinian resistance and the further 
strengthening of Arab solidarity. The Conference decides to approve the resolutions of the 
Six-Party Arab summit Conference published on 18 October 1976. 
The Arab Kings and heads of state reaffirm their commitment to providing the necessary 
guarantees with respect to the consolidation of the cease fire announced at 6.00 a. m. on 21 
October 1976, the aim being to put and end to all forms of fighting in Lebanon, and to 
restore normal life there. They further reaffirm that the Arab Security force will be 
strengthened so that it might become a deterrent force operating inside Lebanon under the 
personal command of the President of Lebanon. 
They unanimously reject the partition of Lebanon in any form, whether legally or in 
practice, expressly or implicitly; they are also unanimous in their commitment to maintain 
Lebanon's national unity and territorial integrity, and to refrain from prejudicing the unity 
of its land or interfering in its internal affairs in any way. 
They have also examined with great attention the situation in Southern Lebanon, and are 
extremely concerned over the growing number of Israeli acts of aggression against 
Lebanese territory, particularly in the South, as well as over Israel's persistence in its 
aggressive expansionist policy in Arab territories. 
They further stress the importance of implementing the Cairo Agreement and its annexes, to 
which the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization has declared his full 
commitment. They have agreed on the formation of a committee comprising 
representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian 
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Arab Republic, and the State of Kuwait in order to ensure co-ordination. with the President 
of Lebanon in respect of the implementation of the Cairo Agreement; the committee's 
mandate will cover a period of 90 days beginning on the date of the announcement of the 
cease-fire. 
The Arab Kings and Heads of state reaffmn their commitment to the decisions of the 
Seventh Arab Summit Conference held at Rabat, decisions whereby the Palestine 
Liberation Organization was declared to be the sole legitimate representative of the people 
of Palestine, all Arab states belonging to the League of Arab States pledged their support 
for the Palestine Liberation Organization and undertook not to interfere in its affairs, and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization affirmed its policy of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of any Arab State. 
The Arab King and Head of states have agreed that Arab countries should contribute to the 
reconstructin of Lebanon to the removal of the traces of the armed conflict and to the 
making good of damage affecting the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, and for that 
purpose have agreed to extend urgent assistance to them. 
The Arab Kings and Heads of State have paid particular attention to the consolidation of 
Arab solidarity, this being the essential basis for the success of joint Arab action and for 
the realization of the Arab nation's objectives concerning liberation and development. In 
this respect they also reaffmn their full commitment to implementing the decisions of the 
Arab summit conferences and the council of the League of Arab states, particularly the 
Charter of Arab Solidarity issued by the Casablanca Summit Conference on 15 September 
1965 
They have studied with great concern the explosive situation in the occupied Arab 
territories, a situation caused by continued Israeli occupation, the increasing incidence of 
oppression, intimidation and expulsion, as well as the confiscation of land and the 
desecration of religious places, particularly the Al Ibrahimi Mosque; all of these measures 
are being applied by the occupying authorities in flagrant violation of the provision of 
international law and the Charter of the United Nations. 
They hail the steadfast Arab people in the occupied territories and their legitimate national 
struggle, and reaffirm the support of all Arab states. 
They call on all countries and peoples of the world to condemn and stand up against 
continuing Israeli aggression and to discontinue any dealings with Israel that might 
consolidate the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, or allow the continuation of 
oppressive Israeli measures directed against the population of these territories. 
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Resolution Adopted at the First Extraordinary Session of the Arab Summit 
Conference 
Cairo, 26 October 1976 
The king and Heads of State of the League of Arab States meeting from 25 to 26 October 
1976 at the quarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo, , 
Having examined the present situation in Lebanon and the outcome of the Six-Party Arab 
Summit Conference held in Riyadh, as announced on 18 October 1976, and having 
examined also the importance of further strengthening Arab solidarity. 
Decide the following. 
I- The situation in Leban n 
1- To approve the statement, resolutions and annexes, issued on 18 October 1976, by the 
Six-Party Arab Summit Conference held at Riyadh attached hereto; ( the Delegation of Iraq 
did not agree to this paragraph) 
2- That Arab States should, according to their individual capabilities, contribute to the 
reconstruction of Lebanon, and help meet the related material requirements in order to 
remove the traces of the armed conflict and make good damage affecting the Lebanese and 
Palestinian peoples; Arab States should also extend urgent assistance to the Lebanese 
government and to the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
IT- Further Strengthening of Arab Solidarity: 
To affirm the commitment of the Arab Kings and Heads of State to the relevant provisions 
of the resolutions adopted by Arab summit conferences and the Council of the League of 
Arab States, particularly the Charter of Arab Solidarity published in Casablanca on 15 
September 1965, and to take steps towards their immediate and full implementation. 
ITT- Financing *of Arab Security Forcps: 
ne Arab Summit Conference: 
With a view to providing the financial resources required to maintain the Arqab Security 
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forces in Lebanon, forces established in accordance with the second resolution adopted at 
the Riyadh Summit Conference, 
Having reviewed the relevant report of the Military Secretariat of the League of Arab States, 
Decides the Following: 
1- A special fund shall be set up to meet the requirements of the Arab security forces in 
Lebanon; 
2- Each member state of the League of Arab states shall contribute a certain percentage to 
the fund, to be determined by each state according to its capabilities; 
3- The president of the Republic of Lebanon shall supervise the fund, and, in consultation 
with the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States and those States contributing at 
least 10 per cent, shall work out general rules governing payments from the fund and its 
liquidation when its term expires; the present regulations for the Arab security force shall 
remain in effect until new regulations are drawn up; 
4- The fund shall be set up for a six month period renewable by a decision of the Council 
of the League of Arab States; the Council shall meet for this purpose at the request of the 
President of the Republic of Lebanon. 
IV-Renewal of the A1212pintment of the Secret=-Geneml of the League of Amb States. 
The Arab summit conference decides to renew the appointment of Mr. Mahmound Riad as 
Secretary-General of the League of Arab states for another term beginning at the end of his 
present term 
V-Special Resoludon: 
The Arab summit conference, holding its first extraordinary session in Cairo, having met in 
an atmosphere of brotherhood and concern with respect to the further sstrengthening of 
Arab solidarity and having successfully concluded its work is pleased to express its deep 
gratitude to the president, Government and people of the Arab Republic of Egypt, for 
hosting and welcoming the conference and providing for its success. The conference is 
also pleased to express its deep appreciation for the sincere efforts of President Mohamed 
Anwar El Sadat during preparations for the Conference for his wise chairmanship, which 
enabled the Conference to attain its objectives, and for his efforts towards the further 
strengthening of Arab solidarity. 
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The Cairo and Melkart Agreements: Regulation of PLO presence in 
The, Cairo Agreement. 3 November 1969. 
On Monday, 3 November 1969 the Lebanese delegation headed by Army Commander 
Emile Bustani and the PLO delegation headed by Yasser Arafat met in Cairo .... It was 
agreed to re-establish the Palestinian presence in Lebanon on the basis of : 
I- Ile right of Palestinians presently living in Lebanon to work, reside and move freely; 
2-The establishment of local committees from Palsestinians living in the camps to look after 
the interests of Palestinians there, in cooperation with the local authorities and within the 
context of Lebanese sovereignty; 
3-The presence of command centers for the Palestine Armed Struggle Command inside the 
camps to cooperate with the local authorities and guarantee good relations. These centers 
will handle arrangements for the carrying and regulations of arms within the camps, taking 
into account both Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian revolution; 
4- Permission for Palestinian residents in Lebanon to join the Palestinian revolution 
through armed struggle within the limits imposed by Lebaneie security and sovereignty. 
Commando Operati2n II 
It was agreed to facilitate operation by Palestinian commandos through: 
I- Assisting commando access to the border and the specification of access points and 
observations posts in the border region; 
2- Ensuring the use of the main road to the Arqub region; 
3- Control by the Palestine Armed Struggle command of the actions of all members of its 
organizations and to prevention of any interference in Lebanese affairs; 
4-The pursuit of mutual cooperation between the Palestine Armed Struggle Command and 
Lebanese army; 
5- An end to media campaigns by both sides; 
6- A census of the complement of the Palestine Armed Struggle corm-nand through its 
leadership; 
7- The appointment of representative of the Palestine Armed Struggle command to the 
Lebanese High Command, 
8- Study of the distribution of suitable concentration points in the border regions to the 
Lebanese High Comrnand, 
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9- organization of the entry, exit and movement of Palestine Armed Struggle elements; 
10- Abolition of the Jainoun base; 
11- Assistance by the Lebanese Army in the work of medical centers, and evacuation and 
supply for commando operations; 
12- Release of all internees and confiscated arms; 
13- Acceptance that the civil and military Lebanese authorities will continue to exercise 
effective responsibility to the full in all region of Lebanon and under all circumstances; 
14- Confirmation that the Palestine Armed struggle acts for the benefit of Lebanon as well 
as for all Arabs. 
The Melkart Agreement. 17 May 19 3. 
Both parties eagerly agree to serve the Palestinian cause and to continue its struggle, and to 
preserve the independence of Lebanon and its sovereignty and stability, and in the light of 
contracted agreements and Arab decisions, comprising: the Cairo agreement and all its 
annexes; agreement concluded between Lebanon and the leadership of the resistance forces; 
and decisions taken at the joint Arab Defence council; it was agreed on all points as follows 
Presence in the Camps of Personnel 
I- No commando presence; 
2- Formation of permanent Palestine Armed Struggle Command units; 
3- Confirmation of militia presence for the guarding and internal protection of the camps. 
By militia is understood Palestinians residing in the camps who are not members of the 
resistance force and who practice normal civilian duties; 
4- Establishment of a guardpost for Lebanese internal security forces at a location to'be 
agreed upon close to each camp. 
Presence in the Camps of Arms 
1- T'he militia will be permitted to carry light arms individually; 
2- No medium or heavy weapons will be permitted within the camps (e. g mortars, rocket 
launchers, artillery , anti-tank weapons, etc. ) 
Presence in the Border Regions 
I- Western sector presence and concentration outside the camps is forbidden 
2- Central sector According to agreements made at the meeting between the Lebanese High 
Command and the resistance forces leadership in 8 October 1972: Presence will be 
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permitted outside Lebanese village in certain areas by agreement with the local Lebanese 
sector commander. Resistance forces are not permitted east and south of the line running 
Al-Kusair/Al-Ghandouriya/Deir Kifa/ Al-OShihabia/ Qana., This prohibition applies to all 
these points inclusively. Concentration of resistance forces at a guardpost south of Hadatha 
is permitted. The number allowed is between five and ten men in civilian clothes, with all 
military appearance to be avoided. They will be supplied by animal transport. At all these 
places the total number permitted must not exceed 250. 
3- Eastern sector: According to decisions taken by the Lebanese 11igh Command and the 
resistance forces leadership, three bases will be permitted in the Southern Arqub at Abu 
Kamha Al- kharbiya ( AI-Shahid Salah base) and Rashaya AL Fakhar (Jabal Al Shahr). 
Each base will contain no more than 30 to 35 men each. Supply for these bases will be by 
motor-transport. Elements at these bases will be forbidden to proceed in the direction of 
Maijayoun unless they have a permit. The carrying of arms in Maijayoun is forbidden. In 
the northern Arqub and at Tashaya al Wadi, presence is permitted at a distance from the 
villages, but not west of the Masnaa-Hasbaya road. At Ballbeck no commando presence is 
permitted except at the Nabi Sbat training base. 
Note: Medium and light arms are permitted in these sectors; commando presence inside 
Lebanese villages is not allowed; all units which have been reinforced in Lebanon from 
abroad will be adjusted. 
Movement. in the Camps 
Movement will be allowed without arms and in civilian dress. 
Movement in the Frontier areas 
Movement will be allowed by arrangement with local Lebanese commanders and according 
to agreement. 
Movement of Civilian and Military Leaders 
Military leaders will be allowed to move freely provided they are above the rank of 
lieutenant, carrying no more than a personnel weapon and are accompanied by a driver 
only. Civilian leaders will be supplied with numbered permits signed by the responsible 
joint liaison committee. The number of permits issued to area leadership will be determined 
by the Lebanese Liaison centre and supplied under the request of the Palestinian Political 
Committee in Lebanon. 
Military Training 
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Military training is forbidden in the camps but allowed at the training base at Nabi Sbat. 
Technical military training is permitted at points to be agreed upon by arrangement with the 
Lebanese High Command liaison centre. Practicing with arms is forbidden outside the 
maining base. 
Operation 
All Commando operation from Lebanese territory are suspended according to the decision 
of the Joint Arab Defence Council. Departure from Lebanon for the purpose of commando 
operation is forbidden. 
Command 
The Palestinian side reaffirm that the chief command base is Damascus, and that the 
Damascus office has representatives in other countries including Lebanon. Ile Palestinian 
side pledged to reduce the number of offices in Lebanon. 
Informations 
Ile Palestinian side affirmed that the resistance in Lebanon only produces: 
a- Filastin al-Thawra; 
b-Wafa news agency, in addition to certain cultural and educational publications issued by 
palestinian organization for for their own use; 
c- The Palestinian side pledged that these publications would not touch upon the interests 
and sovereignty of Lebanon; 
d- The palestinian side adheres to the abstention form broadcasting in Lebanon; 
e- the Palestinian side pledges not to involve Lebanon in any of its publication or broadcast 
news items or announcements emanating from resistance sources in Lebanon. 
Controlling Contraventions and Offences 
Lebanese laws will be implemented on the basis of Lebanese sovereignty and offenders 
will be referred to the responsible courts. 
I- Contraventions in military sectors will be submitted to local liaison committees. In cases 
where no result is achieved, they will be referred to the Higher Coordination Committee 
which will give an immediate decision. 
2- Contraventions inside the camps will be the charge of the internal security forces in 
cooperation with the Palestine Armed Struggle Command, regarding the pursuit of all 
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crimes, civil or criminal, which occur within the camps whoever the offender. They will 
also be responsible for delivering all legal notices and orders pronounced against persons 
residing in the camps. Incidents occurring in the camps between the commandos which 
have a bearing on the security and safety of the Palestinian revolution will be excluded from 
this procedure and be the responsibility of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command. 
3- Contraventions outside the camps shall be subject to Lebanese law. The Palestinian 
Armed Struggle Command will be informed of detention and the procedures taken against 
offenders. In the case of commandos being apprehended in an offence and where the 
Lebanese authorities deem necessary the co-operation of the Palestine Armed Struggle 
command, contact will be made through the liaison committee and the decision on the 
offender will be left to the Lebanese authority. 
The Palestinian side condemned detention of any Lebanese or foreigners and the conduct of 
any investigation by resistance forces and pledged no repetition of such matters. 
Regarding traffic offences, it has been agreed previously that a census would be taken of 
cars with Lebanese number plates under the auspices of the Internal Security forces, and 
cars entering Lebanese territory under temporary licensing regulations of the customs 
authorities. Therefore any commando vehicle on Lebanese territory will be prohibited 
unless it carries a legal license according to Lebanese traffic regulation. 
Foreigners 
By the term Foreigners it meant not Arab commandos. The Palestinian side pledges to 
deport all foreigners with the exception of those engaged in non-combatant work of a 
civilian or humane nature (including doctors, nurses, translators and interpreters). 
Coordination 
Implementation will be supervised by the liaison Committee and its branches in accordance 
with the Palestinian side. 
Highly Confidential 
Aspiration of the Palestinain side After the Joint Meeting. 
Re-establishment of the atmosphere to is state before the incidents of 9 May 1973; 
Gradual easing of armed tension; 
Reduction of barriers of suspicion; 
Aspirations towards the cancellation of the emergency situation; 
Dealing with the matter of fugitives from the law particularly those persons pursued as a 
result of the incidents of 23 April 1969; 
Freeing of those persons detailed as a result of the incidents of 2 April 1973; 
Return of arms confiscated since 1970; 
Facilitation of employment for Palestinians resident in Lebanon 
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For the Palestinain side 
Lt Col Abal Zaim 
Abu Adnan 
AlSayyid Salah Salah 
For the Lebanese side 
Lt Col Ahmd AI-Haj 
Col Nazih Rashid (Col Salim Mogabghab 
Col Dib, Karnal 
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